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ABSTRACT 
 
 This study provides a historical analysis of the 1995 Chicago School Reform Act, 
as well as an analysis of the tenures of Chicago Public Schools Chief Executive Officers 
Paul Vallas and Arne Duncan.  It provides an analysis of words and actions of the two 
CEOs through the interpretive framework of Thomas Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of 
Authority.  The sources of authority are bureaucratic, psychological, technical-rational, 
professional and moral.  Each source of authority represents certain assumptions that are 
dominant if the particular source is primarily utilized.   
 This dissertation will answer six questions through the lens of Sergiovanni’s Five 
Sources of Authority: What were the skills, knowledge and dispositions that Mayor 
Daley sought from the CEO position for Paul Vallas; what were the skills knowledge and 
dispositions that the mayor sought for the CEO position for Arne Duncan; how did Paul 
Vallas and Arne Duncan respectively fulfill the CEO role, how did the leadership styles 
of the two CEOs compare; and what implications does the CEO model have for school 
governance and school leadership. 
 Newspaper sources such as the Chicago Tribune and the Chicago Sun-Times 
provided a rich source of data for the purposes of analyzing the words and actions of the 
CEOs related to how they fulfilled their roles.  Board reports and proceedings gathered 
from the Harold Washington Library as well as the Chicago Public School website were 
greatly utilized, along with primary documents held at the Chicago Public Schools 
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archives located at the CPS Central Offices located in downtown Chicago.   
 1 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Purpose of the Study 
 
 This dissertation will examine the tenures of two Chicago Public School (hereby 
referred to as CPS) Chief Executive Officers (hereby referred to as CEO): Paul Vallas 
and Arne Duncan.  The purpose of this examination is to define the role of “Chief 
Executive Officer” as it applied to the new leadership structure of the Chicago Public 
Schools, and to provide evidence of how well the role of CEO was carried out by Vallas 
and Duncan.    The researcher will use documents to examine the policies and practices 
of the two CEOs.  Paul Vallas’ administration spanned from 1995 to 2001, while Arne 
Duncan’s administration spanned from 2001 until 2008, when he was nominated to be 
Secretary of Education by then president-elect Barack Obama.  The researcher will 
provide a synopsis of the characteristics of a CEO in the private sector, as well as a 
synopsis of the district’s priorities as recommended by Governor Jim Edgar which 
influenced characteristics that Mayor Richard M. Daley required of the position and use 
those to determine the degree by which the two CEOs fulfilled the CEO role.   
 In order to define the CEO position for CPS, a comprehensive examination of 
each of the tenures of Vallas and Duncan will be provided.  In examining the tenures of 
the two CEOs, the researcher will specifically review their backgrounds and professional 
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experience, major programs and initiatives that were implemented, problems that 
occurred during their tenure as well as inherited problems, along with their words and 
actions as well as Mayor Daley’s words and actions related to educational decision 
making during each of their tenures.  Statements issued by Governor Edgar leading up to 
the signing of the Chicago School Reform Amendatory Act will be provided to serve as a 
framework as for the expectations of how the new governance structure was to be utilized 
to improve the district as far as the State was concerned.  The researcher will also provide 
a synopsis of how each CEO handled the change in authority vested into the school 
system, examining the manner by which Paul Vallas led as CPS’ first CEO, and 
reviewing how Arne Duncan functioned with those duties in comparison how Vallas did.   
The words and actions of Daley, Edgar, Vallas and Duncan will be examined 
through the lens of Thomas Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of Authority.  The five sources 
and their characteristics are as follows: 
1. Bureaucratic Authority: Micromanaging, teachers are subordinates, do what I 
say or else, expect and inspect, teacher performance is narrowed - who should 
I follow 
 
2. Psychological Authority: Teachers have needs, and if they are met at work, 
the work gets done as required, what is rewarded gets done, congenial climate, 
teachers don’t respond without rewards, performance is narrowed, why should 
I follow  
 
3. Technical Authority: Evidence defined by logic and scientific research, use 
research to identify best practice, standardize the work of teaching, 
performance is narrowed, what and how I should do something 
 
4. Professional Authority:  Teachers respond in light of common socialization, 
professional values, accepted tenets of practice and internalized expertise, 
purpose of scientific knowledge is to inform not prescribe practice, give 
teachers as much discretion as they need, require teachers to hold one another 
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accountable for meeting practice standards, performance is expansive, what 
is rewarding gets done 
 
5. Moral Authority:  Communities are defined by shared values, beliefs and 
commitments, people are motivated by emotions, felt obligation and duties 
derived from widely shared community values, ideas, and ideals, use of 
purposing and local school autonomy leads to covenantal communities and the 
source of authority changes from bureaucratic to moral, from secular to 
sacred, grounded in what is best for kids, performance is enhanced and 
sustained, what is good gets done 
 
Using the Five Sources of Authority as an interpretative framework provides a basis by 
which the researcher can compare the words and actions of the mayor as well as the two 
CEOs and determine the values that are used in decision-making processes.  Traditional 
leadership theory as related to the management and administration of educational 
organizations tend to endorse technical-rational expertise, bureaucratic authority and 
utilitarian motivational techniques as a basis for organizational decision-making.   
 For the purposes of this dissertation, CEO decisions will be judged based on the 
source of authority that the CEO utilized to ensure the compliance of CPS employees 
regarding the decision.  The decisions will fall into a particular source of authority based 
on “why” they should follow the directive.  The researcher will also use all available 
documentation to provide background information which led to the particular decision 
that was made by each CEO.    
Sergiovanni argues that the moral dimension of leadership is often ignored and 
needs to be placed at the forefront.  Although bureaucratic principles have their place, 
Sergiovanni contends that when the bureaucratic source of authority is emphasized, 
leaders prefer that the led do not question why they are doing things – they are supposed 
to just do them.  The reason behind following orders lies in the leader’s bureaucratic 
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position in the organization.  When the bureaucratic source of authority is emphasized 
along with psychological authority, the leader must micromanage to get things done.  The 
organization then reflects a “top to bottom, bottom to top” hierarchy that keeps people in 
their respective places within the organization.  In schools, teachers rely on leaders to 
dictate which tasks are to be done as well as how and when to get them done.  This 
reliance causes teachers to fall into a subordinate role rather than one of followership, 
which consists of individuals who are committed to the professional ideal and who are 
motivated by what is good.  Leadership that is based in professional and moral authority 
encourages self-management that reduces the need for direct leadership.1  In examining 
the tenures of the two CEOs appointed after the 1995 Chicago Amendatory Act, this 
dissertation will illustrate the sources of authority emphasized by Mayor Daley as well as 
Vallas and Duncan to determine the framework that Daley believed was best in managing 
the Chicago Public School District.    
Background to the Study 
In 1987, U.S. Secretary of Education, William Bennett, called Chicago’s schools 
the worst in the nation: “If it isn’t the last, I don’t know who is.  There can’t be very 
many cities that are worse.  Chicago is pretty much it.”2  The complex mix of machine 
politics, deindustrialization, “white flight,” business influence, financial troubles, 
ineffective board governance, failed desegregation attempts and teacher union influence 
makes it difficult to ascertain the predominant causes of the status of the Chicago Public 
                                                            
1Thomas J. Sergiovanni,  Moral Leadership: Getting to the Heart of School Improvement (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1992). 
 
2Casey Banas and Devonda Byers, “Chicago’s Schools Hit as Worst,” Chicago Tribune, 1987. 
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Schools at that time.  In 1988 and 2005, the city would experience two important reform 
efforts that greatly affected the governing structure of the school system.  The first reform 
effort would dramatically change the school governance structure of the Chicago Public 
School System, decentralizing authority from the central office into neighborhood 
schools.  The second reform act would amend the first set of reform efforts, keeping a 
great deal of community control while centralizing a great deal of authority at the top of 
the bureaucratic hierarchy.   
In 1988, the Illinois State Legislature passed the Chicago School Reform Act as a 
result of the efforts of grassroots school activists, public school advocacy groups, 
business leaders and legislators.3  The goal of this legislature was to decentralize central 
office authority and place power in the hands of individual school councils at each of the 
district’s schools.  The Local School Councils (LSCs) consisted of eleven members, 
which comprised of six parents, two community members, two teacher representatives, 
and the principal of the school.  LSCs were granted the power to hire and fire the 
principal, to set school policy, made budgetary decisions, as well as other key educational 
decisions.  Principals were taken off the tenure track and issued four-year performance 
contracts that LSCs monitored.  They were also given greater autonomy in hiring staff as 
well as allocating school funds.    
The 1988 law also created professional personnel advisory committees at each 
school that were made up of teachers.  The purpose of those committees was to deliver 
input regarding educational programming.  Sub districts would consist of a cluster of 
                                                            
3Illinois State General Assembly, Chicago School Reform Act, Public Act 85-1418, 1988. 
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schools separated by neighborhood boundary lines.  Each sub district was led by a sub 
district superintendent who was hired and fired by a group of representatives comprised 
of individuals from the various LSCs.  Another important change that the law 
implemented was an expansion of the central school board from 11 to 15 members, and a 
nominating commission that was created to select board members.  The nominating 
commission consisted of 22 parent and/or community members elected from each of the 
district’s sub district councils and five members appointed from the mayor.  The mayor 
selected the board members from a pool of three candidates nominated by the 
commission per school board position.   
The 1988 reform measures marked an attempt to share decision-making and 
accountability within the Chicago Public Schools.  Failed efforts at reform at the sub 
district level influenced reform advocates in Chicago to focus decision making at the 
school, instead of the sub district level.4  Alfred G. Hess Jr., one of the architects of the 
1988 reform act who had studied Chicago schools for over 25 years as a post-doctoral 
fellow at Northwestern University and later as executive director of the Chicago Panel on 
Public School Policy and Finance, argued that the vision of the process was one of 
collaboration.  Professional personnel advisory committees gave input on academic 
related items.  Principals had greater autonomy to make most important day-to-day 
decisions regarding the management of the school.  LSC members hired and fired 
principals and were a part of the school’s financial decision-making process.  Community 
                                                            
4A. G. Hess, Jr.,  “Community Participation or Control? From New York to Chicago,” Theory into 
Practice 38, no. 4, The Politics of Participation in School Reform (Autumn 1999): 220. 
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members facilitated the hiring and firing of sub district superintendents.  It was geared 
to be the perfect blend of local decision-making.   
After seven years decentralized decision-making, the mayor, along with state 
policy makers and various groups of stakeholders grew very frustrated with the 
decentralization structure.5  Wong and others argued that the dissatisfaction came from a 
number of sources.  First, student performance did not show significant improvement.  
Second, the formation of LSCs did not bring about a significant increase in parental 
involvement in school-related matters.  Third, a budgetary crisis ensued, causing the 
opening of school on time in September of 1995 to be in question.  Fourth, the school 
board was unable to restore public confidence in the system, and the aptitude of its top 
administrators was questionable.  Finally, Mayor Daley was frustrated because of the 
limitations placed on his ability to select board members.6 
In 1995, the Republican-controlled legislature passed a series of amendments to 
the 1988 Chicago School Reform Act.  This legislature was named the Chicago School 
Reform Amendatory Act.7  Among the major features of this reform was an attempt to 
institute a more effective set of checks and balances to the governance system, while 
ultimately centralizing the main governance functions.  The Amendatory Act changed 
                                                            
5Kenneth K. Wong and Gail L. Sunderman, “How Bureaucratic Are Big-City School Systems?,” 
Peabody Journal of Education 76, no. 3/4, Global Issues in Education (2001): 18. 
 
6Ibid. 
 
7Illinois State General Assembly, Chicago School Reform Amendatory Act, Public Act 89-0015, 
1995.   
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four major areas in CPS governance: the management structure, fiscal areas, the Board’s 
relationship with the Chicago Teachers Union, and school board governance.   
The management structure of the CPS was transformed into one that closely 
resembled a corporate-style management system.  The top positions within CPS were 
eliminated, and were replaced with corporate titles.  The superintendent position was 
eliminated, and replaced with the “CEO” distinction.  Daley was given the complete 
authority to appoint the CPS CEO.  In addition, the system would now be managed by a 
chief financial officer, a chief educational officer, a chief operating officer, and a chief 
purchasing officer, none of which were required to have educational credentials.   
Fiscally, the Board was not given additional funding, but was granted greater 
financial flexibility by streamlining state funding for the district by creating two block 
grants, one to pay for general education and one for educational services.  Also, sixteen 
of the district’s property tax categories were collapsed into a single operating levy.  The 
law also removed restrictions on outsourcing, allowing the district to accept bids for 
outside services.  The School Finance Authority was suspended, giving the Board of 
Trustees and Mayor Daley sole control over the management of finances.   
In regards to CPS relations with the Chicago Teachers Union, the law effectively 
limited the items on the table during contract discussions and placed a moratorium on 
strikes for eighteen months.  Important items taken off of the bargaining table were class 
size and teacher assignments.  Daley knew that those restrictions would lead to strained 
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relations between him and the union, and called them together to ask them not to fight 
the law.  In return, he would rescind most of those restrictions.8 
The school board would also experience a makeover.  The fifteen member board 
would be converted into a five member corporate-style board.  The nominating 
commission was abolished, and Daley was granted the authority to appoint all board 
members of his choosing.  Daley’s chief of staff Gerry Chico would be installed as the 
president of the new Reform Board of Trustees.  To the surprise of many, Local School 
Councils remained in tact.    
Significance of the Study 
In naming the former Chicago Transit Authority President Ron Huberman to run 
the Chicago Public School system in 2009, Mayor Richard M. Daley passed over Chief 
Education Officer Dr. Barbara Eason-Watkins, who was widely credited with sparking 
some of the system’s biggest improvements.  Eason-Watkins was the favorite candidate 
of U.S. Education Secretary and former CPS CEO Arne Duncan.  Huberman praised 
Eason-Watkins as “an unsung hero of the Chicago Public Schools.”  Many were not 
happy with the mayor’s decision.  In a prepared statement, Chicago Teacher’s Union 
President Marilyn Steward expressed disappointment that he did not appoint someone 
with a strong background in education.  “He has to understand that we are working with 
children with emotional and social issues coming into the classroom” Steward said.  
“You cannot manage something that you do not understand.”  Reverend Jesse Jackson 
                                                            
8Dorothy Shipps, “Updating Tradition: The Institutional Underpinnings of Modern Mayoral 
Control in Chicago Public Schools.”  In When Mayors Take Charge: School Governance in the City, edited 
by Joseph Viteritti (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 124. 
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said that Daley should have selected Eason-Watkins and called his selection 
“political.”  Julie Woestehoff, executive director of Parents United for Responsible 
Education, called the move “a disservice to the city of Chicago.”  
 Mayor Daley’s decision revived a long-running debate in urban education over 
who makes the better leader: the lifelong teacher-turned-administrator, or the super-
business manager that has never set foot in the classroom.  Daley has been clear about his 
preference: “The system repeatedly failed our children.  It is only after we separated the 
two—skilled educator and strong manager—that we started to see real reform.”9  Daley 
first executed this philosophy in 1995 when he was given complete control over 
managing the Chicago Public Schools.  The 1995 Illinois legislation allowed the 
Democratic mayor to select a “Chief Executive Officer” for the schools and appoint a 
powerful five-member board of education.10 
In light of the “Superintendent versus CEO” debate, this study will examine CPS 
CEOs Paul Vallas and Arne Duncan through the lens of Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of 
Authority to assist in answering the question regarding why Daley chose non-educators to 
run the district after the 1995 Amendatory Act.  While the Amendatory Act changed 
CPS’s governance structure and created the CEO title, Mayor Daley selected individuals 
to fill the roles that he believed were able to formulate solutions for the problems 
plaguing the district up to the 1995 Amendatory Act.  The words and actions of Daley 
                                                            
9Quotes from Huberman, Jackson, Woestehoff, and Daley taken from Sadovi, Carlos, and Dan  
Mihalopoulos. "Daley Standing by School Chief Choice - Huberman Appointment Called Political," 
Chicago Tribune, January 29, 2009. 
 
10Ann Bradley, “Chicago Mayor Poised to Take District’s Reigns,” Education Week 14, no. 39 
(1995): 1-2. 
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and the two CEO’s as related to their educational philosophies, political agendas, 
policies and practices during their tenures will be utilized to reveal the definition of an 
“Education CEO” according to CPS.   
After the 1995 Amendatory Act, Mayor Daley appointed individuals that did not 
have educational backgrounds to the CEO position.11  Shortly after former budget 
director Paul Vallas was appointed to the CPS CEO position in 1995, he stated: "There 
will be some headaches; there will also be improvements in what happens in the 
classroom. First, we'll be reaching out to all these interests, and then we'll have to have a 
meeting of the minds.  But whatever the case, the mayor has put Gery and me over here 
to bring financial stability to the system and improve education. And we don't expect to 
fail."12  Clearly, the goal of the mayor was to ensure that the Chicago Public Schools was 
run by an individual that could cut costs and balance the budget.  This would require an 
individual that could manage the massive CPS bureaucracy.  Wong and Sunderman 
argued that the word “bureaucracy” has gathered negative connotations over time, and it 
is simply seen as central control that exists to frustrate individuals whose charge is to 
carry out orders.13  In analyzing the Chicago Public School System, they argue that 
bureaucratic organization facilitates effective management by making it possible to create 
                                                            
11Paul Vallas claimed that he taught elementary school for a short period of time, but an 
investigation questioned if that was truly the case.  For the purposes of this dissertation, the researcher will 
classify him as a non-educator.   
 
12John Kass, ”City Schools Get Chief Who Rejects Failure,” Chicago Tribune, 1995. 
 
13Wong and Sunderman, 20. 
  
12
efficient systems to carry out financial and management tasks, and enhances the ability 
of the central office to tend to the interests of the district as a whole.   
  Additionally, this study intends to provide educational leaders with information 
to help them determine why educational reformers that backed the 1995 Chicago School 
Reform Act determined that the district should run like a business instead of utilizing a 
more traditional approach in line with school districts headed by an educational leader.  
Examining leadership decisions, the types of initiatives implemented by each leader, and 
the manner in which initiatives were executed through the lens of Sergiovanni’s Five 
Sources of Authority will help educational leaders to understand how the educational 
governance philosophy of the district affects the leadership philosophy throughout the 
district, all the way down to the classroom.   
Research Questions 
This study will answer the following research questions:  
1. Through the lens of Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of Authority, what were the 
skills, knowledge and dispositions that Mayor Daley sought from the CEO 
position for Paul Vallas during the years of 1995-2001 
2. Through the Lens of Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of Authority, what were the 
skills, knowledge and dispositions that Mayor Daley sought from the CEO 
position for Arne Duncan during the years of 2001-2008? 
3. Through the lens of Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of Authority, how did Paul 
Vallas fulfill the CEO role based on Mayor Daley’s criteria for the CPS CEO 
position?  
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4. Through the lens of Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of Authority, how did Arne 
Duncan fulfill the CEO role based on Mayor Daley’s criteria for the CPS CEO 
position?  
5. How did the leadership styles of the Paul Vallas and Arne Duncan compare 
through the lens of Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of Authority?  
6. What implications does the CEO model have for school governance and 
school leadership? 
Proposed Methodology 
 Gary McCulloch, in his book Documentary Research: In Education, History and 
the Social Sciences argues that documents can provide potent evidence of continuity and 
change in ideals and in practices in private and in the public arena.14  In the spirit of that 
argument, the methodology utilized for this study will be historical documentary 
research.  Primary and secondary sources will be used to gather words and actions of 
various individuals and applied to Sergiovanni’s framework to conduct the analysis.   
There are important distinctions between primary and secondary sources.  A 
primary source is a document or physical object which was written or created during the 
time under study.  These sources were present during an experience or time period and 
offer an inside view of a particular event. Some types of primary sources include:  
 Original Documents: Diaries, speeches, manuscripts, newspapers, letters, 
interviews, news film footage, autobiographies, official records   
 
                                                            
14Gary McCulloch, Documentary Research: In Education, History and the Social Sciences (Social 
Research and Educational Studies Series, 22) (New York: Routledge Falmer, 2004). 
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 Creative Works: Poetry, drama, novels, music, art   
 
 Relics or Artifacts: Pottery, furniture, clothing, buildings  
 
A secondary source interprets and analyzes primary sources. These sources are one or 
more steps removed from the event. Secondary sources may have pictures, quotes or 
graphics of primary sources in them. Some types of secondary sources include:  
 Publications: Textbooks, magazine articles, histories, criticisms, 
commentaries, encyclopedias   
 
Examples of secondary sources include:  
 
 A journal/magazine article which interprets or reviews previous findings 
   
 A history textbook   
 
 A book about the effects of WWI   
 
Through this study, the researcher will utilize public records from the Chicago 
Public Schools Archive located at 100 S. Clark Street in Chicago, and the Harold 
Washington Public Library in Chicago, including memos from Paul Vallas and Arne 
Duncan, and Board of Education Proceedings.   Other sources utilized will be doctoral 
dissertations related to CPS school leadership, educational journal articles, Chicago Sun 
Times and Chicago Tribune newspaper articles, Chicago Teacher’s Union publications, 
and televised speeches and presentations.  Documents such as Board Proceedings, state 
legislative documents, and other related documents will provide the evidence necessary 
to outline policies and procedures while newspaper accounts and other related sources are 
utilized to give readers a feel for how individuals responded to certain situations at that 
time.  Direct quotes are utilized often as a rich source of evidence to illustrate how the 
mayors and CEOs utilized media savvy to promote their agendas. 
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In analyzing historical documents, issues of reliability, bias and authenticity 
become relevant.  The researcher of this study must take those issues into consideration 
when using particular documents to tell a story.  Newspaper articles that may describe 
particular initiatives implemented by a CPS CEO may not be objective in its reporting of 
a story.  An article in a Chicago Teacher’s Union journal may not accurately reflect 
unbiased information.  However, the usage of such documents is critical in examining the 
reaction of the public when certain initiatives were implemented and also in gauging who 
was involved in the implementation.   
Limitations of the Study 
 The researcher acknowledges that this study is subject to certain limitations.  In 
researching the words and actions of Governor Jim Edgar, Mayor Richard M. Daley, Paul 
Vallas, and Arne Duncan, the researcher is limited to available documentation that may 
not always completely illustrate the true feelings of the speaker.  With newspaper articles 
as a primary means of capturing the statements of individuals regarding particular events 
and actions, the speaker will usually utilize caution in revealing information, which may 
limit the perspective that is presented concerning the individuals that are examined in this 
study.   
 Another limitation of this study includes the failure to include direct interviews 
from the individuals examined in this study.  Although the researcher contends that this 
study will provide sufficient perspectives through available documentation, it would have 
been interesting to include interviews from the individuals examined in this study if it 
were feasible to do so.  This study is designed to utilize documents to present an account 
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of the individual’s words and actions at that time, as opposed to their current 
perspective in retrospect.   
 Finally, this study is limited to the words and actions of individuals examined in 
this study to determine the definition of the educational CEO in Chicago.  Although 
similar circumstances exist in other major cities, Chicago’s public school history is 
unique and therefore resulted in a different approach to their educational governance 
structure.  Therefore, this study provides a historical background of mayoral control in 
the public school systems of several major cities, but does not intend to present a 
framework as to how major public school systems should be run.   
Biases of Researcher 
 The researcher acknowledges personal biases that could potentially affect the 
presentation of information within this study.  In order to maintain the integrity of this 
study, the researcher has identified all potential biases and maintains a personal journal 
for the purposes of recording personal reactions and opinions formed throughout the 
collection and presentation of data.   
 The researcher acknowledges that he is African-American male, who personally 
attended a Chicago Public School from grades kindergarten through fourth grade.  The 
researcher did not have a particularly positive experience in general, and was removed 
and placed into parochial schools after completing the fourth grade.  This negative 
opinion of public schooling could skew the presentation of information presented. 
 The researcher acknowledges that he is an educational leader in a Chicago Public 
School under the current educational governance structure that is examined in this study.  
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He has personally been affected by decisions made as a result of the current 
governance structure.  He has participated in conversations with other CPS administrators 
that have questioned the effectiveness of a non-educator leading our school system.  The 
researcher acknowledges that in order to maintain the integrity of this study, it is vital that 
his personal opinions regarding the governance structure of CPS do not affect his 
research or presentation of information.   
Proposed Chapters 
Chapter II, A Historical Perspective of Mayoral Control of Schools in the United 
States, will provide a historical summation of state takeovers of school districts, as well 
as cities that have instituted varying degrees of mayoral control.  This historical review 
will give readers a background of problems and issues that have plagued other major 
urban school districts as well as a framework for how they have elected to repair their 
schools with increased mayoral control.  Major cities that experienced significant 
mayoral control included Boston, who would begin the charge in 1991, followed by 
Chicago in 1995, Baltimore in 1997, Cleveland in 1998, New York City in 2002, and the 
District of Columbia in 2007 (partial in 2002).  The chapter ends with an in-depth 
examination of the history of mayoral control in 20th century Chicago, events leading up 
to the 1988 Chicago School Reform Act, followed by an examination of the Chicago 
School Reform Amendatory Act, which were major revisions that were implemented in 
1995.  The major revisions included an abolishment of the 15 member board of education 
to allow for the mayor to appoint a five member School Reform Board of Trustees, the 
elimination of the “General Superintendent” position in favor of a “Chief Executive 
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Officer,” increased authority for principals, a reversal of previous decentralization 
efforts, a decrease in the Chicago Teachers Union bargaining rights, and increased 
flexibility in the use of state and local funds for the school board.  This chapter will also 
illustrate the rationale for the implementation of the two acts.  Finally, this chapter will 
analyze the words and actions of Governor Edgar as well as Mayor Daley leading up to 
his selection of the first CPS CEO to determine the skills, knowledge and dispositions 
that he sought from the CEO as well as compare those traits to the traits of a corporate 
CEO.     
 Chapter III will examine the tenure of CEO Paul Vallas and analyze his words 
and actions through the lens of Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of Authority.  Vallas was the 
first to function under the title “CEO.”  Preceding this title change was a perception that 
the system was prone to all sorts of problems stemming from a lack of focus on learning 
and effective fiscal management.  The State of Illinois, after years of providing 
considerable resources and emergency funding worked with the city to develop a plan to 
bring better management into the Chicago Public Schools.  In 1995, a reform movement 
passed by the State and supported by the City of Chicago led to the mayor’s appointment 
of a new oversight Reform Board of Trustees. With that change, a new management team 
was formed to lead the Chicago Public Schools.  Along with the new management team, 
the law eliminated the title of “General Superintendent” and replaced it with “Chief 
Executive Officer.”  The CEO title came with increased flexibility across certain funding 
categories, and broader powers of remediation to intervene in failing schools.  This 
allowed the CEO to hold schools more accountable for results, which made 
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“accountability” a major theme of Vallas’ tenure.   
 Chapter IV will examine the tenure of CEO Arne Duncan and also analyze his 
words and actions through the lens of Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of Authority.  In 2001, 
Mayor Daley showed displeasure in the decrease in student achievement test scores and 
shortly thereafter, the school board president resigned, followed by CEO Paul Vallas.  
Mayor Daley then turned to the former Deputy Chief of Staff to Paul Vallas, Arne 
Duncan.  Duncan’s tenure would be marked by his management of the district in light of 
the No Child Left Behind Act, signed by former president George W. Bush in 2002.   
The final chapter will contain an analysis of the words and actions of the two 
CEOs as compared to the words and actions of Governor Edgar and Mayor Daley in 
regards to what type of leader he wanted for the purposes of running the school system, 
as well as initiatives that came directly from the mayor.  This chapter will also contain a 
comparison between the leadership styles of the two CEOs to analyze similarities and 
differences in how they ran the district during their tenures.  The researcher will use the 
comparison to determine if there are trends and patterns of decision making that are 
exclusive to each leader according to the Five Sources of Authority.  Additionally, this 
study will apply the arguments of Wong and Sergiovanni in regards to their views on 
effective school leadership.  Wong argues that when power and authority are 
decentralized and dispersed throughout the system, it leaves room for organized groups to 
emphasize their own agendas.15  Sergiovanni argues that individuals inherently work best 
when the work is satisfying and meaningful.  In this instance, individuals work for the 
                                                            
15Wong and Sunderman, 25. 
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professional ideal and for what is good.  A top down bureaucracy will not cultivate 
followership, which is necessary to transform organizations.  For the school leader, this 
dissertation will provide an examination into the tenures of Vallas and Duncan to 
highlight policies and reform efforts designed to improve the state of the Chicago Public 
Schools.  Although the focus of this dissertation is not to judge the effectiveness of their 
leadership styles on student achievement, school leaders will be able to draw some 
conclusions regarding the usage of the CEO model to run a school system and its effect 
on producing effective school governance outcomes.  This chapter will also contain 
implications for leadership as well as implications for further research.     
Key Terms 
Bureaucracy – A way of organizing work through an administrative structure 
that defines authority and specifies the actions of those who occupy hierarchically 
arranged offices.  Authority is exercised through the hierarchical ordering of relationships 
and systems of communication.  Central to bureaucratic management is the specialized 
professional knowledge possessed by the person holding a particular office.  Impersonal 
relationships are assumed to assure the detachment necessary for efficiency to govern 
administrative decisions.16 
Busing – Mandatory busing plans were implemented to transport students from 
all black schools to all white schools.  The objectives for mandatory busing included 
relieving overcrowding in sending schools, the promotion of stabilization in the 
communities involved, increase the desegregation in the areas involved, and to improve 
                                                            
16Ibid., 19. 
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the educational experiences for all students involved.17  It is widely argued that 
mandatory busing led to “white flight.” 
Chief Executive Officer – Top executive responsible for a firm’s overall 
operations and performance.  He or she is the leader of the firm, serves as the main link 
between the board of directors and the firm’s various parts or levels, and is held solely 
responsible for the firm’s success or failure. CEO implements and maintains corporate 
policy as established by the board and may also function as the chairman of the board.18    
Decentralization – In regards to school reform, there are two perspectives related 
to decentralization.  The managerial view refers to the transfer of authority from a higher 
level of a bureaucracy to a lower one in order to give local officials more flexibility in 
responding to particular needs.  The second view is termed local mandate representation, 
which states that a representative should respond to the individual’s best interest so that 
the individual is pleased.  In order to properly respond to community needs, extensive 
community involvement in decision-making is necessary to ensure that administrative 
decentralization is not an empty gesture.  In other words, managerial decentralization can 
take place without citizens playing any role, and thus comes a failure to implement 
community wishes.19 
                                                            
17Dionne Danns, "Racial Ideology and the Sanctity of the Neighborhood School in Chicago," 
Urban Review: Issues and Ideas in Public Education 40, no. 1 (March 1, 2008): 66. 
 
18www.businessdictionary.com, BusinessDictionary.com, 2010. 
 
19James G. Cibulka, Obstacles to School Decentralization: The Chicago Case (1974), 2, 7-8. 
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Desegregation – The term “desegregation” literally means to cease to be 
segregated.  In regards to school enrollment patterns and the racial composition of 
students in public schools, the landmark Brown v. Board case dealt only with de jure 
segregation, which is intentional segregation.  Since then, a great deal of attention has 
been placed on de facto segregation, which is segregation that occurs as a result of the 
racial segregation that occurs as a result of neighborhood settlement patterns.20   
Inequalities between schools with a majority white student enrollment and schools with a 
majority black student enrollment were found in the 1950’s, and schools in major urban 
areas would soon have to implement mandatory desegregation plans.  Resistance to 
desegregation efforts would ultimately render court ordered mandatory desegregation 
meaningless because there were so few whites left in the public school system by the 
1980’s.21 
Deindustrialization – This term is generally used to refer to the structural change 
in the economy that occurs as a result of the shift from a goods-producing manufacturing 
industrial economy to a more high-technology service-producing economy.  A direct 
impact of this structural change is the loss of manufacturing jobs in the inner cities, and 
an increase in the demand for service-producing workers who typically need a relatively 
                                                            
20Advisory Panel on Integration of the Public Schools, Integration of the Public Schools--
Chicago; Report to the Board of Education, City of Chicago, 1964. 
 
21John L. Rury, “Race, Space, and the Politics of Chicago's Public Schools: Benjamin Willis and 
the Tragedy of Urban Education,” History of Education Quarterly 39, no. 2 (06/01/1999): 138. 
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high level of education.  Those trends suggest a link in the formation of poverty areas 
in major metropolitan areas.22   
Educational Crisis – CPS schools that met the criteria to of a school in the midst 
of an educational crisis would receive intervention from central office, the principal could 
be fired and the LSC members could be removed.  Examples of the criteria that could be 
used were: The failure of the principal to develop or implement a school improvement 
plan, the failure of the principal to provide a safe building for students and staff, and a 
non-functional LSC.23 
Intervention – Different from reconstitution, a school that was determined to be 
in intervention status were placed under the direct control of the CEO who could dismiss 
teachers directly for non-performance.24 
LSC – Elected bodies which consist of six parents, two community members, two 
teachers, and the principal.  The LSC chairperson must be a parent representative.  LSC’s 
major responsibilities are to approve the school budget and school improvement plan, 
evaluate the principal every year and to decide on the renewal of a principal’s contract 
every four years. 
Patronage – Political patronage is a form of constituency service that serves the 
electoral needs of incumbent politicians.  Chicago political machines regained control of 
                                                            
22Julian Chun-Chung Chow, "The Changing Structure of Neighborhood Social Conditions in 
Cleveland, Ohio, 1979-1989,” PhD diss., Case Western Reserve University, 1992, 30, 92. 
 
23Chicago Public Schools.  Board of Education Proceedings.  Board of Education, City of 
Chicago, September, 1995.  Harold Washington Library, Chicago, Illinois, 15-17. 
 
24Chicago Public Schools.  Board of Education Proceedings.  Board of Education, City of 
Chicago, June, 2000.  Harold Washington Library, Chicago, Illinois, 79-84. 
  
24
the public schools in part through the issuance of patronage appointments in the non-
teaching positions.25  
Political Machines – A political machine is a political organization where the 
boss gains the support of followers who receive rewards for their efforts.  In Chicago, 
machine politics were infused in the schools by the use of the expanding school system to 
reward business and machine supporters with custodial jobs and building projects.   Black 
Chicago was eventually brought into the machine though the building of additional 
schools in black neighborhoods.26 This practice inadvertently reinforced the segregation 
of students in neighborhood schools.   
Primary Source – Refers to basic raw materials (such as government papers, 
diaries, and newspapers) which were created within the period of time that is studied.27    
Reconstitution – The process of reconstitution involves the re-staffing of all 
employees in a school.  Each employee of the school would have to interview for their 
positions.  If not hired, they would be put into a reserve pool where they would be paid 
until they found another job.  The decision to utilize reconstitution was determined by the 
CEO.   
School Board – Local school boards exercise responsibility for the decision and 
policymaking for individual school districts.  Local school boards of education are 
                                                            
25Jim Carl, "Good Politics Is Good Government: The Troubling History of Mayoral Control of the 
Public Schools in Twentieth-Century Chicago,” American Journal of Education 115, no. 2 (02/01/2009): 
316. 
 
26Ibid., 315. 
 
27McCulloch, 30. 
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charged with creating the conditions within their school districts that will foster student 
achievement and for engaging the community in support of this central mission.   Primary 
duties include establishing specific priorities for improving student learning and school 
performance, ensuring staff and resource allocations meet district goals, aligning 
programs and initiatives with student achievement priorities, and leveraging resources to 
address the needs of all students.28 
Secondary Source – The books and articles produced later by historians studying 
a particular period of time, making use of primary documents within.29 
White Flight – Refers to the change in school enrollment patterns due to the loss 
of middle class white students in the Chicago Public School system due to 
suburbanization, and enrollment of white students in to private and parochial schools.  
This loss is argued to be due to onset of desegregation efforts.30  
                                                            
28National Association of State Boards of Education, http://www.nasbe.org/index.php/section-
table/32-faq-sbe/376-sb-different-local-sb. 
 
29McCulloch, 30. 
 
30Rury, “Race, Space and the Politics,” 140. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF MAYORAL CONTROL OF 
 
SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
Introduction 
 
 Historically, the management of American schools was treated as other city 
municipalities, and was the direct responsibility of the city mayor.1  Progressive era 
reformers of the 20th century did not approve of that arrangement, determining that 
mayors were subject to the political machines that often dominated local politics.2  
Progressive reformers fought to separate the educational system from other governmental 
departments by creating separate school districts with dedicated revenue streams.3  As of 
late, city and state takeover of public school systems has gained prominence as a school 
reform strategy.  This has been a manifestation of the growing concern of policymakers, 
educators and parents regarding the state of the nation’s public schools.  The 1990’s in 
particular saw the emergence of a “new style” of mayor interested in taking a strong 
                                                            
1Edelstein Fritz, Mayoral Leadership and Involvement in Education: An Action Guide for Success 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Conference of Mayors, 2006). 
 
2Jeffery Henig, “Mayoral Control: What We Can and Cannot Learn From Other Cities,” In When 
Mayors Take Charge: School Governance in the City, edited by Joseph Viteritti (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2009). 
 
3Ibid. 
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leadership role in their city’s school system.4  Major cities that experienced significant 
mayoral control included Boston, who would begin the charge in 1991, followed by 
Chicago in 1995, Baltimore in 1997, Cleveland in 1998, New York City in 2002, and the 
District of Columbia in 2007 (partial in 2002).5   
Mayor-appointed school districts are often the manifestation of the state takeover 
of school districts.  As of 2002, 24 states had enacted policies that allowed them to take 
over a school district if it was experiencing academic difficulties.  States could also take 
over a school district due to financial mismanagement, corrupt governance and failing 
infrastructure.6  In a policy brief for the Educational Commission of the States, Todd 
Ziebarth outlined many opposing perspectives on the state takeover of schools.  He 
argued that according to proponents of the approach, state takeovers are a necessary 
extension of a state’s constitutional responsibilities, they provide a good opportunity for 
state and local decision makers to combine resources and knowledge to improve 
children’s learning, allow a competent executive staff to guide the effective 
implementation of improvement efforts, and use achievement data collected from school 
districts and schools to bolster accountability efforts.  He also argues that opponents of 
this approach assert that state takeovers imply that the community has the problems and 
                                                            
4Kenneth K. Wong, Francis X. Shen, Dorothea Anagnostopoulos, and Stacey Rutledge, The 
Education Mayor: Improving America's Schools (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2007). 
 
5Michael Kirst, “Mayoral Control of Schools: Politics, Trade-offs, and Outcomes.”  In When 
Mayors Take Charge: School Governance in the City, edited by Joseph Viteritti (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 46. 
 
6T. Ziebarth, State Takeovers and Reconstitutions Policy Brief. Prepared for the Education 
Commission of the States, 2002. 
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the states have the answers, place poorly prepared state-selected officials in charge, use 
narrow learning methods, focus on cleaning up incompetent administration and fail to go 
to the root of the social problems facing disadvantaged students in urban school districts, 
and foster negative connotations and impressions that hinder the self-esteem of school 
board members, administrators, teachers, students and parents.7 
Extent of Mayoral Control 
 For school districts that have been turned over to the mayor for reform, the 
amount of mayoral control varies by the city.  Kenneth Wong and Francis Shen have 
done extensive work regarding the research of mayoral control of school districts and the 
effects that mayoral takeover have on school performance.  In an essay written for 
education week, they outlined the powers of mayors in regards to the selection of school 
boards8, and in their book, The Education Mayor: Improving America’s Schools, they 
provided a chart of characteristics of school districts with mayor-led integrated 
governance.9  A summary of that research is provided to illustrate some of those 
characteristics for major cities that have elected to utilize various degrees of mayoral 
control.   
                                                            
7Ibid. 
 
8Kenneth Wong and Francis Shen, “Mayors Can Be Prime Movers’ of Urban School 
Improvement,” Education Week 14, no. 7 (2009): S11-S13. 
 
9Wong, Shen et al., The Education Mayor. 
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Major Cities With a Significant Extent of Mayoral Control of Schools 
In Boston, Massachusetts as of 1992, the mayor picks a seven-member school 
committee from a list of names nominated by a screening panel and then the committee 
chooses the superintendent.  The mayor selects the majority of the school board but does 
not have full appointment power.  In Chicago, Illinois as of 1995, the mayor directly 
appoints a Chief Executive Officer, and also selects the seven members of the board of 
education.  He appoints all of the board members and has full appointment power.  In 
Baltimore, Maryland as of 1997, the mayor and governor jointly appoint the nine 
members of the school board from a list of qualified individuals submitted by the state 
board of education.  This means that the mayor does not have full appointment power.  In 
Cleveland, Ohio as of 1998, the mayor appoints the nine members of the school board 
from a slate of nominees selected by a local nominating panel.  In this instance, the 
mayor appoints all of the board but does not have full appointment power.  In New York 
City, New York as of 2002, the mayor has the authority to appoint the chancellor of 
schools (equivalent of traditional superintendent), and 8 of 13 members of what is called 
the Panel for Educational Policy.  The mayor has full appointment power.  In 
Washington, D.C. as of 2007, the mayor has governance authority previously held by the 
D.C. board of education but city council retains budgetary oversight.   
Smaller Cities With a Significant Extent of Mayoral Control of Schools 
In New Haven, Connecticut, since 1990, the mayor actually serves on the board of 
education, and appoints the seven additional members of the board with full appointment 
power.  In Providence, Rhode Island beginning before 1990, the mayor appoints the nine-
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member school board from a slate of candidates developed by the Providence School 
Board Nominating Commission. In Trenton, New Jersey, beginning previously to 1990, 
the mayor appoints the nine-member board of education with full appointment power.  In 
Yonkers, New York, since previously to 1990, the mayor appoints the nine-member 
board of education.  In Harrisburg, Pennsylvania as of 2000, the mayor appoints all five 
members of the board of education and has full appointment power. 
Cities With Lesser Degrees of Mayoral Control 
In Oakland, California from 2000-2004, the school board was expanded from 
seven to ten, which the three new board members appointed by the mayor.  The mayor 
has full appointment power for the three board members.  In Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 
the mayor appoints two of the five members of what is called the School Reform 
Commission, and the governor appoints the other three.  Unlike in Baltimore, the mayor 
and governor’s selections are separate instead of jointly done.  In Hartford, Connecticut, 
as of 2005, the mayor appoints five of nine board of education members, including the 
president of the board.  Before 2005, the school board was appointed by a mix of mayoral 
and state authorities, but currently, the mayor has full appointment power.  In Detroit, 
Michigan from 1999-2004, the mayor appointed six of seven school board members.  The 
seventh member was the state superintendent of public instruction.  The mayor had full 
appointment power.  In 2004, Detroit residents voted in a 2004 referendum to return to an 
elected school board for five years, and then the mayor would appoint all seven members.   
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Cities in Which Mayoral Control Has Largely Taken Hold 
Boston 
 In the 1970’s Boston, like many cities in the country, struggled with the 
integration of African Americans into public schools.  Boston’s racial issues were so 
highly publicized that business and political leaders vowed that their city would never 
again be “dragged through the mud.”10  Usdan and Cuban argue that the backlash against 
the racial conflict and the national embarrassment that took place as a result of their 
struggles with integration led to the early efforts of the city reformers to press for 
restructuring the way Boston schools were governed.  The 1970’s through the 1980’s saw 
the Boston schools become political battlegrounds.  In addition to desegregation issues, 
the separation of the school department from the general government created 
fragmentation and limited accountability.  Infighting between departments made 
desegregation efforts even more difficult.  Although reform efforts surfaced starting in 
the early 1970’s, those efforts were overshadowed by the fact that between 1974 and the 
late 1980’s, the U.S. District Court had issued more than four hundred court orders 
involving  school closings, personnel decisions, textbook adoption and community 
partnerships.11   
                                                            
10Michael Usdan and Larry Cuban, “Boston: The Stars Finally in Alignment.”  In Powerful 
Reforms with Shallow Roots: Improving America’s Urban Schools, edited by Michael Usdan and Larry 
Cuban (New York: Teachers College Press, 2003). 
 
11John Portz and Robert Schwartz, “Governing the Boston Public Schools: Lessons in Mayoral 
Control.”  In When Mayors Take Charge: School Governance in the City edited by Joseph Viteritti 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009). 
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Typically, Boston’s mayor did not involve himself in school administration.  
However, in the early 1970’s, it was becoming increasingly clear to Boston Mayor Kevin 
White that if changes were not made, court ordered desegregation would occur and he 
would be forced to deal with them.  This would prompt White to attempt to gain control 
of Boston’s schools.  That attempt was unsuccessful.  In October of 1980, after racial 
tensions led to fighting between black and white students at South Boston High School, 
White was asked if the Boston Schools were in “crisis.”  He replied: “Yes, I think the 
schools are traumatized, but that is not the fault of the mayor.  The Mayor had nothing to 
do with South Boston High School…”12    
In the 1980’s, criticisms of Boston’s education system continued, and in 1983, the 
school committee grew from five members to thirteen.   In 1984, the newly elected 
Raymond Flynn would declare his wishes for control of the Boston Public School 
system: 
For the longest period of time there has been aggravation and hostility (in 
relations between the city and the school committee).13  I think it’s real 
important to send a real positive message.  I hope to see, in the near future, 
public education returned to the city.  We have to build up confidence that 
we are, in fact, serious about moving public education forward.14 
 
In his first year, Mayor Flynn was invited to serve on the school board as an ex-officio 
member without voting privileges.  He never fully assumed the seat, but attended some 
committee meetings.  He would later find out that his unofficial status meant that he had 
                                                            
12John Yang, “White’s View on the Schools: Not my fault,” Boston Globe, 1980.  
 
13Boston referred to their “school board” as “school committee.”   
 
14Anonymous, “Flynn Speech to Education Panel: A Signal,” Boston Globe, 1984.  
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very little leverage with the school board.  In January of 1985, the school board hired 
nine individuals and promoted three, despite the mayor’s educational advisor’s 
recommendation not to do so.15  For the next few years, Flynn hesitated to involve 
himself heavily with school politics.   
By 1989, public education in Boston was the target of widespread criticism.  
Flynn then began to push education reform to the top of his agenda.  In September of 
1988, Flynn appointed an eleven member advisory committee to examine Boston school 
governance and other problematic issues.  John Portz cites that the study declared that 
“frustration with school performance (in Boston) has reached an all time high.”16  The 
advisory committee reached a consensus in favor of turning the 13 member school 
committee into a panel appointed to the mayor, citing that the current structure made 
critical decision making difficult.  When Flynn was directly asked if he was ready to 
campaign for an appointive school committee, Flynn’s response was “I’m going to play it 
on the basis of what I think will work.  If I see it, we’ll go for it.  We have to find out 
what has the confidence of the people of the city.”17  However, Flynn was clearly 
expressed frustrated with the current school governance structure of Boston Schools: 
Being mayor, if the parks of this city aren’t working, or the swings are 
broken, or the benches are broken, I know what I’ll do.  I’ll get on the 
phone to the parks commissioner and growl, and they’ll get fixed.  But 
calling the School Department with such a request is to confront a system 
                                                            
15Anonymous, “School Board Hires 9 Despite Flynn Advice, Boston Globe, 1985.  
 
16John Portz, “Problem Definitions and Policy Agendas: Shaping the Educational Agenda in 
Boston,” Policy Studies Journal 24, no. 3 (October 1, 1996): 371. 
 
17Peter Howe, “Flynn Group Favoring Appointed School Panel,” Boston Globe, 1989.  
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that some up with 59 different answers… a central bureaucracy that goes 
around in circles at Court Street without ever making a decision.18 
 
The Flynn administration would seek three important changes in the Boston School 
System: A new student assignment plan to make busing more efficient, more authority 
and accountability for school leaders and teachers, as well as changes in how the schools 
were governed.    
In November of 1989, a citywide advisory referendum on the issue would take 
place.  Leading up to the nonbinding referendum, Flynn spent approximately $65,000 on 
a last minute advertising campaign.  Flynn urged voters to give Boston school children “a 
new school board that will stop wasting time and tax dollars.”19  Flynn would continue to 
openly criticize the school governance structure and the Boston School System:  
Right now everyone has the right to vote and look at what they’re voting 
for.  It’s a terrible school system.  Individually, they’re fine people but it’s 
the structure that’s inherently flawed.  No matter who is on the committee, 
the first thing they have to worry about is getting reelected.  I think that if 
you want to get into politics, then run for City Council.  Politics does not 
belong in the schools.20 
 
Later in the year, Flynn would even solicit parent support, sending letters to 100 parents.  
Despite strong efforts to sway voters, the referendum yielded mixed results.  An equal 
number of committee members supported an appointed committee as well as opposed it.  
This would temporarily freeze efforts to convert to an appointed committee until efforts 
resumed in 1990, and in April of 1991, the city council voted to forward a petition to the 
                                                            
18Ibid.  
 
19Diego Ribadeneira, “Flynn’s Referendum on School Committee: A Clear Test of his Popularity,” 
Boston Globe, 1989.  
 
20Ibid. 
  
35
state to create a seven-member committee appointed by the mayor.  Under the new 
system, a thirteen-member nominating committee would be appointed by the mayor to 
review applications and recommend three individuals for each open committee position.  
Black members of city council continued to strongly debate the decision to change the 
governance structure, arguing that an appointed board would not represent and address 
the concerns of the black community.  Despite criticism, Flynn appointed seven 
individuals out of the people recommended from the nominating committee to begin their 
terms in January of 1992.   
 This significant shift to mayoral control in Boston would begin an era of change 
which changed many roles and left questions as to how leadership would function with 
the new control issued to the mayor.  Superintendent Lois Harrison-Jones, who was hired 
by the previous board who was elected, would now have to answer to the new mayor-
elected board.  Mayor Flynn and Harrison-Jones began to have disagreements which 
would often become news stories in the Boston Globe.  In addition to that, Flynn 
appointed his top aide, Robert Consalvo, as executive secretary of the committee.  This 
was a position that did not exist previous to Flynn gaining control.  Questions would arise 
concerning his appointment, where board members as well as community members 
openly criticized the appointment because of the cost of his position, as well as the 
possibility that he was there to ensure that the mayor controlled the board.  Controversies 
would continue as the newly appointed school board made decisions in an attempt to 
improve the Boston School system.  Many accused the new board of being the mayor’s 
“rubber stamp.”  The controversies would subside some when Mayor Flynn resigned to 
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join the Clinton administration as the ambassador to the Vatican in mid-1993.  Thomas 
Menino, the city council president, became acting mayor, and later won the special 
election held that November.   
Menino would immediately begin the process of change by demanding the 
resignations of all of Boston’s city department heads-all but the superintendent of 
schools, Lois Harrison-Jones.  “I look forward to working with Lois Harrison-Jones to 
improve the quality of education for all the students of Boston,” says Menino.  “As far as 
I’m concerned, her job is secure.”21  Many of Boston’s public was surprised by his 
decision not to ask for her resignation.  Although the school superintendent and the heads 
of the Boston Redevelopment Authority and the Department of Health and Hospitals 
could not be fired by the mayor because they were appointed by the boards that run those 
agencies, that did not stop Menino from asking everyone except Harrison-Jones to resign 
anyway.   
Intent on taking an active role in the decision making process within Boston 
Schools, Menino did not take long to assume an active role in school governance.  A little 
over a month after becoming the mayor, he would unveil plans to create a year-long boot 
camp for fifty of Boston’s most troubled students.  Menino stated: “It’s an alternate 
program for these kids to get them back into the mainstream.  It’s better to do this than 
spend $50,000 on putting them in jail.”22  This plan would soon draw criticism from the 
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NAACP, and supposedly drew disappointment from Harrison-Jones, who reportedly 
wondered why she was not included in the planning of the boot camp.23  This would 
serve as the beginning of a series of disagreements that ultimately ended with Menino 
asking Harrison-Jones to resign.   
Menino continued to exert direct influence on educational affairs, setting a 
deadline on plans for improving schools for the Boston Compact, which was a 
partnership of businesses, higher education, parents and community agencies.  Menino 
stated:  
The goals we put forth today are the right goals.  I am now challenging 
everyone who pursues partnerships and collaborative efforts in our schools 
to develop a strategic plan…that will detail how these efforts fit together.  
And I want this strategic plan on my desk by June 15.24 
 
In a move that was done to help improve his working relationship with Boston’s 
Superintendent, Menino invited Harrison-Jones to serve on his cabinet.  “Lois Harrison-
Jones will be the person who sits on the Cabinet,” Menino said.  “This is my way of 
reaching out.  The schools are so important to me.  If we don’t do something in the next 
two years, they are gone.”25 However, this truce would only last a short time.  By the end 
of the year in 1994, the Boston Globe put out several reports indicating that board 
members and the mayor encouraged Superintendent Harrison-Jones to step down from 
her post.  In January of 1995, she delivered the following quote: 
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The superintendent is the leader, the person who should set the pace.  The 
difference between Boston and other places is that Boston will not respect 
the agenda or the plan or the vision put forth by the superintendent.  It has 
happened here for the past two decades…I am very serious about my work 
and I work hard at what I do.  I have very little time or inclination for 
politicizing children’s lives and education.  If Boston is to take its schools 
seriously, it has to get politics out of schools.26   
 
Harrison-Jones stood strong and did not step down from the superintendent position.  
However, she was later informed that her contract which would expire in July would not 
be renewed.  After a broad search process, Thomas Payzant, assistant secretary in the 
United States Department of Education, and former superintendent, was offered Boston’s 
superintendent position and assumed the post in September of 1995.   
Portz and Schwartz argued that at this point in Boston School history, the key 
ingredients for the governance of school reform were now in place.27  At this point, the 
mayor had been responsible in directly appointing five of the seven board members, as 
well as the superintendent.  Payzant remained superintendent for nearly eleven years, 
which broke a trend in Boston (as well as other major urban school districts) which saw a 
new superintendent about every five years or less.  Mayor Thomas Menino, since elected 
in 1993, continues as mayor as of this writing.  The chair of the school committee would 
maintain her post for ten years.  The president of the Boston Teacher’s Union served at 
his post for twenty years, until 2003, when he would be replaced by a long-time Boston 
teacher and union member.  Portz and Schwartz would contend that this alignment of 
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individuals played an important role in fostering communication and cooperation 
around school improvement.28   
In January of 1996, Mayor Menino would make a statement that solidified his 
stance on the improvement of the Boston School system and informed the public as to 
who to blame if it failed: 
I want to be judged as your mayor by what happens now in the Boston 
public schools.  If I fail to bring about these specific reforms by the year 
2001, then judge me harshly.29 
 
The Boston public was behind him, and the current school governance structure 
continued to earn support as well, as evidenced by the results when the issue was put on 
the ballot for voters in November of 1996.  The ballot issue gave voters the choice of 
keeping the seven-member mayor-appointed committee, or reverting back to the thirteen-
member elected committee. The appointed committee won 53 percent of the votes while 
returning to an elected committee got 23 percent of the vote (23 percent of the ballots 
were blank on this issue).30   
With public support behind him, Mayor Menino would launch a number of major 
educational reforms during his tenure.  In 1996, he proposed a five-year reform plan for 
Boston schools called Focus on Children.  This plan had an emphasis on instructional 
improvement, and highlighted six areas: literacy and mathematics instruction, applying 
student work and data, professional development, replicating best practices, aligning 
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resources with an instructional focus, and community engagement.  Other important 
reform initiatives would include the adoption of citywide learning standards, a rigorous 
promotion policy, a restructuring of large high schools into smaller learning 
communities, a full day program for all five year old students, a plan to reduce class 
sizes, and a technology initiative that increased the number of computers available in the 
classroom.31  Those reforms had resulted in a general increase in student academic 
achievement as evidenced by Boston standardized test scores.   However, Menino’s 
“judge me harshly” statement would be used against him in a 2001 mayoral debate.  
When asked about student performance by a member of the national board of directors of 
the Black Alliance for Educational Options, Menino responded with the following: 
Well, we have made progress…The long slide in the schools is over, and 
you have to continue to work with us on the improvement of the school 
system.  It is unfortunate that we had a system where education wasn’t the 
important issue and we just continued to promote kids.  Now that has 
stopped.  We have mandatory summer school for kids and we are also 
starting this very extensive after school program.  But education in urban 
areas is not as easy as some people think it is.32    
 
The debate over if mayoral control in Boston has truly brought about positive increases in 
student achievement continues, but Boston would serve as the first of many cities to 
utilize mayoral control as an educational reform.  Chicago would be the next city to place 
the governance of the school system in the hands of the mayor, which will be discussed 
in detail at the end of this chapter.  Baltimore would follow Chicago in 1997.  
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Baltimore 
 Historically, Baltimore already had a school structure that was mayor dominated.  
Baltimore’s 1899 City Charter provided that the mayor appoint all nine members of the 
Board of School Commissioners, which gave the mayor considerable power over school 
affairs.33  Baltimore’s school superintendent officially reported to the school board, but in 
reality, depended on a large amount of mayoral support.  The mayor also had 
considerable budgetary authority, with spending over $300 requiring the approval of a 
five-member Board of Estimates, which the mayor controlled by holding a seat and 
appointing two of its members.34 Frustrated with reform efforts, Maryland state officials 
would succeed in reversing a great amount of mayoral control and took on a considerable 
amount themselves, creating a city-state partnership.35  Cibulka argues that the partial 
state takeover was a result of poor student performance and mismanagement that can be 
traced back to the policies of former mayor Donald Schaefer, who held office from 1971 
until 1986.36 
 As a result of the Supreme Court’s 1954 decision in Brown v. Board, Baltimore 
would desegregate quickly without the conflict that was typical in other major cities.37  In 
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1963, school board president Eli Frank would appoint an ad hoc committee to prepare 
a report regarding desegregation efforts.  The report was called Seven Years of 
Desegregation in the Baltimore Public Schools: A Report.  The report charged the system 
with purposely segregating schools and overcrowding schools attended by African 
Americans by not building enough schools in the inner city, “districting” white schools to 
keep African Americans from enrolling, and refusing to issue transfers to African 
American students who attempted to enroll in predominately white schools.38  The school 
system would ultimately purchase enough school buses to transfer five thousand students 
to bus African-American students into many all-white schools.  This integration would be 
met with little opposition, which was an extremely liberal transformation.   
 By the time Mayor Schaefer took office in 1971, Baltimore’s white population 
would begin to shift to the suburbs, and by the late 1970’s, black residents made up the 
majority of Baltimore’s population.  Naturally, these trends would be reflected in school 
enrollment patterns.  By 1980, only 20 percent of Baltimore’s school population 
composed of whites.  As percentage of black students grew, the black community wanted 
the demographics of school administration, teachers, and other school personnel to 
change with this shift.39   In July of 1971, the school board would appoint the city’s first 
African-American superintendent, Roland Patterson.  Superintendent Patterson and the 
mayor would clash often.  Patterson immediately made significant changes to the 
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administrative staff in Baltimore, reassigning white administrators and replacing them 
with blacks.  Patterson’s hiring, which was supposed to help relieve racial tension in 
Baltimore ended up creating additional racial tensions.40  Wong contends that initially, 
Schaefer and Patterson worked together without incident.  But Patterson’s assertive style 
and association with black community leaders began to cause a rift between the two.   
Wong provided a quote from the state superintendent: “In conducting school business, it 
is difficult to know who is in charge.  Is it the president of the school board, the 
superintendent, the mayor, the city council, or some combination of some or all of 
them?”41  In 1975, Mayor Schaefer did not reappoint three school board members who 
had been previously loyal to Patterson, and brought in his own board members.  With this 
influence of the school board, Patterson was removed from his post that July.   
 The 1970’s and 1980’s would see the building of relationships between Baltimore 
administrators, city hall, and the school system.42  Mayor Schaefer would reach an 
agreement with black leaders about how the school system would be controlled.  Schaefer 
would select John Crew, a former deputy under former superintendent Roland Patterson 
as the city’s second black superintendent.  Black representation would remain constant, 
as two out of four deputy superintendents, thirteen of sixteen assistant superintendents, 
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and three of six regional superintendents were black.  Along with this, several 
principals along with two thirds of the Baltimore teaching staff were black.43 
 Marion Orr argued that public education was not the main concern of Schaefer 
during his administration.  As a result of this, educational spending was sparse.  Schools 
operated with a shortage of books and low staffing levels in school support positions.  
The system had little room for enrichment programs, and low teacher pay restricted the 
system’s ability to recruit good teachers.44  Demographic shifts continued, and the white 
population that remained in the city attended private and parochial schools.  But as long 
as Schaefer tended to the material needs of the black community, he continued to receive 
the majority of black votes.45   
By 1987, it was evident that Baltimore was ready to elect a black mayor.  Cibulka 
contended that a “new breed of urban mayor was emerging, people who saw the 
improvement of their city’s schools as inextricably linked to the fate of the cities 
themselves.”46  Kurt Schmoke was to represent this type of mayor and new generation of 
African American leaders.  Schmoke was the son of college educated parents, was a high 
school and college sports star, and a graduate of Yale University and Harvard Law 
School, as well as a Rhodes Scholar.  During his mayoral campaign, we would express 
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that the economic goals of Baltimore did not include neighborhood improvement. 47  
He promised Baltimore that he would focus on public education.   
Schmoke was elected mayor in 1987.  By 1989, he would reject the school 
board’s majority choice to replace retiring superintendent Alice Pinderhughes, and 
instead endorsed his own candidate, Richard Hunter.  Hunter would not last long, because 
of a difference in fundamental educational administration philosophy between him and 
the mayor.  Schmoke would ask the school board not to renew his contract.48  Walter 
Amprey would be hired to replace Hunter.  By this time, Schmoke would begin to 
express some frustration with the Baltimore School system.  His commitment began to be 
questioned when he reportedly considered taking his daughter out of the school system in 
1992.  Schmoke would be asked about the possible public reaction to that decision, and 
he answered:  
Both of my children have had experiences in public and private schools.  
Different people will draw different conclusions.  I think most people 
understand that I have responsibilities as a father and that is to do what is 
in the best interest of my child.49 
 
Orr cites a report that was released in 1992 called A Report on the Management of 
the Baltimore City Public Schools, which reported that many of the systems’ school 
based and central office administrators were incompetent and a culture existed that did 
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not allow for effective management.50  Few reform efforts were in place and 
Baltimore’s students performed poorly academically.   
 However, Schmoke would demonstrate that he would be directly involved with 
school affairs.  He would take advantage of his control of the Board of Estimates to 
increase the amount of local revenues that would be used for education.  The amount of 
funds allocated for educational purposes increased each year during his first term.51  In 
1992, he would hire a private firm, Educational Alternatives, Incorporated, to run nine 
Baltimore Public Schools.  Schmoke believed that the company could illustrate that 
giving schools more autonomy and utilizing private management techniques could 
improve performance.52  The Sun ran a report calling the move “a courageous step to 
improve the schools.”53  This partnership would end in 1995 when the company failed to 
show significant improvements.  Schmoke would also formulate a committee that 
consisted of central office administrators, teachers and representatives from BUILD 
(Baltimoreans United for Leadership Development) to develop a site-based management 
(SBM) plan.  The plan would gain little support from Baltimore’s schools.   
 Despite failed reform attempts, Schmoke won a third term in 1995.  Leading up to 
his victory, the state of Maryland would be among the first in the nation to adopt high 
stakes testing, accountability reporting, and a program of intervention in low-performing 
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schools.  The state of Maryland declared that low-performing schools could be 
“reconstitution eligible” if it were not making adequate progress.54  “Reconstitution 
eligible” was another term for state takeover.  The state would require that schools meet 
an array of standards that include improved standardized test scores, attendance rates, 
lower dropout rates, and higher promotion rates to avoid state takeover.  State 
Superintendent Nancy Grasmick, in a letter to The Sun, defined what the state’s 
intentions were: 
I am concerned that there has been a great deal of confusion and 
misunderstanding about what reconstitution is and what we are trying to 
achieve.  Let me be absolutely clear.  Reconstitution is not immediate state 
“takeover” or “seizure” of a school.  It is a process of identifying a school 
in need of serious change and determining the appropriate actions for 
turning that school around.  More importantly, it is about rejecting that 
time honored myth that some children are incapable of learning and that 
we should therefore consign them to failing schools.55   
 
She would go on to assert that the state was not interested in being in the business of 
operating or contracting out the operation of individual schools, citing the importance of 
cooperation  between the state, local school systems and individual school communities.   
 Although the state superintendent claimed that the state was not in the business of 
operating Baltimore schools, it would find that many were reconstitution eligible.  The 
state would ultimately determine that the district itself was the problem.  An ongoing 
lawsuit that was brought against Baltimore by a disability rights organization led to loss 
of control to operate special education programs through the orders of a federal judge.  
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As a result of this, the state superintendent requested that an oversight team be put in 
place to review the all appointments of Superintendent Amprey above the rank of 
teacher.56  As more lawsuits were brought, and the relationship between the state and the 
city continued to worsen, the state and city would reach an agreement that placed the 
state in charge of major management and educational reforms in 1997.  Kurt Schmoke 
would decide that he would not run for reelection.   
Cleveland 
 In the decades leading up to 1998, Cleveland mayors, just as Boston mayors, did 
not make public school reform a priority.  Mirroring issues similar to other urban school 
districts, Cleveland also experienced changes in the ethnic and racial background of its 
students as they complied with mandatory desegregation orders.  Because Cleveland was 
so racially segregated, busing would be implemented in an attempt to desegregate its 
schools.  Galster argued that this would cause a chain reaction called “white flight,” 
where white families moved to the suburbs, causing the schools to become even more 
segregated.57  Student performance in Cleveland was generally poor.  Rich and Chambers 
argued that the concerns of Clevelanders became manifested in mistrust and 
unwillingness on the part of many citizens, politicians and businesses to invest more 
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funding into a system that was so broken.58  A fiscal crisis would soon develop, 
leaving the city with an educational debt that would cause the state to have to put the 
district in receivership for three years in 1981.59 Cleveland’s high dropout rates, low 
achievement scores, and fiscal mismanagement would cause the city to begin the process 
of reforming its public schools.   
 Unlike Boston mayors, Cleveland Mayor Michael White would at least attempt to 
endorse a more collaborative approach to reforming Cleveland’s schools.  White would 
begin to respond to the city’s concerns by launching the Cleveland Summit on Education 
in May of 1990.  Participants of this summit would give recommendations that would 
target nine key areas for reform.  The summit would convene again in 1991, and review 
prior recommendations as well as discuss securing the funding to implement additional 
reforms.  White told summit participants that they must be the driving force to initiate 
change: 
We must work like never before to ensure they (recommendations) are 
implemented.  We cannot relax.  We cannot sit down.  We cannot leave 
this building today and say the work is done.  All of us must dig in, roll up 
our sleeves and work like never before.60 
 
White would also provide support to what was known as the “Four L-Slate Reform 
Coalition.”  Those would be school board candidates whose names started with the letter 
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“L.”  His support would help them land school board election victories and 
characterize the school board as being a “reform board.”61   
Despite White’s efforts, Cleveland’s governor, George Voinovich, would begin to 
intervene in Cleveland school reform efforts.  He would publicly announce that he was 
considering a plan that would replace the Cleveland Board of Education and 
superintendent for up to three years.  School board members spoke out against this plan.  
Board member Martha Smith was quoted as saying that “he (Governor Voinovich) has 
not been a friend of the Cleveland Public Schools.  I have not seen him exhibit any 
sensitivity or understanding of the district.”  Board member Stanley Tolliver claims: “He 
doesn’t discuss what he’s going to do about poverty, high unemployment, the drug 
problem, and all the other societal ills that our kids face, but he thinks that changing the 
governance will help the school.”62  Mayor White would claim to be shocked that the 
governor was considering a state takeover.   He would openly oppose: 
I’m not looking for a confrontation and I don’t think bickering solves 
anything, but I think his plan is premature.  A state takeover will not 
cleanse the schools.  I am more concerned about getting citizens involved 
from all segments to improve the schools…There is no quick fix.  It takes 
the involvement of all sectors of the community and a commitment to 
bring about change.  It will never happen with an edict from the 
governor.63 
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White would continue to build public support and consensus for school reform.  
Governor Voinovich would later claim that he was prepared to be patient regarding a 
school-takeover bill.   
 Towards the middle to late months of 1991, Mayor White would begin to exhibit 
a loss of confidence in the Cleveland school board.  As he continued to endorse his own 
candidates for school board seats, he would openly criticize the incumbents: 
I want the people of this city to make the decision.  If they don’t make the 
decision to get rid of these incumbents – the people who have destroyed 
this system for their own gain, to maintain their own political bases – then 
we’re going to deal with it on November 6, and the call will be loud and 
clear and will be from all parts of this community for the state to take this 
school system.64  
 
While warning Cleveland of the possible consequences of not electing reform-minded 
school board members, White continued to sharply criticize board members: 
Today we have children who for weeks have eaten baloney sandwiches.  
They try to learn in schools where the roofs are leaking.  They sit in 
classrooms where there are not enough books.  They sit in classes where 
there are not enough materials.  And all we get from the school board is 
more talk about politics more talk about the court order and more attempts 
to divide this community, black against white.65  
 
White reasoned that a new group of board members who shared his views would make 
necessary fundamental changes to public policy.66 
 In 1993, Cleveland would have its third educational summit, which focused on the 
implementation of Superintendent Sammie Parrish’s Vision 21 plan.  The Vision 21 plan 
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was presented by Parrish in late 1992, which was a reform plan that included 
developing a long range education strategy, forging consensus in modifying the 
desegregation order, developing a cost-cutting and overall financial plan, and creating a 
building-use plan.  This plan was extremely important in that reforms contained in this 
plan was ultimately utilize to cause Judge Battisti to give preliminary approval to end 
federal court supervision.  The plan itself predicted that by the year 2000, the Cleveland 
Public Schools would be recognized nationally for academic excellence.  The vision of 
the plan would encompass three main components: 
 A Comprehensive Core, created by work teams comprising the major 
stakeholders in the education process and addressing the educational 
foundation for all students by outlining steps required to “raise the floor;” 
 
 Enhancements to the Comprehensive Core, designed primarily to provide 
equitable learning opportunities for African-American students but benefiting 
all of our students by going beyond the core requirements; 
 
 Parental Choice, providing a dramatically improved magnet school program 
and a new system of community school choices.67 
 
The Vision 21 plan would not survive Superintendent Parrish’s tenure, which would end 
in her resigning in 1995.   
 Leading up to 1994, Cleveland would again experience a fiscal crisis.  Voters 
rejected a 12.9 million dollar operating levy in 1994, and for the 1994-1995 school year, 
the district overspent its $500 million dollar budget and was $125 million dollars in debt.  
Superintendent Parrish would resign in February of 1995.  Rich and Chambers argue that 
the Parrish resignation, along with the failed levy attempts and new debt led to added 
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uncertainty to the ongoing fiscal situation going on in the district.68  In March of 1995, 
Judge Robert P. Krupansky would order the state to takeover the Cleveland Public School 
System. 
Rich and Chambers contend that by 1994, Mayor White began taking a less 
visible role in the educational summits.69 Mayor White was away on business and did not 
attend the 1996 summit.  This summit drew a record two thousand attendees, including 
many parents, who complained about Cleveland teachers, the lack of books and 
computers in schools, the condition of school buildings, the lack of parental involvement, 
and threats to student safety.70  Mayoral control was also a topic discussed during the 
summit.  Activists began to monitor progress being made in Chicago, who converted to 
full mayoral control in 1995.  Westside-Eastside Congregations Acting Now, a coalition 
of churches and activists, endorsed the idea of the mayor taking control of Cleveland’s 
schools: “The question being asked is, who is the most natural person to run the schools?  
The conversation always comes back to the mayor.”71  Rich and Chambers pointed out 
that support for mayoral control is typically not common within the African American 
communities.  They argue that the support shown here was likely related to Mayor 
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White’s prior use of cooperative reform strategies.72  They were also of the opinion 
that Mayor White became more convinced that an appointed school board would be more 
effective than an elected one.  In his 1996 State of the City Address, Mayor White would 
call for a law that would grant him the authority to appoint all members of the school 
board.    
In September of 1997, the state legislature passed House Bill 269 which granted 
the mayor control of the schools.  Specifically, the bill gave the mayor the authority to 
appoint the school board, transfers control of the district to the appointed school board 
once the federal court order releases the district from state control, schedules the 
referendum on the mayor’s authority to  appoint board members for the general election 
in the first even numbered year occurring at least four years after the federal court 
releases the district from state control (2002), and requires that the mayor alone appoint 
and dismiss a chief executive officer (CEO) of the district during the first thirty months 
after the appointed board initially assumes control.  After thirty months, the mayor is to 
confer with the school board.     
In a letter to Cleveland newspaper The Plain Dealer, White would explain that the 
new proposal did not mean that the mayor would run the schools: 
First, contrary to what its opponents say, the governance proposal does 
provide for a public vote before any permanent change is made in the 
current system…Second, the proposal does not call for the mayor to run 
the schools.  That is the job of the CEO.  The proposal calls for the mayor 
to make sure that the schools are being run by people who have the best 
                                                            
72Rich and Chambers, 172. 
  
55
interests of children in mind and who are willing to make difficult decisions to 
improve conditions in schools.73   
 
However, certain groups were not convinced that the mayoral takeover was right for 
Cleveland.  The mayoral takeover was met with many lawsuits.  Former school board 
president Stanley Tolliver filed suit, claiming that the takeover violated the city charter.  
The Cleveland Teachers Unions and the Service Employees International Union Local 47 
filed suit, as well as the NAACP.  All lost their cases.   
 In 1998, White appointed Reverend Hilton Smith as chair of the newly created 
nine-member school board.  The mayor also appointed Barbara Byrd-Bennett, from New 
York City, as the new CEO.  Seemingly, the new CEO and Mayor White had a positive 
working relationship.  The school board was usually unanimous on decisions made.  
During a telephone interview with Wilbur Rich, school board chair Hilton Smith would 
claim that there were “no politics on the board.  It is like any other board…(except) no 
one is running for office.”74  In his 2000 State of the Union address, White would go so 
far as to claim the board was the best board of education that Cleveland has had in the 
past thirty years. 
 Everyone was not quite sold on the new governance structure.  A poll conducted 
by the Plain Dealer would reveal that the majority of Clevelanders wanted to return to 
the previous governance structure, where the school board was elected.75  Many would 
                                                            
73Michael R. White, “Appointed CEO Will Focus on Children, Improvements,” The Plain Dealer 
(Cleveland, OH), 1997. 
 
74Rich and Chambers, 174. 
 
75Stephens and Frolik. 
  
56
point to the fact that fiscally, the district continued to struggle.  Cleveland’s continual 
struggles can be connected to how it uses property taxes as a primary source of revenue.  
Chow has done extensive research on neighborhood social conditions in Cleveland.  His 
research points out that in the 1980’s, one third of the city’s population would become 
“family breakout areas.”  These areas would be saturated with African-American, single 
parent families with female-headed households, with low income levels.  He would go on 
to describe outlier areas, where residents typically had not completed high school, and 
relied on public assistance as income levels were extremely low.  Public housing was the 
major housing stock in that area.  Chow argued that as the economic structure of 
Cleveland continued to change with deindustrialization, working class blacks became 
victimized by this trend.76  With these trends became more intense in the 1990’s, the 
declining tax base left school budgets in deficit.  Although an operating levy that 
generated $67 million dollars per year had been passed in 1996, giving the district much 
needed stability, the district still had many areas where improvements in schools has not 
been addressed.77 
 Currently, the district is facing a $53 million dollar deficit for the 2010-2011 
school year has a high school dropout rate of about 54 percent, severely declining 
enrollment, and close to 75 percent of its schools are listed under academic emergency or 
watch status.  Overall, the district is in “academic watch” status, since in all elementary 
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grade levels, student math and reading scores are well below state averages.78  Rich 
and Chambers wonder whether Cleveland schools’ future policy options will lead to 
improved academic performance.  This was supposed to be the purpose of their reform 
efforts.79   
New York 
 The New York Public School System is the largest in the world, educating more 
than one million students in over 1,500 public schools.  It is over twice as large as the 
next largest district that will be examined in this chapter, Chicago Public School District 
299.  Historically, the physical size of the school district made governing a difficult task.  
In April of 1842, the legislature allowed for a board of education to be formed in New 
York City.  The board consisted of thirty four people, and schools were broken up into 
seventeen wards.  Each ward was to function as if it were a separate town under state 
law.80  School reformers would begin to push for governance changes in 1867.  They 
wanted to replace the elected board with a smaller, appointed one.  By 1873, legislature 
would pass a law that reduced the size of the board and gave the mayor the power to 
appoint the new twenty-one member board.  Control of schools would be centralized 
under this board.  This system would remain until reformers complained that board 
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members were too political and successfully convinced the state legislature to further 
consolidate the school board.81 
 As New York City solidified its boundaries in 1898, and established its five 
boroughs, each borough would have its own school board.  After complaints of disunity 
between the boroughs in regards to uniformity in educational practices, William Henry 
Maxwell would be chosen as the superintendent for the entire city of New York.  
Criticism of the borough system would result in the state legislature eradicating the 
borough boards and establishing a single board of education again in 1901.82  This time, 
the board would be expanded to 46 members, with varying numbers of representatives 
from each of the five boroughs.  The city was split into 46 districts, and each of the 
districts had a seven-member local school board.  In 1917, at the urging of New York 
Mayor John Mitchel, the legislature reduced the size of the board from forty-six all the 
way down to seven.  This system of governance featuring a central board appointed by 
the mayor, with local school boards would last until 1969.   
 In January of 1968, Mayor John Lindsay sent a letter to New York Governor, as 
well as the state legislature, supporting decentralization.  Within the letter, he explained 
that “The goal of decentralization is the improvement of the quality of education in the 
New York City public school system, to be achieved by liberating the system from the 
constraints that have smothered it and by reconnecting the parties concerned with public 
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education in a constructive, creative effort.”83  In 1969, the decentralization issue 
would heat up as public hearings on the topic took place.  During one hearing that took 
place in Brooklyn in the month of January, a speaker had to be removed from the hearing 
by the police because he refused to give up the microphone after his five minutes 
elapsed.84  Minority communities demanded racial integration or community control.  
Protestors argued that to improve the condition and quality of the schools, it was 
important that the individual communities had a voice in school governance.  A report by 
Marilyn Gittell would report that decentralization was necessary because of the new 
reform board and the fact that its troubles over integration, decentralization and other 
issues led to a great deal of turnover amongst them.  The positions were held by twenty 
persons at various times.85  In another document, Gittell acknowledged that the need for 
greater community involvement was evident, but an effective decentralization plan must 
outline (1) the procedure for the selection of the board; (2) the method of appointment of 
the local superintendent; (3) the control of the budget plan; (4) the determination of the 
deployment of personnel; and (5) the setting of boundaries for local districts.86  The 
difficulty in agreeing to terms prolonged the development of the decentralization plan.  
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On May 3rd of 1969, the state senate came up with a resolution after working for ten 
straight days, resulting in the drafting of the decentralization law.   
 The new law would drastically change the structure of New York school 
governance once again.  A summary would be prepared by the Office of Education 
Affairs outlining the many changes that were to take place.87  The new law required that 
there would be between 30 and 33 community districts, none fewer than 20,000 students 
in average daily attendance.  Each community school district was to have a community of 
board of between seven and fifteen members.  Each member would be elected into their 
positions.  The city board would consist of seven members, five paid by the city council, 
and two appointed by the mayor.  Generally, the community boards were to have same 
powers previously possessed by the city board, except for those reserved for the 
chancellor.  The chancellor would be appointed by the city board with a general authority 
as the chief administrator, as outlined in the law.  The community boards had the 
authority to select the superintendent of the community district.   
 Ravitch argued that criticism of decentralization would emerge as community 
school boards would occasionally become enmeshed in political scandals, such as selling 
jobs, taking kickbacks, and buying school services from friends and family.88  She also 
contended that decentralization affected student achievement in that more affluent 
districts produced better achievement results than impoverished ones.  The school board, 
according to Ravitch, seemed unable to set a clear agenda for the improvement of 
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schools.  Some mayors complained of the inability to take over school boards.   The 
decentralization debate would continue behind the scene for over thirty years until 
Rudolph Giuliani became mayor in 1994. 
 Ramon Cortines was selected as New York’s Chancellor in August of 1993, and 
Giuliani was inaugurated as mayor of New York City in January of 1994.  In February of 
that year, Giuliani would unveil the financial plan, which called for $291 million dollars 
in school cuts.  After this was proposed in a meeting between the mayor and the 
chancellor, Cortines questioned the mayor’s authority to order the cuts that he proposed.  
Giuliani asked for a “bureaucratic head count” of all eligible workers.  Cortines would 
turn in a figure that was less then half the actual amount.  After another count revealed 
that those numbers were off, Giuliani announced that we would appoint a fiscal monitor 
to watch over the board of education.  A midnight meeting between the chancellor and 
the mayor’s office resulted in an agreement for the chancellor to cut 2500 positions over 
two years.  Giuliani also demanded that he dismiss two aides or he would appoint the 
fiscal monitor.  After the chancellor missed the deadline to dismiss the aides, Mayor 
Giuliani announced the appointment of Herman Badillo as fiscal monitor, and Cortines 
resigned an hour later.  In response to the resignation of the chancellor, Giuliani would 
remark: 
I’m sorry he did this, but we really have to move on and reform this 
system.  There are some people who are capable of doing it, and some 
people who maybe won’t make personnel changes for one reason or 
another.  You can’t reform the system by magic or all by yourself…He’s 
had months to make internal changes.  He’s made no changes.  He’s 
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sitting there with the same bureaucracy that brought you the bloat in the first 
place.89 
 
The New York governor, Mario Cuomo, would remediate.  As a result of remediation, 
the chancellor decided to return after his aides were allowed to stay, and he would accept 
Badillo as counsel to the mayor on education.   
Although the two sides reached an agreement on that issue, the school budget 
issue would remain a point of contention.  Chancellor Cortines, acting as an advocate for 
schools, demanded additional school funding.  Mayor Giuliani would be viewed as the 
“bully,” denying those requests.  Schools were overcrowded, and Cortines asked for 
additional capital improvement funding to build additional room.  Giuliani denied the 
request.  Cortines endorsed an agreement between the Board of Education, and the school 
custodians.  Giuliani rejected the tentative agreement.  The mayor would begin to openly 
back reform plans designed to eliminate the central administration of the New York City 
Board of Education.  He would be in favor of redistributing the central board’s power to 
the local boards.  In September of 1994, Giuliani would outright denounce the New York 
Board of Education: 
We are spending $8.5 billion on our schools, so when you don’t see 
money getting into your classroom and your schoolroom, it’s because of 
the bureaucracy.  It’s because of decisions that they make, and it’s because 
we have this system that allegedly is independent, and I can’t revise the 
budgeting of it…I would cut out, massively cut our and crush the 
bureaucracy of the school system at a level that the bureaucracy of the 
school system isn’t ready for yet.90 
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Giuliani would continue to demand cuts that sparked talks of a shortened school day or 
school year.  Clashes between Giuliani and Cortines continued, and the board backed 
Cortines who was the seventh New York City chancellor in ten years, and Giuliani 
wanted to have input on selecting a new chancellor. 
 In regards to the state of educational affairs in New York at that time, Diane 
Ravitch, a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Education, wrote an article for the New 
York Times, stating that the New York City’s public school system needed to be 
“reinvented from the ground up.”91 She argued that the system became a “bureaucratic 
monster” that mismanages funds that should be allocated for instruction.  She provided 
statistics from the State Commissioner of Education which reported that 63 of the state’s 
worst 77 schools were in New York City.  Fewer than half of the ninth graders graduate 
within four years.  She went on to contend that although Chancellor Cortines was 
energetic and hands-on, he lacked the tools to bring about the changes that were 
desperately needed to renovate bad schools.92  She called for a drastic altering of the 
system’s governance structure.  Giuliani wanted the power to appoint all board members, 
but this would not be granted to him during his tenure.  However, in 1996, the 
decentralization-centralization “see-saw” would produce another change in the way the 
schools would be governed.  In December, the New York State Legislature passed a new 
statute that weakened the authority of the community school boards, giving the 
                                                            
91Diane Ravitch, "First, Save the Schools," New York Times (1923-Current file), June 27, 1994. 
 
92Ibid. 
  
64
chancellor broader powers to hire and fire community superintendents, and remove 
individual board members.93   
 Michael Bloomberg would become the next mayor of New York City in 2001.  
He declared that the New York City schools were in a “state of emergency,” and previous 
to his election, he revealed his plans to push for the abolishment of the Board of 
Education and to be allowed to directly select the chancellor.94  Bloomberg would be 
successful in convincing the legislature to pass legislation in 2002 that abolished the 
board of education and the elected local school boards.  The legislature granted the mayor 
the sole authority to appoint the school chancellor.  The statue also created an education 
panel in the place of the school board, which would be comprised of eight members 
which would be appointed by the mayor.  This panel would later be perceived as a rubber 
stamp for decisions made by the chancellor and the mayor.95  This mayoral takeover 
would serve as one of the most comprehensive of the major cities that have adopted this 
model as a means of school reform.   
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Washington, D.C. 
 In the 1840’s, Washington’s City Council voted to establish a public school 
system.  Initially, it was open to just whites.  In the 1860’s, schools were opened for 
black students.  As educational appropriations increased, the Washington City Council 
passed an act that created the Superintendent of Public Instruction.  The mayor vetoed the 
act, stating that the superintendent should be appointed by the mayor.  In 1858, the 
Council passed a law which granted the mayor the authority to appoint the school 
trustees.  In 1869, the Council passed legislation that granted the mayor to appoint a 
Superintendent of Schools to oversee the schools under the guidance of the board of 
trustees.96 
 In 1871, Congress would merge the separate cities of Washington City and 
Georgetown City, along with some surrounding rural county area under a single 
government called the District of Columbia.  The President appointed a Governor, who 
assumed the responsibility for appointing superintendents for the three separate areas.  
The governor would appoint one superintendent that would be responsible for the three 
school boards that ran each school system.  Black schools had their own board of trustees 
and superintendent.  That structure would be later abolished, and the governor would be 
replaced by a three person commission, a Board of Trustees, and two superintendents.   
 In 1900, conflict regarding the governance of the school system would resurface.  
The superintendent of the white schools was released, and the Senate District Committee 
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would examine the system of school management in Washington to determine that the 
Board of Trustees authority was too indistinct and easy to control by the 
Commissioners.97  This would lead to a restructuring of the school system by Congress.  
They would create a seven member Board of Education, who was appointed by the 
Commissioners, which had the authority over all administrative matters in the public 
schools, including the power to appoint a single superintendent and assistant 
superintendents over all of the schools, as well as other employees including teachers. 
 In the decades to pass, Washington D.C. experienced many problems with the 
school governance structure.  The Board of Trustees constantly battled with the 
Commissioners over school financial needs.  The Organic Act of 1906 would be 
established, which shifted the responsibility for the selection of the school board from the 
Commissioners to the courts.  The act would also give the superintendent the authority to 
appoint and dismiss all of his or her subordinates.  This system would remain in place for 
the next 62 years.  
In the wake of the landmark Brown v. Board case that legally ended segregation 
in schools, Washington, D.C. would experience case law unique to their location.  
Decided alongside the Brown case, Bolling v. Sharpe was a case that was relevant to 
D.C. because a difference in the law.  The petitioners were refused admission to a public 
school attended by whites because of their race.  After appealing to the courts for 
admission, their case was dismissed.  The Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth 
amendment disallows states from exercising racial segregation in public schools.  
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However, the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia, does 
not contain an equal protection clause as the fourteenth amendment, which applies only 
to the states.98  The Supreme Court would ultimately decide  
In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from 
maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable 
that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal 
Government.   We hold that racial segregation in the public schools in the 
District of Columbia is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by 
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.99  
 
Washington D.C. would respond quickly to the decision of the court, and ended the dual 
school system.  Eight days after Bolling v. Sharpe, the school board developed a 
desegregation policy.  By November of 1954, three quarters of the district’s white 
students attended schools with black students.100 
 The next important discrimination case would take place thirteen years later.  The 
1967 Hobson v. Hanson case would examine substandard education of the poor: 
It is regrettable, of course, that in deciding this case the court must act in 
an area so alien to its expertise.  It would be far better indeed for these 
great social and political problems to be resolved in the political arena by 
other branches of government.  But these are social and political problems 
which seem at times to defy such resolution.  In such situations, under our 
system, the judiciary must bear a hand and accept its responsibility to 
assist in the solution where constitutional rights hang in the balance.101 
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Judge Wright, in delivering his decision, delivered these words as he accused 
Washington D.C. schools of practicing “criminal” discrimination against poor black 
students.  Judge Wright held that the substandard education of the poor was 
discriminatory, regardless of race, and ordered the busing of blacks to predominately 
white schools, teacher integration, and the ending of academic tracking.  He also ordered 
a bar against economic discrimination, holding that the annual per pupil expenditure in 
black schools was $100 less than in white schools.  This case was significant because it 
would begin to outline what equity in education truly meant.   
 Washington D.C. implemented an elected school board in 1969, and Congress 
established an elected mayor and council in 1973.  The school board structure that was 
implemented consisted of eight members elected by ward and three elected at-large.  
Henig argued that during the late 1960’s and into the 1970’s, the school board became the 
focal point for individuals and groups to build political power because it was the only 
major elected local office in the district.102  He went on to characterize the period of time 
following the elected school board as one where “few thought that the schools were 
working as well as they should be during this period, but neither was there a sense that 
matters were wildly out-of-control.”103 
 The 1990’s would bring about major problems in the Washington D.C. public 
school system.  Unsatisfactory student academic performance as a whole led to the hiring 
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of Frank Smith as superintendent, who had success in Dayton, Ohio.  Conditions 
would not significantly improve during his tenure.  The structure of the school board was 
brought into question.  There was a notion that the different entities that raised school 
revenue versus spent the funds for school education would not ever reconcile the feeling 
that either enough money was allocated for the schools, or on the other end, the money 
was not used wisely enough.  Second, the ward based membership of the school board 
created members who provided constituent service rather than broad policy setting.104  
 In 1995, Congress passed a law creating a Presidentially-appointed District of 
Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Board (Control Board), and a Chief 
Financial Officer appointed by the mayor.  The mayor was granted the power to appoint a 
seven-member board from a list of fifteen nominees selected by the U.S. Secretary of 
Education.  The Washington Post reported that the control board produced a report that 
blamed the superintendent for spending heavily on office operations while teachers 
lacked the necessary materials to adequately educate the city’s students.  During Smith’s 
tenure, the report stated, student test scores declined, the district has a high dropout rate, 
and buildings are crumbling and abysmal financial, personnel and contracting practices 
took place.105  John Hill Jr., the control board’s executive director, said the 
superintendent and school board deserve “An absolute F.”  The report stated: 
The deplorable record of the District’s public schools by every important 
educational and management measure has left one of the city’s most 
important public responsibilities in a state of crisis, creating an emergency 
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that can no longer be excused or ignored.  In virtually every area, and for every 
grade level, the system has failed to provide our children with a quality 
education and safe environment in which to learn.  This failure is the result 
of not the students—for all students can succeed—but of the educationally 
and managerially bankrupt school system.106    
 
Superintendent Smith claimed that the report was filled with outdated information that 
painted an unfairly grim picture: “All of us know this school system is not where it 
should be.  We haven’t made the progress we should have made.  You don’t need to put 
stuff out to make it look worse than it is.  It is already bad enough as it is.”107 
In 1996, shortly after the Control Board report was released, the control board 
took drastic measures.  They fired the superintendent, and stripped the elected school 
board of most of its authority until June of 2000, and gave oversight of the system to an 
appointed nine-member Board of Trustees.  A reform group named the DC Appleseed 
Center began in late 1997, to examine the Control Board’s operations to make a 
determination if the system would be in adequate shape for local control.   In September 
of 1999, they would release a report entitled Reforming the D.C. Board of Education: A 
Building Block for Better Public Schools.  In this report, they recommended that the 
school board’s size should be reduced from the then current number of eleven members, 
with their rationale being smaller bodies work better as a unit.108  They also discussed 
advantages and disadvantages associated with a fully or partially appointed board.  They 
acknowledged that mayoral control would centralize accountability, but also came with 
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risks, if the mayor did not appoint school board members who represent the concerns 
of the entire city.  
As a result, Kevin Chavous, Chair of the Committee on Education Libraries and 
Recreation introduced the School Governance Act of 1999 and the School Governance 
Companion Act of 1999, which recommended some important changes, including the 
reduction of the Board of Education from eleven members to nine, required that the 
members be elected by D.C. residents, and the president be elected at large.  D.C. mayor 
Anthony Williams would take those recommendations a step forward, and asked for an 
even smaller board and argued that he should select all board members as well as the 
school superintendent.109  A compromise would ultimately be reached, and as part of a 
referendum that took place in June of 2000, the school board was reduced to nine 
members, general election voters would select five of nine members, and the mayor with 
the advice and consent of the Council, would select the other four members.   
Mayor Williams would not end his efforts of gaining direct control of the troubled 
D.C. public school system.  In 2003, he lobbied to strip the Board of Education of most 
of its power and take direct control of the system: “The schools ought to be under mayor 
and the council.  I’m ultimately accountable for what happens to the students.”110  In 
February of 2004, he would release a school governance reform proposal.  The purpose 
of the reform according to the report was to centralize accountability to ensure greater 
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programmatic and fiscal oversight, strengthen the role of the superintendent, increase 
opportunities for improved coordination of district services in support of student 
achievement, and maintain the Board of Education as an “important avenue for citizen 
input.”111  Mayor Williams proposed that the structure of the board remain intact, but the 
board would be reestablished as an advisory board, and all current policy, oversight and 
rule making authority would be transferred to the mayor, who would determine what 
would be delegated to the Chancellor which the mayor appointed.  Adrian Fenty would 
be elected mayor and assume office in 2007.  Fenty would continue to push for mayoral 
control, leading to the District of Columbia Public Education Reform Amendment Act of 
2007.  This act gave the mayor the authority to govern the public schools in D.C., as well 
as over all curricula, operations, functions, budget, personnel, labor negotiations and 
collective bargaining agreements, facilities, and other education matters.  The mayor is to 
decide which of those responsibilities to delegate to a designee as he or she determines is 
warranted.  The act also eliminated the position of “Superintendent of Schools”, and 
replaced that with the position of “Chancellor.” 
Chicago 
 In October of 1996, Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley discussed the topic of 
educational reform in a room full of area educators, business leaders, parents and 
community activists.  Boston mayor Thomas Menino, who was given school board 
appointment power in 1992, was also in attendance.  Daley told the group that “Because 
of Mayor Menino’s dedication to school reform, I’ve asked him to chair a U.S. 
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Conference of Mayors task force on education.  That task force will work to put the 
education agendas of cities at the top of the national education agenda.”112  Daley 
discussed various reforms such as a back-to-basics curriculum, mandatory homework, 
performance contracts for school principals, an academic probation period for schools 
which are failing their students, and a zero-tolerance policy on weapons.  “Mayors need 
to set the standards for the community, to give people direction so that they can make a 
difference.  That is why it is important for mayors to be accountable.”113  
 In 1995, Illinois Governor Jim Edgar signed a Republican-drafted bill that put 
Chicago Mayor Richard Daley in charge of the Chicago Public Schools (CPS).  The 
governor claimed “This bold, innovative approach should bring more accountability, 
better fiscal management and a higher quality of education to a system that desperately 
needs an overhaul.”114  The bill would follow the footsteps of reform efforts implemented 
in Boston in 1992, and would prompt several cities to adopt some form of mayoral 
control for its schools. Major features of this bill included the authority for the mayor to 
select a “Chief Executive Officer” and appoint a powerful five member “corporate style” 
board of education.  Kirst and Bulkey contend that Chicago has the most extreme form of 
mayor impact.115 
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 Jim Carl argues that Chicago has had a long tradition of varying levels of 
mayoral school control.  Before the 1995 reform, Chicago school reformers have “all 
encountered Chicago’s mayors at the top of the school bureaucracy.”116  Chicago, as one 
of few cities that have never had an elected school board, has always experienced 
mayoral-appointed school boards.  Until 1979, mayors were directly in charge of school 
budgets.  The varying degree of mayoral control was highly depended upon the mayor’s 
style and political aims.  Most Chicago mayors supported the governance of schools by 
educational experts.  Few mayors endorsed any major reform efforts related to the 
governance structure, including Richard M. Daley.   
 Chicago’s first schools were established in the 1830’s.  Funds for early schools 
were sparse, and one teacher would often supervise classes of 100 or more students.  As 
the student population grew, Chicago’s first superintendent would be hired in 1854.  John 
Dore was appointed by the city council, and worked for higher quality for teachers, 
improved facilities, and separation of grade levels.  After the school population grew to 
more than 27,000 students, the state legislature created a Board of Education, which 
consisted of members appointed by the mayor to oversee school governance throughout 
Chicago.  The school system grew steadily, and the Board of Education responded by 
publishing curriculum guides and sponsoring teacher institutes for the purposes of 
improving instruction.  By 1897, the Chicago Teachers Federation was formed to help 
improve the working conditions for the expanding teacher population that grew to over 
5,000.   
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 The first major attempt at reform would take place in 1897, when Mayor Carter 
Harrison II, encouraged by University of Chicago President William Harper, sought 
approval to appoint a commission to investigate the Chicago Public School system.  In 
1898, the committee would finish its work and produced a comprehensive report that 
would become known as the “Harper Report.”  The beginning of the report contained 
communication from the mayor that was presented to the City Council of Chicago that 
outlined the rationale for the work of the commission: 
With the continual growth of the city, additional burdens keep coming to 
the door of the board of education, which is seriously handicapped by 
having to deal with new conditions and difficult developments in the 
harness of antiquated methods.  A change is needed, a change is essential 
in regard to the educational and business conduct of the school system, 
and to that end, I request power to appoint a commission to consist of 
nine, two to be members of the city council, two to be members of the 
board of education, and five to be outside citizens.  The objective of this 
appointment of the commission is to utilize all that is good in the present 
system, to discard all that is defective and apply new methods where 
needed.117   
 
The major recommendations outlined in the report were a mayor-appointed board with a 
reduction in the number of board of education members, more power for the general 
superintendent of schools, a business manager that was left free to exclusively handle 
executive work, and an increase in the qualifications needed to become a CPS teacher.  
The Chicago Teacher’s Federation did not embrace those recommendations because of a 
                                                            
117Educational Commission, Report of the Educational Commission of the City of Chicago 
(Chicago: Lakeside Press, 1898). 
  
76
perception that its members would be left out of decision making processes.118  They 
were ultimately able to block the passage of the Harper Bill.   
 Carl would describe the next mayor, William “Big Bill” Thompson as a machine 
politician who used schools to galvanize voters.119  Urban political machines were built 
fundamentally on the votes of various immigrant populations.  Successful machines 
provided jobs, political appointments and welfare benefits in exchange for political 
loyalty.  Carl argues that the expanding school system allowed Thompson to dole out 
building projects and patronage appointments to reward his business and machine 
supporters.  Thompson would take an anti-labor position and was instrumental in 
dismantling the Chicago Teachers Federation.    
 Thompson successfully convinced the city council to investigate the state of 
Chicago Public Schools in 1916.  The committee published a report entitled 
Recommendations for Reorganization of the Public School System of the City of Chicago.  
The recommendations were similar to those published in the Harper Report.  By 1917, 
the Otis Law was passed by the Illinois Legislature.  This law would include provisions 
that dramatically changed the structure of Chicago school governance.  Main features of 
the law begins with an strengthening of the superintendent position, extending the term 
from one to four years, allowing the superintendent to hire and fire teachers, and clearly 
defined the superintendents responsibilities.  The school board experienced an expansion 
of its power, which included more separation from the city council, the authority to buy 
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and sell school property, as well as the ability to borrow up to 75 percent of the taxes 
for the following school year.  Teachers would receive better job security with tenure 
after three years, and dismissal only when formally charged and a board investigation 
took place.120   
 Mayor Thompson would also directly influence educational policy after he 
determined that textbooks used in many Chicago Public Schools were “unpatriotic.”  
Supposedly, materials used by the teachers in painted American colonists in a negative 
light.  One of the books was used by school teachers in a course at the University of 
Chicago as part of the coursework necessary to become a history teacher.  Thompson 
claimed “If public school teachers studied and believed this book ‘New Viewpoints in 
American History,’ they would not be human if they did not pass on seditious viewpoints 
to their students.”121  Thompson would ultimately use this to launch a campaign to 
appoint a “patriotic” school board and drive out the superintendent, William McAndrew.   
 Anton Cermak would become the next mayor of Chicago and took office in 1931.  
Cermak was considered the first of a democratic machine that lasted for decades.  The 
school district at that time was in the middle of a financial windfall.  He asked the school 
board to consider deep cuts, but was assassinated before any changes were implemented.  
Edward Kelly would announce that he planned to follow Cermak’s plan for the Chicago 
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Public Schools.122  In 1933, the terms of five board members ended, and he appointed 
individuals that would carry out his wishes in regards to school cuts.  Kelly was able to 
bring the schools more fully under machine control, and developed a relationship with 
President Roosevelt that helped to create more federally funded jobs that he doled out as 
patronage jobs.123  Carl noted that Kelly would ultimately be taken to task by the National 
Education Association (NEA) who questioned how the school system cut, demoted and 
transferred teachers while disproportionate amounts of money was put into maintenance 
and other non-education related services.  Pressure related to NEA reports resulted in the 
establishment of a nominating committee which appointed new board members.  Along 
with this, the state legislature gave the responsibility of hiring a general superintendent of 
schools whose educational requirements were defined by the law and who would be in 
charge of business and legal departments to the school boards.124  Carl argued these 
changes only gave the mere appearance that public school governance was detached from 
mayoral interference.   
 As the Democratic county chairman and nominee for mayor in 1955, Richard J. 
Daley spoke in support of a wider use of city schools, a sales tax hike to aid schools, and 
pay increases for teachers.  Known as a “family man,” he spoke positively of teachers: 
“Parents should teach their children to have full respect for their teachers, policemen, and 
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other adults.”125  During Daley’s tenure as Mayor, he believed that a good government 
management style kept teachers together as well as other patronage workers.  He 
practiced partisan politics and rewarded friends and punished enemies, and also managed 
the budgetary and city planning aspects of being mayor.126  Daley supported 
neighborhood construction projects and advocated for sufficient school facilities.  Other 
than that, he maintained a distance from school affairs.127 
 As Daley endorsed the building of schools, racial politics would become a focus.  
The schools were used to support the machine as contracts for the building of schools 
went to his loyal constituency.  Dorothy Shipps argued that “patronage was re-instituted 
with a vengeance” under Daley’s mayorality.128  During the 1950’s and early 1960’s, 
more schools were built in areas that were predominately black than any other area, as a 
reward for their vote.  But those same building patterns would lead to keeping black 
students in what Carl described as “densely populated ghettos.”129  Surprisingly enough, 
Daley was able to capture the black vote without initially responding to desegregation 
expectations set forth from the Brown decisions of 1954 and 1955.   
 Mirel noted that through the 1960’s and 1970’s, Mayor Daley’s aim was stopping 
white flight by maintaining the current composition of the neighborhood structure rather 
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than racial integration of the schools.130  The fear of neighborhood integration 
prompted small white demonstrations regarding school integration or housing reform in 
the early 1960’s.  A group of demonstrators at Bogan High School located on the 
southwest side of Chicago successfully convinced the superintendent, Benjamin Willis, to 
remove Bogan from a list of schools that was supposed to receive voluntary transfer 
applications from black students which was designed to relieve school overcrowding.131  
Rury argued that the fear of losing white support caused the mayor not to care the state of 
the city’s schools, but instead, the protection of his power of the Democratic political 
machine, and protecting the existing distribution of status and privilege in Chicago.132  
The prevailing thought was that the white vote could be lost, but blacks would continue 
to vote for Daley.  So instead of working to desegregate schools, Superintendent Willis 
did the opposite.  He addressed the problem of school overcrowding in predominately 
black neighborhoods by ordering the erection of temporary mobile classroom units that 
would be situated near the main school building on vacant lots.  These buildings would 
be referred to as “Willis Wagons.”  Willis would ultimately assist Daley in keeping the 
status quo in the city, and Mayor Daley allowed Willis to take the heat with any 
community displeasure.  
 Richard J. Daley’s management of political machines and silence on matters of 
desegregation set the stage for a collapse in the governance of the Chicago Public 
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Schools.  The Chicago Teachers Union (CTU) was empowered by Mayor Daley 
leading into the 1970’s and several teacher strikes took place.  In order to maintain order, 
Daley settled strikes by negotiating in the favor of the teacher’s union, but the city did not 
have the money that he promised.  He was able to convince state legislators to alter state 
aid formulas and lessen limitations on school borrowing, and utilized shady accounting 
practices to keep the districts’ bonds unrealistically high.133  This fiscal mismanagement 
would lead to the formation of the School Finance Authority which was controlled by 
Chicago’s bankers.  They would be in charge of managing CPS financial issues.   Daley’s 
death in 1976 would weaken machine politics and set the stage for the anti-machine 
Democrat to take over as mayor in 1983, Harold Washington. 
 In summary, the years after Richard J. Daley’s death would bring a shakeup of the 
political machine, and more involvement in school governance by business leaders. One 
organization that would become heavily involved was the Commercial Club of Chicago, 
founded in 1877.  The Commercial Club was a social club for some of Chicago’s 
commercial and industrial giants.  The purpose of the club, as Shipps notes, was to 
“insure the success of their own businesses while building the prestige of Chicago in the 
eyes of the more established Easterners who had invested in their city.”134  The club 
publicly attempted to reduce corruption in the city government and to spend educational 
funds more efficiently during the 1930’s.  The most frequent meeting topics would be 
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infrastructure, municipal reform and education.135  In the early 1900’s, they would 
attempt to influence school policy by advocating for vocational education.  They would 
ultimately lobby for an independent system of public vocational schools.  Although the 
club repeatedly brought their proposal to the state government, this system would not 
ever be instituted.  They were successful in helping to centralize the Chicago Public 
School System.  They believed that principles of business efficiency would work in the 
schools as it had in their businesses.136  They would also attempt to take control of the 
Chicago’s worsening school financial situation in 1930.137 
 Another entity that would become more involved in educational policy was 
Chicago United.  The formation of Chicago United would arise as a result of civil unrest 
with the city’s black leaders.  In 1966, Martin Luther King came to Chicago to assist in 
eliminating slums in Chicago’s ghettos.  After a giant rally at Soldier field, King taped a 
list of demands regarding open housing on the door of city hall.  Non-violent marches on 
white working class communities ensued.  Although they were not successful in changing 
the racially segregated housing patterns in Chicago, their efforts led to a mayoral summit 
which included a prominent Commercial Club member.  Summit meetings would result 
in the formation of the Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities, which 
was to monitor compliance to open housing, educate the public about the effects of 
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housing discrimination and seek federal injunctions against those who discriminated.138  
The Leadership Council would not be able to stifle the resentment and anger in the black 
communities however.  Neighborhoods were torched in frustration after King’s 
assassination.  Some of the leaders of the Commercial Club were victims of arson as 
well, including Carson Pirie Scott department store and Montgomery Ward.  Jesse 
Jackson insisted that the mayor call a conference of the leading businessmen in order to 
be made aware of the problems in black ghettos.  Chicago United was formed by 
Commercial Club leaders as an avenue to facilitate communications between black 
leaders and white businessmen.139  Ultimately, Chicago United would work with Chicago 
Superintendents and members of the school board in an attempt to decentralize the 
board’s responsibilities in order for the board to deal with policy, and for the schools to 
be accountable for student performance.140    
 After years of working behind the scenes, the Commercial Club as well as 
Chicago United would look to take a more significant role in public educational policy 
making.  The two organizations, along with the newly formed Civic Committee of the 
Commercial Club would be authorized to serve as decision makers in the policy making 
process by a governor and two mayors.141  As a result, the organizations formulated the 
School Finance Authority, which would have an oversight role in school financing, and 
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selected an entire school board.  Their growing authority and influence led to the 
school reform act of 1988.   
 Harold Washington took office as Chicago’s mayor in 1983.  Carl contends that 
Washington helped define and implement an approach to urban school reform that 
emphasized grass roots initiatives and stressed equitable levels of funding in the context 
of the city’s racial segregation.142  The black population of Chicago grew, but more 
importantly, the percentage of the city’s black population grew between 1950 and 1980 
as a result of large percentage of whites that moved to Chicago’s suburbs. As a result of 
those migration patterns, and because of minority poverty rates, the rate of low income 
student enrollment increased while white enrollment decreased.  In 1950, whites 
consisted of 62 percent of CPS student enrollment.  By 1983, white enrollment was less 
than 17 percent.143  Washington did not focus on desegregation because he did not 
believe that it was realistic to expect equitable desegregation with the number of white 
students in the district. Furthermore, Washington attended predominately black schools 
while enrolled in Chicago schools himself and believed in excellent black schools.    
 Washington solicited the advice of the Commercial Club and Chicago United 
business leaders and gave them authority in the policy formation process in the CPS.  
Washington would select Chicago United to select a new school board and they were to 
be heavily involved in a city wide summit to address the high dropout rate as well as poor 
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achievement status.  In 1985, an attempt would be made to convince the Illinois 
General Assembly to approve an elected school board that failed.144  But demands for 
school improvement increased, and it was becoming evident that governance changes 
would have to take place.  Washington would find himself in a precarious position when 
it came to school reform.  Washington advocated for fairness in educational opportunities 
and equality in the quality of education and educational funding.  Grass roots community 
leaders who helped him get into office were hoping for drastic school improvement 
measures.  However, many of Washington’s supporters worked for the Board of 
Education.  Many of the calls for a change in governance could greatly impact the 
teachers, administrators, and central office workers who also supported Washington.145  
He would begin planning an educational summit to address the high school dropout rate, 
and the lack of jobs available for CPS graduates by working with the business 
community, which he did not build his platform with.  His sudden death in 1987 would 
cause the summit to lose momentum.   
 In 1987, U.S. Secretary of Education, William Bennett, called Chicago’s schools 
the worst in the nation: “If it isn’t the last, I don’t know who is.  There can’t be very 
many cities that are worse.  Chicago is pretty much it.  How can anyone who feels about 
children not feel terrible about Chicago schools?  You have an educational meltdown.”146  
Bennett went on to contend that a first step in solving the problem is reducing the systems 
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bureaucracy, and to create a program of school-based accountability.  Without 
Washington’s guidance, the grassroots school activists, public school advocacy groups, 
business leaders and legislators that he brought together were responsible for advocating 
for the 1988 legislation that would be known as the Chicago School Reform Act.  This 
act would create school-based accountability measures that Bennett spoke of.  Three 
major provisions of the act were: 
 Goals were established for the school system in areas such as reading, 
writing, and math.  The law also set specific graduation, attendance, 
promotions, and achievement test levels that schools would have to 
meet by the 1993-1994 school year. 
 
 The allocation of resources to reduce the size of the central 
bureaucracy, placing a cap on administrative costs and transitioning 
funds from central office to the schools. 
 
 An eleven member local school council (LSC) was established, 
consisting of six parents, two community members, two teachers, and 
the principal who together would set policy and make important 
educational and budgetary decisions in the city’s individual schools.147  
 
The local school council’s parent and community members would be elected by the 
geographical area that the school served, and the teacher members would be elected by 
teachers in the school building.  Also, the new law required the formation of a 
Professional Personnel Advisory Committee in every school, which consisted of teachers 
and the principal, who were responsible for formulating a school improvement for the 
LSC to approve.  The law also created sub district (broken up by geographic boundaries) 
councils which were composed of parent and/or community representatives in each LSC 
in the sub district that had the authority to hire and fire sub district superintendents.  The 
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law also created a school board nominating committee consisting of five mayoral 
appointees and eighteen additional people that were elected from the sub district councils 
that recommended prospective school board members to the mayor.148   
 The elements that were unique about the Chicago School Reform Act of 1988 
centered on its success in decentralizing the district.  The law truly reduced the size of the 
central bureaucracy.  It shifted a great deal of power to the individual schools, and put it 
in the hands of the community.  Principals, who normally accrued tenure in the position, 
were stripped of tenure and performance contracts were put in place.  However, 
principals were given increased abilities to remove teachers, as well as more control in 
other areas.  There were important aspects to the Chicago Public School System that did 
not change as a result of the law.  One element that remained unchanged was educational 
funding.  Although the need for additional funds existed, the individual schools would 
have to function under the same financial constraints.  Also, the School Finance 
Authority remained in charge of finances, but with increased authority.  Third, the 
nominating committee was created to limit the mayor’s choices for school board 
members, but the mayor still retained the right to appoint all of the school board 
members.  The new law expanded the number of board members from 11 to 15.  Finally, 
the teacher’s union still had to negotiate with the central board rather than LSC’s.   
 The late Richard J. Daley’s son, Richard M. Daley would take office in April of 
1989, inheriting the new reform act.  By 1995, dissatisfaction with the reform act would 
result in major amendments to the Chicago School Reform Act of 1988.  Wong and 
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others, and Ziebarth outlined sources of dissatisfaction with the act.  Among them was 
the fact there was not any improvement regarding student achievement.  Second, the 
LSCs did not encourage an increase in parental involvement in schools.  Third, another 
budgetary crisis ensued, putting the opening of schools on time in 1995 in jeopardy.  
Fourth, the school board and top administrators failed to restore public confidence in the 
system.  Lastly, Mayor Richard M. Daley was frustrated by constraints over the 
appointment of school board members.149,150    
 The Chicago School Reform Amendatory Act of 1995 would dramatically shift 
power over the school district back to the mayor.  Ziebarth outlined the major features of 
this act: 
 Gave the mayor the authority to appoint all school members and top 
administrators, and decreased the number of central board members to five 
 Created “corporate style” positions in regard to the top administrative offices 
and replaced the “general superintendent” position to “chief executive officer” 
 
 Eliminated the School Board Nominating Commission and the School Finance 
Authority  
 
 Expanded the financial authority of the board 
 
 Restricted the bargaining power of the Chicago Teachers Union 
 Gave school board the power to hold LSCs accountable to system-wide 
standards 
 
 Gave district flexibility in utilizing private agencies to provide certain services 
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 Gave the CEO the authority to place poorly performing schools on 
remediation, probation, reconstitute or close them151 
 
The new law also placed a moratorium on teacher strikes for eighteen months following 
the passing of the bill.  Also, managerial employees would not be able to join the union.  
The bill did not change the structure of LSCs, nor limit their power.  Individual school 
governing would still be in the hands of the local school councils, as long as the school 
was not on academic probation.   
Jim Edgar, Mayor Daley and the Corporate CEO 
Why a CEO for Schools? 
 The new CEO position for the Chicago Public Schools did not require candidates 
to have educational credentials to take the position, but that individual was granted all of 
the control that the general superintendent had, including over the district’s curriculum.152  
After the Amendatory Act was passed, Mayor Daley would subsequently appoint two 
CEOs without an educational background: Paul Vallas and Arne Duncan.  Shipps argued 
that Daley did not trust educators to run the school system, and demanded loyalty to him.  
She quoted one of Daley’s former aides who claimed that Daley thought that it “isn’t 
realistic” to ask an educator to “run a $3 billion operation.”153  In terms of direct quotes, 
Mayor Daley did not outwardly discuss credentials that he looked for in selecting a CEO 
to run the Chicago Public School District.  However, there were statements made by 
Governor Edgar and Mayor Daley that revealed which school related issues would be 
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made a priority which illustrates why he selected non-educators to assume the CEO 
position.  
The Corporate CEO 
 There is a plethora of research related to leadership and CEO’s.  However, in 
regards to the knowledge, skills and dispositions of a CEO, the research was relatively 
sparse.  Rock (1977) outlined the nature and scope of the accountabilities reserved to 
chief executive positions.  He described those accountabilities as:  
 Goal Setting – Setting the fundamental goals of the company and establishing 
priorities 
 
 Strategy – Formulating the overall direction, including guidelines and long-
range plans 
 
 Character – Setting the standards regarding how the company is to conduct 
business 
 
 Resource Allocation – Establishing a strategic framework for the allocation of 
the resources of the corporation 
 
 Acquisitions and Mergers 
 
 Organizational Structure – Developing the grand design of the corporate 
structure, assigning functions 
 
 Human Resource Management – Selection, development, assessment, 
motivation, and rewarding of top executives 
 
 Review and control – Reviewing short and long term strategies related to the 
attainment of company objectives 
 
 Tactical Supervision – Ensuring the execution of operating plans 
 
 Finance – Ensuring the soundness of the organization’s financial structure, 
monitoring indications of company’s financial health, determining the 
company’s present and future capital requirements, arranging for outside 
financing 
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 Key success factors – Making certain key decisions such as product pricing, 
sourcing or design that impact corporate performance 
 
 Relations with board of directors – Ensures board’s full understanding, 
constructive review, or final approval of management policies, direction and 
objectives 
 
 External relations – develops and maintains key external relationships154 
 
Upon reviewing several job descriptions seeking an individual to fill the CEO position 
for several companies in Illinois, there were several CEO descriptions that were common 
among the many companies.  Common CEO responsibilities, skills, knowledge, and 
dispositions included: 
 Developing a strategic plan to advance the company’s mission and objectives 
 Promote revenue, profitability and organizational growth 
 Insure production efficiency, quality, service and cost-effective management 
of resources 
 
 Implementing strategies for generating resources and/or revenues for the 
company 
 Review financial statements to determine progress and status in attaining 
objectives 
 Building a fundraising network 
 Working knowledge of public relation techniques 
 Strong written and communication skills 
 Strong or strategic leadership skills; superior management skills 
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There were several references to “leadership” and “management” skills.  Many times, 
those terms were used in the same line.  The job descriptions did not contain a definition 
of leadership or management.   
The CPS CEO 
 In passing the 1995 Chicago School Reform Amendatory Act, Illinois lawmakers 
purposely ensured that the law included specific language that shifted the governance 
structure of the Chicago Public School System.  In addition to the corporate-style 
positions of chief financial officer, chief educational officer, chief operating officer, and 
chief purchasing officer, the law eliminated the previous position of “General 
Superintendent” and replaced it with “Chief Executive Officer.”  Some of the words and 
actions of former Governor Jim Edgar, and Mayor Richard M. Daley reveal some of the 
reasons why this specific change in governance took place.   
 In January of 1995, Edgar warned CPS that the state would not bail them out of 
the system’s anticipated budget deficit which threatened the opening of classrooms that 
fall: “It is up to the Chicago schools to look internally at ways to cut costs.  If they expect 
to be bailed out by the state, it isn’t going to happen.  The day of reckoning is coming.”155  
As plans to overhaul the CPS system of governance were unveiled in April of 1995, 
Mayor Daley expressed reservations about it.  Although the reform law contained 
elements that Daley asked for, including the authority to abolish the current management 
structure, appoint board members, and give him more flexibility in spending state funds, 
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money was still Daley’s bottom line: “There has to be an understanding that, if this all 
takes place … then they are going to help us with (funding),” Daley said.  “To me, there 
has to be an understanding that you don’t reform something in structure without having 
accountability, without having some new money going into the system.”156   
 After the school reform law was signed on May 30th of 1995, Edgar provided a 
written statement describing the reform effort: “This bold, innovative approach should 
bring more accountability, better fiscal management and a higher quality of education to 
a system that desperately needs an overhaul.”157  As Daley and other critics complained 
about the lack of provisions for additional funding for schools, Edgar added: “As all of us 
recognize, money alone will not improve education.”158  After Mayor Daley installed 
Paul Vallas as CEO, he acknowledged that changes needed to be made at central office: 
“You have to change management,” Daley said.  “There’s a lot of management problems 
there.”159  One of Daley’s senior aides made a statement regarding how the change in 
management might look in terms of structure: “The board and the senior staff will be 
doing most of the work.  The mayor won’t be imposing his education vision on the 
schools in a formal way.  The idea is to bring in the budget people and the educators and 
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get out of the way and let them do their jobs.”160  When asked how he would erase the 
funding deficit at a June meeting at Healy Elementary School, Daley was still unsure: 
“I’d be a miracle worker if I could (answer) that.”161   
 After officially naming his new five member team and senior management team 
at the end of June of 1995, Mayor Daley revealed a bit more of his educational agenda.  
He quickly announced his position regarding the priority of the district: “Today, we begin 
a new era in the history of public education in Chicago by putting children first.  From 
every neighborhood school in Chicago to every office in Pershing Road, people will be 
held accountable for the quality of the students we produce and the money we spend.”162  
He later announced his position on special interest groups including unions, politically 
connected contractors, and Democratic Party patronage bureaucrats: “Business as usual is 
over.  The special interests will move to the back of the line.  The bureaucrats who stand 
in the way of change will be removed and their powers dissolved.”163  CPS was facing a 
150 million dollar school funding deficit and a budget gap double for the next year.  
Daley spoke of how costs had to be cut to balance the budget for long-term financial 
stability: “We must continue to fight for every dollar in Springfield, because the state has 
                                                            
160John Kass and Jacquelyn Heard, “Daley Woos Parents in School Push,” Chicago Tribune, 1995. 
 
161Ibid. 
 
162John Kass, “Daley Names School Team – Now Comes The Difficult Part: Turning Everything 
Around,” Chicago Tribune, 1995. 
 
163Ibid. 
  
95
not met its (funding) responsibility.  But clearly we must also make progress here in 
controlling costs before expecting any further help from the state.”164 
 The words and actions of Governor Edgar and Mayor Daley leading up to the 
Chicago School Reform Amendatory Act and shortly thereafter reveal that there was a 
conflict regarding the need for school funding between the mayor and the governor.  
Mayor Daley voiced the city’s need for additional school funding on several occasions.  
Governor Edgar made it clear that the state would not provide additional funding and 
pointed out that if the state covered Chicago’s shortfall and treated every other school 
district equally, it would cost one billion dollars: “Well, there isn’t a billion, I have to tell 
you, in the budget for new money.”165  Common themes in the language of the governor 
and mayor leading to the selection of the new CEO were accountability, fiscal 
management, management problems, controlling costs, and money.  Mayor Daley 
ultimately selected Paul Vallas as the first CPS CEO.  Vallas was a former Chicago city 
budget director who reformed the city Revenue Department and was the former executive 
director of the Illinois Economic and Fiscal Commission.  Upon taking the position of 
CEO, Vallas revealed the focus of his new position according to the mayor: “But 
whatever the case, the mayor has put Gery and me over here to bring financial stability to 
the system and improve education.  And we don’t expect to fail.”166 
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The next chapter will examine the words and actions of Paul Vallas to provide 
evidence regarding how he carried out the role of CPS CEO according to the expectations 
of Mayor Daley and later analyze those words and actions according to Sergiovanni’s 
Five Sources of Authority.  The researcher will also provide an analysis explaining 
similarities and/or differences in how Vallas carried out the role of CEO as compared 
with the characteristics of a corporate CEO as defined in this chapter.
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CHAPTER III 
 
PAUL VALLAS: CPS’ FIRST CEO 
 
Background 
 
 Illinois Legislative Public Act 89-15 would become known as the 1995 Chicago 
School Reform Amendatory Act because of alterations to the original 1988 School 
Reform Act that dramatically changed the governance structure for the Chicago Public 
Schools.  The term Board of Education was struck, and replaced by Chicago School 
Reform Board of Trustees.  Specific language was in place specifying that the direct 
appointment of their positions would be made by the mayor, without the need for the 
consent of the city council.  Following that language was the creation of a “full-time 
compensated chief executive officer” appointed at the mayor’s discretion.1  The language 
embedded in the Amendatory Act clearly outlined the purpose for the changes: 
Sec. 34-3.3. Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees; powers and 
duties; chief operating, fiscal, educational and purchasing officers.  The 
General Assembly finds that an education emergency exists in the Chicago 
Public Schools and that a 5-member Chicago School Reform Board of 
Trustees shall be established for a 4 year period to bring educational and 
financial stability to the system.2 
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As outlined in the Amendatory Act, the Reform Board of Trustees and the CEO were 
empowered and directed to: 
 Increase the quality of educational services in the Chicago Public 
Schools 
 
 Reduce the Cost of non-educational services and implement cost-
saving measures including the privatization of services where deemed 
appropriate 
 
 Develop a long-term financial plan that to the maximum extent 
possible reflects a balanced budget for each year 
 
 Streamline and strengthen the management for the system 
 
 Ensure ongoing academic improvement in schools through the 
establishment of an Academic Accountability Council 
 
 Enact policies that ensure the system runs in an ethical as well as 
efficient manner 
 
 Establish within 60 days after the effective date of the Amendatory 
Act, develop, and implement a process for the selection of a local 
school council advisory board for the trustees 
 
 Establish any organizational structures, including regional offices  
 
 Provide for such other local school council advisory bodies as the 
Trustees deem necessary3 
 
The Amendatory Act also defined the position of chief executive officer and 
stated that “The mayor shall appoint a chief executive officer who shall be a person of 
recognized administrative ability and management experience, who shall be responsible 
for the management of the system, and who shall have all other powers of the general 
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superintendent…”4  Mayor Daley originally offered the CEO position to former chief 
of staff member Gery Chico, who reportedly declined the position in order to further his 
law career. He did accept the post of President of the Reform Board of Trustees, which 
was even more powerful.  Daley next asked Paul Vallas, the former Chicago budget 
director with a reputation of cutting costs.  Daley claimed that he chose Vallas because of 
“his analysis of managers and the whole idea of management performance and 
accountability.”5 
The 43-year-old Paul Vallas began his career as a teacher in the 1970’s, who 
briefly taught in elementary school and college.  He then served as Director of Policy for 
the president of the Illinois State Senate, and next as executive director of the Illinois 
Economic and Fiscal Commission where he was responsible for reviewing, analyzing and 
assessing the legislative impact of state finances on state and local taxes.  In the 1990’s, 
he worked for the city of Chicago as revenue director, and later as budget director, and 
was able to close Chicago’s then $125 million dollar budget gap.  He received the first 
unanimous city council vote for the passage of a city budget in over 40 years.  City hall 
insiders claimed that Vallas did this by working around the clock.  Then City Hall 
Spokesman Jim Williams stated that “In all my many years of working, I have never met 
anyone who has the determination, the intellect or the level of energy that Paul Vallas 
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has.”6  Vallas claimed that his combination of experience with education, policy and 
finance helps to explain why Mayor Daley selected him for the CEO position: “You 
cannot work for the Illinois legislature and not get a least some sense of politics. And you 
cannot survive as an effective staff person and not understand at least some of the 
fundamentals of consensus and coalition building.”7 
The language embedded in the Amendatory Act called for a non-traditional 
approach in the selection of the new CEO position, and Paul Vallas possessed experience 
regarding the new priorities for the district as outlined by the Amendatory Act.  Vallas 
summed up his intentions for his role in the district in a 1999 quote: 
I'm in a great position. I don't want to be a lifetime school superintendent. 
I don't want to be an education consultant when I'm done here. I'm not 
setting the stage for a political office. If I physically survive this job and 
accomplish what I hope to accomplish and what the mayor hopes to 
accomplish, then my ticket is written: I'm going to heaven. I can go back 
and become a normal person and try to raise my kids and spend time with 
my family.8 
 
In order to accomplish what the mayor wanted him to accomplish, his first order of 
business would be to change the philosophy of the structure of the district, which is 
illustrated with the following Vallas quote: “This district has got to evolve and become 
more like a corporation.  This is essentially a $3 billion dollar business, and we have got 
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to learn how to leverage our buying power.”9  Vallas would set about making the 
necessary changes without apologizing for any perceived lack of experience in working 
in an urban school district: “If having that kind of experience was important, how come 
there hasn’t been more success before now?”10 
Early Cost Cutting Measures 
 Vallas immediately set about developing plans to improve the district, beginning 
with communicating the new priorities of the district: “The mayor has said that 
improving education in city schools is the top priority.  Everything else takes a back seat.  
What you’ll see as we develop our plans over the next few weeks are changes that will 
help us accomplish that.”11  In a memo to all Chicago Public School employees, Vallas 
communicated goals in greater detail: 
The goal of the Chicago Public Schools is to educate our children and 
prepare them for the challenges of the next century.  To do this, we must 
improve performance in the classrooms and the schools.  We must also 
become an efficient, cost-effective organization that gets maximum public 
benefit for the taxpayers’ dollars.  This means changes have to be made.  
We are beginning to make these changes to succeed in meeting this goal.12 
 
The first changes to be made immediately surrounded Vallas at CPS’ central office.  In 
July of 1995, Vallas confronted two top district administrators- the chief education 
officer and the chief accountability officer, for upgrading their offices.  He then banned 
                                                            
9Heard, “Tough Love.” 
 
10Ibid. 
 
11Jacquelyn Heard, “New School Officials Plan Coordinated Effort,” Chicago Tribune, July 4, 
1995. 
 
12Paul Vallas, Memo to Chicago Public Schools Staff, August, 1995, Chicago Public Schools 
Archives. 
  
102
all travel by central office managers, placed a halt on catered meals and demanded 
that any orders for new furniture be cancelled: “No one.  No one is to order anything new 
unless it is specifically authorized by me.”13  Vallas also decided to retain the taxpayer-
funded car, but rid himself of the personal driver and other amenities: “I don’t need 
anyone to pick me up and drop me off at home.  There will be no more coffee and rolls 
paid for out of the schools budget.  And there is plenty of furniture here.  We don’t need 
any desks or cabinets built.  We don’t need anything new.”14  Vallas also cited that as of 
July of 1995, the old school administration spent at least $90,000 since January on 
catered food for meetings.  Vallas put an immediate end to that practice: “The next time 
we have a meeting, the coffee and rolls will be bought by me, out of my pocket.”15  A 
food and refreshments policy soon followed.16 
 Vallas continued to identify cost saving measures at the central office level.  He 
determined that a shop facility at the central office headquarters, then located at 1819 W. 
Pershing Road, was an unnecessary expense to the district and shut it down: “We have 
people here whose main job has basically been to build furniture for administrators….We 
ask them for a new lock, they bring us a whole new door….It’s ridiculous.  Those 
                                                            
13Jacquelyn Heard, “School Execs Get a Lesson in Austerity – Vallas Pulls Rug on Remodeling,” 
Chicago Tribune, 1995. 
 
14Ibid. 
 
15Ibid. 
 
16Chicago Public Schools, Board of Education Proceedings.  Board of Education, City of Chicago, 
July, 1995.  Harold Washington Library, Chicago, Illinois, p. 5420. 
 
  
103
workers should be in the schools fixing and building things.”17  He then instructed 
school board painters and carpenters that were based at headquarters to be sent to local 
schools.  Many services would now be assigned to private companies.18 
 Upon inspecting one of the districts’ warehouses, school leaders found loads of 
unused equipment that was covered with thick dust.  Among materials found were nine 
new pianos, two rowing machines, a Jacuzzi, several thousand student desks and chairs, 
copier machines, vacuum cleaners and air conditioners still in boxes.  Vallas stated: “This 
reminds me of a warehouse you might see in the Kremlin.  It’s centralized management at 
its worst.”19  The chief operations manager immediately ordered all the equipment to be 
dispersed to the schools that needed them, redeployed the majority of the custodial 
workers that were stationed at the facility, and ordered the warehouse to be shuttered.   
 Vallas also ordered an end to the heating of the main garage at the central office, 
and banned district-financed cellular phones for central office administrators: “We want 
to make sure that we send the right message.  This is not a perk-laden school district,” 
Vallas stated.  He later stated: “Image means a lot, and if you have catered meals and 
you’re wining and dining people and spending money on conferences, working men and 
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women see that, and it creates an atmosphere of public cynicism.20  Vallas also 
adopted a travel policy to curtail travel expenses incurred by district administrators.21 
Administrators also found that the district wasted a great deal of money on 
telecommunications.  They found that too many calls were made to 411, and in some 
instances, to 900 numbers.  The district paid 2.3 million dollars per year for stationary 
telephone equipment while the City of Chicago (City Hall) paid $450,000.  Chief 
operating officer Ben Reyes and Vallas said they would use the administrative practices 
of city government as a model for city schools.  Vallas called the method “a sound 
approach to cost management.”22  Vallas would quickly adopt a policy for 
telecommunications.23 
 In November of 1995, Vallas found another instance of wasteful spending.  After 
auditing a commission that monitored the district’s desegregation program, it was 
determined that the group spent $213,885 of their $325,800 budget on excessive items.  
The audit uncovered over $6000 in cellular phone calls, over $600 for flowers and 
Christmas cards, and almost $10,000 in meals at expensive steak houses, as well as bills 
for massages, alcoholic drinks and theater tickets.  The audit was released in response to 
a lawsuit that the commission brought against the board for allegedly failing to provide 
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the commission with additional finances and data.  An outraged Vallas retorted: 
“How dare they file a lawsuit against us! This audit speaks for itself.  These people were 
wining and dining at taxpayers’ expense.”24  Vallas was then accused by a commission 
member of attempting to discredit black leadership and embarrass African Americans.  
Vallas responded “Hogwash.  They got their noses out of joint because we refused to give 
them carte blanche to spend taxpayer money on frills and thrills.  The fact is there was a 
lot of wasteful spending here and we’re not going to put up with it.”25  Vallas moved to 
downsize the commission to seven members and subjected the new commission to the 
school board’s ethics guidelines.26 
Balancing the Budget 
 After the initial cost-saving measures installed at the central office, the real work 
of balancing the budget would begin.  An important issue that loomed on the horizon was 
the need to settle a new teacher’s contract.  Within three weeks of officially taking over 
as CEO, Vallas and his new management team announced that they had already 
eliminated the $150 million dollar school funding deficit and were ready to offer a four-
year contract to teachers which included three percent pay raises over the duration of the 
contract.  Vallas stated: “We anticipate we’ll have a teacher’s contract before the budget 
is introduced.  We’ve been talking with the teacher’s union.  We’ve developed a good 
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working relationship with them; it’s a collaborative effort.  It’s not confrontational to 
look at the issues, narrow them down and get them resolved.”27  Vallas began to explain 
what to expect in the upcoming CPS budget report: 
I think there’s a consensus out there that central office needs to be 
downsized, not shifting people around.  A number of years ago they so-
called cut the bureaucracy, and they ended up as subdistrict bureaucrats or 
principals found them on their budgets, or they were hired back on 
vouchers. Central office is going to be downsized.  The public expects 
that.  The schools expect it.  The principals expect it.  The taxpayers 
demand it.  And in Springfield, the expectation is there.”28 
 
Republicans in Springfield, Illinois were impressed with Vallas’ ability to control 
spending.  The Chicago Teachers Union president was pleased and announced that the 
union had reached a tentative agreement with the new school board.  Initially, Vallas kept 
the details of how the budget was balanced under wraps.  
 In August of 1995, details of the new budget would slowly begin to spread around 
the district.  A major component of the trimmed deficit called for the cutting of over 1700 
positions ranging from janitors to department heads.  Vallas initially was vague with the 
details of the cuts, but claimed: “The cuts are very tough, but that’s just the way it’s 
going to be.  We have to get serious.  In the past, (school leaders) haven’t cut, they just 
moved around the furniture.”29  Reportedly, Vallas had also freed up 35 million dollars to 
fund new education programs including tutoring, mentoring, drop-out prevention, job 
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training services, and alternative schools for troubled students.  The new budget also 
included a 13.2 percent pay increase for all of the principals in the district.   In addition to 
the job cuts, Vallas came up with additional revenue by proposing to: 
 Contribute less to the teacher’s pension fund 
 
 Keep some of the discretionary funds CPS schools got for low-income 
students (Chapter 1 funds) 
 
 Putting 20 surplus properties up for sale 
 
 Shifting monies that financed after-school programs at field houses to 
the general fund 
 
The bulk of the money was to be used to maintain the balanced budget over time, and 
also fund an extended class day and year, move violent students from regular classrooms 
into alternative schools, fund tutors and mentors, and establish apprenticeship programs 
for high school students in danger of dropping out of school. Vallas stated: “Student 
performance improves when schools are better organized, when you have a longer school 
year and when you get violent students out of the schools.  Failure is not an option for us; 
we have to deliver.”30 
 The mood at CPS headquarters grew extremely dismal following the 
announcements of administrative cuts.  Before central office cuts were officially 
announced, extra security forces and metal detectors were put in place at central office in 
preparation for potential actions that could have been taken by disgruntled employees.  
Some administrators turned in their resignations in fear of their positions being cut.  
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Many of those administrators had spent their entire career with CPS.  At a budget 
hearing, a parent would take Vallas to task about the layoffs and ask him why he cut so 
many positions, as well as why he didn’t put more pressure on the state legislature to 
come up with additional funding for the district’s schools.  Vallas lost his usual patience: 
“Look, you’re living in a fool’s paradise if you think we’re going to get more money 
from Springfield,” he shouted.  “We’ve got to take Chicago schools out of the headlines 
and off the radar screen Downstate….We’ve got to get our (stuff) together.”31  Despite 
the growing criticisms regarding his hard line approach, he received praise from Illinois 
governor Jim Edgar: “I can’t think of anything that has been more enjoyable to watch.  
They’ve gone in and done a lot of things that many people expected could have been 
done long ago.”  Governor Edgar continued to state: “Now that the Chicago Public 
Schools have proven that they can help themselves, I think there will be more willingness 
on the part of a lot of people to help them, not necessarily with more money, but with 
more flexibility.”32 
Early Initiatives 
CPS Sports 
 After balancing the budget, CEO Paul Vallas began to turn his attention on 
initiatives to improve the district.  Surprisingly enough, one of earliest initiatives that 
Vallas focused his efforts on was related to the improvement of the sports program.  
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Vallas promoted J.W. Smith to oversee the sports programs for CPS high schools, 
with the title of Director of Bureau of Health.33  Vallas stated:  
Some of the finest athletes in sports have come out of the Chicago Public 
league. But there have been too many instances of talented students being 
denied the opportunity to participate.  The three components of our plan 
are to attack the issue of promoting more athletics, provide the facilities 
and provide financial incentives for more teachers to become coaches and 
role models.  Money will be set aside to restore the depleted coaching 
ranks.”34 
 
Vallas went on to discuss his desire to renovate fields and build campuses with soccer, 
baseball and football fields that “compare favorably with the nicest suburban schools.”35  
The funding for this would come from a 600 million dollar capital bond program that had 
not been approved yet.  Vallas would give his reasoning for the importance of investing 
in the sports program:  
Take a drive now and you’ll see high schools surrounded by abandoned 
buildings, vacant lots with weeds 3 feet high, or maybe a few bars and 
garbage dumps.  We will either buy the property or access to the property 
and build fields for interscholastic and intramural sports.  We’d rather 
have the students involved in after-school programs rather than running 
the streets….We realize sports and recreational activities are a crucial 
supplement to what we do in the classrooms.  It is a way to learn how to 
achieve goals, build teamwork and expend energy in a positive fashion.”36 
 
Vallas would soon back up his words regarding his commitment to improving CPS sports 
by supporting the creation of a freshman only sports league, and team sports for 
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elementary schools.  Vallas explained: “What we’re trying to do is give our kids some 
incentives, and offer them some of the same resources suburban students get.  Research 
has already shown that this type of thing helps.”37 
 Vallas’ support for the improvement of CPS sport programs also came with tough 
decision making.  In February of 1996, Vallas issued a verdict regarding the eligibility of 
Farragut High School senior Larry Jackson.  Jackson had recently transferred to Farragut 
from Oak Park High School, a nearby suburban school.  Jackson played basketball at Oak 
Park until he was charged with misdemeanor battery for assaulting the Oak Park 
basketball coach.  Typically, central office did not involve itself in eligibility decisions.  
After receiving a recommendation from a committee that examined the issue, Vallas gave 
his verdict:  
J.W. and the principals’ committee gave me no reason to decide otherwise.  
This was not a question of eligibility; it was a question of ethics.  We 
cannot allow someone to violate school policy at one place and then 
escape to another school.  There was never any doubt in my mind that he 
wouldn’t play.  You can’t be afraid to make the right decision….It’s the 
ethical thing to do.  This would have set a bad precedent if we had decided 
any other way.  It is important to send a message to the whole school 
system.38 
 
Jackson’s family would file a federal lawsuit in an attempt to restore his ability to play.  
The federal lawsuit argued that school officials had violated Jackson’s constitutional due 
process rights in ruling him ineligible to play without a hearing.  CPS’ decision was 
upheld. 
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 On the morning of February 25th, 1996, Ronnie Fields was involved in a car 
crash that left him with three fractured vertebrae and ended his basketball season, and 
some would argue, ruined his professional basketball career prospects.  Fields was a 6-3 
senior who previously played alongside current NBA star Kevin Garnett at Farragut High 
School.  Fields often “wowed” crowds with high-flying slam dunk shots and was one of 
the top basketball prospects in the country.  Fields was in a rental car that was given to 
him by Farragut assistant coach Ron Eskridge.  The story of the accident caught fire 
immediately, and sparked debates regarding the preferential treatment of student-athletes.  
Vallas spoke on the issue: “Teachers and coaches should not be giving students, 
especially star athletes, things such as money, rental cars or tickets to a Bulls game.”39  
After surgery, Fields had to wear a large contraption around his neck and head for 
stabilization.   
As Chicagoans who followed high school sports got over their shock regarding 
the catastrophic event, Vallas offered a different perspective: “This is a defining moment 
for our system, a golden opportunity to drive home that we are about education.  We need 
to send a message that our mission is to educate children.  Athletics should complement 
that.”40  Soon after the accident, Vallas enacted what would be considered the most 
dramatic change in Chicago Public Schools athletics in over thirty years.  A revamped 
ethics policy for sports would be approved by the Reform Board of Trustees.  Some of 
the most significant changes included: 
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 Students transferring from within or outside of the school district are 
ineligible for sports for one year unless their petition for eligibility is 
approved by the director of sports 
 
 Transferring student-athletes deemed not “in good standing” are 
ineligible 
 
 Coaches and CPS personnel are prohibited from providing gifts 
exceeding $20.41 
 
Vallas explained his rationale for the strict ethics policy: 
The whole episode with Ronnie Fields raises questions about the 
preferential treatment of star athletes.  We all realize from time to time, 
teachers take money out of their own pockets to buy a child clothes or 
food when that individual is lacking some of the basic necessities of life.  
But teachers and coaches should not be giving students, especially star 
athletes, things such as money, rental cars or tickets to a Bulls game.42 
 
Vallas further clarified his stance and defined his flexibility regarding the new policies: 
Until now, there had been a lot of gray area where things weren’t 
expressly prohibited.  Once this policy goes into effect, no one will be 
confused on what’s right and wrong.  Also in this ethics policy, any 
student being disciplined or penalized in another school district who 
transfers into the Chicago Public Schools will not be able to compete.  
Period.  End of story.  No debate.  No lawsuits.43 
 
The Farragut assistant coach, Eskridge, was eventually banned from coaching in the 
Chicago Public Schools system under the new ethics policy.      
 Next on Vallas’ agenda would be high school powerhouse King High School.  
King was one of the top basketball schools in the state in the late 1980’s into the 1990’s.  
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King featured basketball stars such as former NBA players Marcus Liberty and the 7 
foot 3 inch Thomas Hamilton, as well as the 7 foot 2 inch former professional basketball 
player Rashard Griffith who predominately played in European leagues.  King won 
multiple state championships during that time period, coached by Landon “Sonny” Cox.  
It was common knowledge in Chicago that King players allegedly received “perks” on a 
regular basis, such as shoes, clothes, and money by King coaches.  None of this was ever 
proven, and Cox was informally considered untouchable. 
 However, in April of 1996, charges surfaced alleging that Cox attempted to get 
grades changed for all-city guard Larry Allaway, and when he was unsuccessful, he 
played Allaway anyway, despite the fact that he was ineligible.  After the investigation, 
Cox was found to be at fault for playing the ineligible player, and he was suspended from 
coaching and assistant principal duties for 10 days.  Vallas stated: “I’m putting all the 
coaches on warning.  This has to be cleaned up once and for all.  The first time they mess 
up, it’s a suspension.  The second time, they get fired as coaches and could lose their 
teaching jobs.”44  A few years after this ruling, King fell from the ranks of basketball 
sports powerhouse. 
School Overcrowding 
 Before the opening of the school year in 1995, a major issue confronting Vallas 
and his staff centered around the issue of school overcrowding.  The long-range solution 
was a tentative plan to borrow 600 million dollars to construct additional schools and 
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repair dozens of decrepit buildings between 1996 and 1999.  Initially for the short 
term, the team developed a busing plan.  This plan was met with heavy criticism and 
resistance from parents, causing Vallas to back away from the plan to explore 
alternatives: “There is a big problem with busing.  People don’t like it, and it causes 
confusion.  I’m not comfortable implementing it.  What I want to do is meet Monday and 
assess overcrowding school by school and come up with alternatives that will minimize 
the need to bus.”45  Vallas and his team located twenty mobile units and bought them for 
one-sixth of the cost, which cost them half of the cost of carrying out the busing plan.   
 After implementing several cost-cutting measures to balance the budget, including 
massive layoffs, resolving contract negotiations, putting a plan in place to temporarily 
relieve overcrowding, and ensuring that the first day of school went off with few hitches, 
Vallas was ready to begin making a case for additional funding: “The fact is that we’re 
not going to be able to attack problems such as class sizes and other major issues without 
more money from Springfield.  We know what we want and need to do, and we’ll make a 
good start without more money.”46  Following those comments, a spokesman for 
Governor Edgar praised Vallas and his team but stated that it was premature to start 
talking about new funds.  Without prospects for additional funding, Vallas and his team 
began to push their educational agenda which included intense intervening in failing 
schools, ending social promotion, decreasing the number of truant students, increasing 
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the qualifications for prospective principals, and the requirement for low-achieving 
students to attend summer school.   
School Remediation 
 A controversial policy implemented by Vallas and his team was related to the 
classification of whether a school was in an “educational crisis.”  Schools that met the 
criteria to of a school in the midst of an educational crisis would receive intervention 
from central office, the principal could be fired and the LSC members could be removed 
if Vallas deemed it necessary.  Critics contended that Vallas was attempting to overturn 
previous school reform efforts with the policy.  Vallas defended the plan: “What if a 
school principal is absent and a gang is taking over the third floor of a school?  We can’t 
just sit around and wait for 20-some (parent) groups to reach consensus.  We’re not trying 
to be vindictive or dictatorial.  We’re not trying to undermine school reform.  But we 
can’t sit around fiddling while Rome burns.”47  Despite the complaints of critics, the 
policy was unanimously passed.48 
 The plan featured 16 criteria that could be considered in determining if a school is 
in educational crisis.  Examples of the criteria were: 
 Principal fails to develop or implement a school improvement plan 
 
 Principal is unable to develop an effective working relationship with teachers, 
staff and/or the local school council 
 
 Principal fails to provide a safe building for students and staff 
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 Local school council is non-functional and/or deadlocked on key issues 
affecting the educational process of the school 
 
 Other factors which in the Chief Executive Officer’s judgment cause the 
school to meet the definition of educational crisis49 
 
Vallas retained the right to determine how many of the criteria had to exist in one school 
for it to be determined that the school was in educational crisis.   
 Swiftly after the school crisis plan was approved, Vallas began to intervene in 
failing schools, prompting a flurry of complaints and criticisms from school employees, 
school reform groups, parents and community members.  A week after the approval of 
the school crisis plan, Vallas and his team declared Prosser Vocational High School “in 
crisis” and quickly moved in to replace its principal, assistant principal and local school 
council.  Prosser reportedly had a number of issues, including reports of teachers getting 
paid overtime to teach classes that did not exist, charges of grade fixing, complaints of 
the failure of school administrators to report allegations of student abuse by a teacher, 
and bullying tactics against teachers by administrators and LSC members.  Vallas 
commented on the importance of being able to take swift action rather than clearing 
bureaucratic red tape: 
It was important for us to move quickly (to replace) these irresponsible 
adults who do not know how to put the interest of children before their 
own.  This will send a signal through the system that we won’t tolerate a 
LSC, a principal, assistant principal or teacher abusing their positions like 
this.  No longer will pupils or employees have to put up with nonsense in 
schools while (district leaders) sit around saying ‘I don’t have the 
authority to do anything.’50 
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This move attracted a tremendous amount of attention from school reform groups, who 
charged that the administration moved too quickly in adopting the policies and failed to 
include due process guidelines to allow for councils to review allegations and appeal 
decisions.  Two months later, the Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees revised the 
policy and required that Vallas must state in writing all the allegations and reasons for 
declaring a particular school in crisis and outline how other measures failed to resolve 
issues.51 
 In January of 1996, Vallas and his team announced that the city’s lowest 
achieving schools would receive intensive intervention, and disbanded the LSC’s at those 
schools and removed two principals.  Vallas claimed that it should serve as a wake-up 
call for the district: “People have said that we’re taking action against LSCs because we 
have a problem with LSCs.  Well, we’re taking action against principals, teachers, 
custodians and security personnel too.  The bottom line is we’ve got to put away the 
nonsense and focus on the primary goal of educating children.”52  Reform groups were 
outraged, and wondered if the decision made against those schools had any legal 
foundation.  Vallas explained: “You can call it whatever you want, but we have the 
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authority to take action when schools are not functioning for whatever reason and 
that’s what we’re going to do.”53 
 Vallas and his team suffered a setback to their intervention plans when a federal 
court ordered the reinstatement of Tilton School Principal Debrona Banks, citing that the 
school board did not have the final authority over a LSCs contract with a principal.  The 
ruling stated that the board could not remove a principal without putting the school on 
probation and holding a hearing, as opposed to merely putting them into remediation.  
Vallas simply stated: “It just means I’m going to use the powers of probation.  We are 
contemplating putting a few on probation anyway.”54 
 In September of 1996, the district would find out what Vallas meant when he 
claimed that they were contemplating putting a “few” on probation.  The board 
announced that they were placing 109 out of Chicago’s 557 schools on academic 
probation.  A school on probation would receive assistance with the supervision of 
intervention efforts such as a back-to-basics curriculum, more classroom time on core 
subjects, after-school programs and summer school.  Probation teams were to consist of 
the current principal, other active or retired principals, central office administrators with 
principal experience, a local school council member and an outside representative from a 
university or professional education organization.  At high schools placed on probation, a 
business manager would be employed to focus on day-to-day operations in order to free 
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principals to focus on academics.  The board retained the power to replace principals, 
LSCs, or reconstitute the entire school if improvements were not made in a timely 
manner.  Vallas commented on the potential to fire principals and teachers: “We will do 
what’s necessary to move the school forward.  But we’re not going to go in and say 
‘You’re fired, you’re fired, you’re fired.’  It’s hard to say how many we’re going to 
remove.”55 
 In October of 1996, Vallas moved to reassign the principal of Marshall High 
School, one of the 109 schools on probation.  After a six-month audit of the school, the 
audit uncovered evidence of the misuse of funds and personnel, failure to complete 
accurate financial records over a five-year period, plans that were contrary to the school 
improvement plan, and reportedly, the principal installed a $14,000 toilet and a shower in 
his office.  Vallas weighed in on the situation at Marshall: “If there was ever a school that 
justified being put in educational crisis, it’s Marshall.  There’s basically a meltdown.  
There are things that are happening that are jeopardizing the education of the children.”56 
 Vallas found himself in federal court once again as the principal of Marshall, 
Steve Newton Jr., challenged his dismissal as principal.  During the hearing, the judge 
asked the school board attorneys why Newton had to be removed before an educational 
crisis hearing took place: 
You’re in an area where there’s been no finding of a school in crisis.  My 
trouble is…you’ve got a lot of things that you say he hasn’t done well, but 
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none of them seem to me to be the sort or nature to support your assertion that 
if this guy’s in the school, our (probation) team can’t get  in there.  There’s 
109 of these places on probation.  Why is it so disastrous to have him 
there?”57 
 
A frustrated Vallas was interviewed after the November hearing, and he asked: “Can you 
imagine a system where you cannot remove an employee while you’re conducting an 
investigation, an employee that represents a threat to not only the education process but 
the people in the school?”58  The School Board’s decision was ultimately upheld.  
Newton was allowed to enter the school between the hours of 4:30 and 6:30 each day to 
gather necessary documents to defend himself at the upcoming educational crisis hearing.  
By December of 1996, Vallas recommended that Newton be permanently removed from 
his post of principal at Marshall High School.59 
Changing the Principal Selection Process 
 Vallas also fought to set tougher employment standards for principals.  Vallas 
argued that the improvement of schools was highly dependent on the quality of the 
principal: “These principals are brain surgeons—they are molding the minds of our 
children.  If you have a bad principal, you are going to have problems no matter how 
good a local school council is.”60  Despite dissent from reform groups who called the 
move a step backward in the effort to decentralize governance, legislation was passed 
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giving the School Board the authority to establish higher standards for selecting new 
principals and renewing the contracts of current ones.  The School Board collaborated 
with the Chicago Principal and Administrators Association (CPAA) to create an academy 
for leadership training.  The goal of the CPAA was to “deliver services to develop a 
leadership academy that will engage school leaders in learning activities that build 
individual and organizational capacity skills necessary to increase leadership skills.”61  
Prospective principals would have to go through the academy training in order to be 
qualified to be placed on the “principal’s list.”  LSCs were only allowed to interview and 
hire individuals who were on that list. 
Ending Social Promotion 
 Under the tenure of former CPS Superintendent Argie Johnson, a policy was put 
in place mandating that a student would not be retained more than once in grades 
kindergarten through eighth.62  The rationale behind this centered on the premise that the 
traumatic social effects that retention had on students outweighed any benefits in having 
the student to repeat the grade.  Vallas disagreed:  
Social promotion was a disaster, and we can see it with the dropout rate, 
which is 42 percent.  When you’re talking about social promotion, there’s 
no pressure on the child or the school to reach the standards you much 
reach before you go to the next level.  So what social promotion did was 
take away the incentive for the kid and the system to ensure what the kids 
should be doing, and it also devalued our diplomas.”63 
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In March, 1996, the Board approved a policy for elementary school promotion.  Effective 
with the 1996-1997 school year, the following students would have to attend mandatory 
summer school: 
 Third grade students who scored more than 1 year below grade level in 
reading or math on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS)  
 
 Sixth grade students who scored more than 1 ½ years below grade level in 
reading or math 
 
 Eighth grade students who scored more than two years below grade level in 
reading or math64 
 
Failure to successfully complete summer school meant that the student would be retained 
in the grade, with the exception of eighth grade students who would turn fifteen years old 
prior to December 1st of that year.   
 By June of 2006, a reported number of over 72,000 students would have to attend 
summer school.  In addition to the 40,000 or so students who were expected to attend 
Mayor Daley’s sport and recreational programs in Chicago schools that summer, almost 
one-fourth of the districts’ students would be in some sort of summer program.  Vallas 
stated: “The mayor has always talked about year-round schools and this is kind of a 
concept of a year-round school…all designed to get the kids off the streets into 
meaningful (recreational) programs and academic programs.  That’s a very, very positive 
thing.”65  However, some teachers questioned the effectiveness of the summer school 
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academic program, asking how would they be able to bring students up to standards 
in such a short period of time.  Vallas responded: “Are we going to be able to close the 
gap in seven weeks?  Not as much as we’d like.  If, on the average, we close it by a year, 
we can consider ourselves successful.”66 
Truancy Program 
 In September of 1996, a new truancy plan was approved in order to help improve 
student attendance.  Vallas explained the need for the plan: “Ultimately, what’s going to 
really make a dent in the area of truancy will be the ending of social promotions, summer 
school, and a better education program.  That said and done, you still need special 
intervention programs.”67  As part of a plan designed to help improve student attendance, 
the Student Attendance Improvement Policy included school based initiatives, which 
involved the development of alternatives to out of school suspension, programs for at risk 
students, and programs for chronic truants.  The program also included system wide 
initiatives, such as computerized attendance and automated calling.  The Board also 
created a 24-hour truancy hotline number to give businesses and residents a means by 
which to report truant students.  To hold schools accountable, a central office staff 
member would conduct school attendance audits.68 
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First School Year, Progress Made, More Progress Needed 
 After a full school year as CEO, Vallas and his team experienced significant gains 
in elementary ITBS scores, but high schools posted some of the lowest scores of the 
decade.  Vallas restated the expectations: “The bottom line is the whole system has to 
move forward.  We realize that’s going to take time with the high schools, but 
nevertheless the high schools have got to show the same progress as the elementary 
schools are showing.”69  Many arguments involving the causes for the failure of the high 
schools surfaced, including the previous policy of social promotion.  In August of 1996, 
the school board moved to end the automatic promotion policy for eighth graders that 
turned fifteen before December 1st who did not pass summer school.70  Instead of being 
automatically promoted, those eighth graders instead would have to attend a transition 
center that provided intensive instruction. 
  Vallas would implement more intensive intervention measures to address failing 
high schools.  Vallas would use a process called reconstitution to intervene in several 
failing high schools as well as some elementary schools.  The process of reconstitution 
involves re-staffing all of the employees in a school.  Each employee would have to 
interview for their positions.  If there were not rehired, they were displaced from that 
school.  Initially, teachers who were displaced during that process were put into a reserve 
pool where they were given twenty months to find another job in the district.  They were 
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paid their full salary during that time period.  Vallas explained his decision for using 
such a drastic measure: “This is a pretty bold step, but we have schools that are not 
showing progress and not improving and we have to use every instrument at our disposal.  
Sometimes you just have to start over.”71 
By the end of the 1996-1997 school year, seven high schools would be identified 
as schools that would be reconstituted.72  Reasons given for the utilization of this measure 
were low test scores, poor attendance, high dropout rates, and failure to follow 
improvement plans.  During the school board meeting, Vallas stated: “The bottom line is 
we are trying to fix things.  We’re into kids, not job security.”73  Also as a result of that 
board meeting, the 20-month time period given to reserve teachers was reduced to 10 
months.  This infuriated Chicago Teacher’s Union representatives.  Vallas explained: 
“There is not lifetime job security.  We cannot financially afford to guarantee that.  Most 
of the teachers who move into the reserve teachers’ pool probably will find other 
employment opportunities quite easily (in the system).”74  Out of those seven high 
schools, one third of the teachers lost their assignments.   
Tommye Brown, principal of Englewood High School, which was one of the 
seven high schools that was reconstituted, was promoted to the post of director of 
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alternative schools previous to the announcement that Englewood would be 
reconstituted.  Englewood was considered one of the worst high schools in the state, and 
had a slew of gang problems.  Brown was considered a savior for the school; working 
around the clock and with a disregard for his own personal health as evidenced with his 
swift return to work after a mild heart attack.  When the move was made, it sparked 
questions concerning if Englewood was already identified as a school that would be 
reconstituted. Vallas was criticized for his plans to move Brown who helped the school 
get rid of a great deal of gang activity and made positive academic gains in the school.  
Vallas claimed that the move was made because Brown had asked for a less stressful 
assignment and a promotion: “He had heart surgery, and he wanted a promotion, and he 
wanted to take over the alternative schools, and I’m not going to deny it to him.  He’s 
earned it.”75 
School Safety Concerns 
The 1996-1997 school year also experienced a host of school safety issues.  One 
of those issues took place at Clemente High School.  Reportedly, the dean of students at 
Homewood-Flossmoor High School, Jerry Anderson, turned down an offer for the 
principalship at Clemente extended to her by the LSC because of death threats that she 
received.  Supposedly, the threats came from a violent Puerto Rican gang who supported 
another candidate for principal.  Vallas responded: “I’m taking over the school.  The 
bottom line is that Clemente has brought this on themselves.  We have been very patient 
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with Clemente.  Clemente is going to have its independence of politics.  The political 
exploitation of Clemente students is over.”76 
In April of 1997, students at Jenner Elementary School, located in the heart of the 
Cabrini-Green Chicago Housing Authority high rises, were moved into the hallways of 
the school several times because of gunfire outside of the school.  Cabrini-Green was 
considered one of the most dangerous housing projects in the city.  An outraged Vallas 
stated: “When do these actions begin to undermine the education process?  When 
children are at school, they should be focusing on school work.  They shouldn’t have to 
be going through emergency drills to avoid gunfire.”77  Vallas met with parents, teachers 
and the principal of Jenner to offer them a temporary space, but they refused over 
concerns of interrupting the school year and disrupting the learning process with busing 
students.   
In October of 1997, students at Jenner Elementary School witnessed a man 
getting shot outside a school window.  Vallas reopened the conversation regarding 
moving the school:  
If the local school council and the school leadership give us the word, the 
kids could be out in a week.  If they don’t give us the green light, we still 
reserve the right to move kids if the situation does not immediately 
improve.  We’re not going to go through a school year worrying about 
Jenner.  Those kids should not have to be going to school in a war zone.78 
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After meeting with about one hundred parents from Jenner, Vallas continued to 
persuade them to reconsider their position: 
We do not want to go through another year of distractions at Jenner.  The 
only thing that would keep us from moving is commitments from the 
Chicago Housing Authority, the police department and community leaders 
that will permanently change the status quo around the neighborhood.  It is 
my decision to make, but I want community support.  If about 125 parents 
want to move, we would operate a small school at Mulligan and leave the 
rest at Jenner.  However, I would prefer we move all the students before 
we lose a life.79 
 
Vallas backed off of the plans to move Jenner after the Chicago Housing Authority 
promised to close down the high-rise buildings.   
 In December of 1997, a random search conducted at Foreman High School turned 
up a large number of banned items such as pagers, knives and marijuana.  Ninety students 
were arrested as a result of the search.   Vallas made the following statement regarding 
the random search: “This is one of the larger ones but the point is we do them very often.  
If you are going to have a zero tolerance policy…you’ve got to enforce that policy.  So 
we have random sweeps, and students can find themselves in big trouble if they bring 
them (unauthorized items) to school.”80 
Character Education and Service Learning 
 Vallas assembled a team of educators along with religious and community 
members to develop a character education program that would be implemented in all 
Chicago City Schools.  The goal was to train teachers over the summer in order to 
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implement the program in September of 1997.  Vallas issued his opinion regarding 
the need for character education: 
I’ve had a religious upbringing where values and ethics and morals were 
being reinforced.  The most dynamic personality outside my father was 
our parish priest.  He’s an institution.  He’s kind of our moral guiding 
light.  There are so many individuals like that in our communities who 
have for all practical purposes been barred from our schools.81 
 
Vallas’ plan was supported by the CTU, who felt that some of the responsibilities 
regarding the teaching of morals and values that may not be taught at the homes of some 
CPS students would have to be taught by teachers and coaches.    
 In addition to the character education program, CPS officials announced that sixty 
hours of community service would be a prerequisite for high school graduation.  To 
fulfill this requirement, CPS students would need to work as tutors for younger students, 
or volunteer in schools, churches, nursing homes or institutions serving the disabled.  
Vallas spoke on the addition of the service learning requirement: “We are focusing on 
academics, but it is important children learn ethics and develop a sense of community.  
Getting kids involved is great.  It also helps the community become more comfortable 
with the school.”82  This plan received some criticism from education experts who argued 
that the value of providing service is severely lessened when it is forced onto teenagers.   
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Modified Magnet School Plan 
 In October of 1997, Vallas proposed a plan that would require for all CPS magnet 
schools to reserve 30 percent of the enrollment for neighborhood children.83  Magnet 
schools were a manifestation of efforts to desegregate schools in the early 1980’s and 
encourage middle-class families to stay in Chicago.  Magnet schools offer a variety of 
different specialty curriculum choices and have citywide enrollment patterns.  There are a 
variety of procedures to gain admittance in to a magnet school, but most involved a 
lottery and an application process.   
 Opponents to that plan felt that by reserving that space for neighborhood children, 
it would defeat the purpose of the existence and purpose for magnet schools.  Vallas 
argued that it would promote neighborhood involvement and decrease transportation 
costs.  Vallas stated: “People across the city have felt for years that only the elite get into 
magnet schools.  What we are trying to do here is demystify the magnet school 
program.”84  Part of the mystery surrounding magnet schools was a general belief that a 
high percentage of white students attended the city’s magnet schools.  In actuality, the 
magnet schools all had a majority minority student population.  The opponents to this 
plan caused school officials to restructure the plan some, and decide to cut the 30 percent 
number in half.  After the first year, if the program was successful, the district could vote 
to increase the percentage.   
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Victory at Springfield 
 In December of 1997, Vallas and the Chicago Reform Board of Trustees 
experienced a major victory in regards to school funding.  Despite heavy lobbying efforts 
from tobacco and gambling companies, the state approved a $485 million dollar funding 
increase for the state’s poorest school districts.  The revenue would come from raising 
taxes on telecommunications, cigarettes and casinos.  The funding issue had been raised 
several times during Vallas’ tenure, and in November of 1997, the same funding plan had 
been rejected by the House.  But after Mayor Daley and Vallas urged Chicago residents 
to call and email state House representatives, they decided to reconvene for a special 
session.  An elated Vallas proclaimed: “The children’s lobby has let their presence be felt 
in Springfield…Any time the community can become organized, any time the community 
can become mobilized, any time common people turn out in mass numbers on an 
important issue, they’re going to overcome the special interests each and every time.”85 
 In a Chicago Tribune news article authored by Board of Trustee President Gery 
Chico and Paul Vallas, they explained that the bill did not solve all the problems with 
educational funding for schools in Illinois, but it allowed for the expansion and 
continuance of several educational programs, including: 
 The adding of 1st and 2nd graders to the mandatory summer school program 
 The after school Lighthouse program 
 Reducing class sizes 
 Expansion of preschool programs 
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 Parents as Teachers First program 
 Cradle to Classroom program 
 The building of new schools and renovations to older buildings86 
Vallas and Chico warned that the debate on educational funding had not ended, but the 
increased funding would provide immense benefits for CPS.   
Business as Usual  
 Over the next months after Vallas’ first two years at the helm of CPS CEO, many 
of the initial controversies that surrounded the district were reduced as he continued to 
push for initiatives that he believed would improve the district.  In late 1997, criticism of 
the district’s inability to fire displaced teachers surfaced.  Vallas contended: “I’ve never 
suggested that it’s easy to get rid of bad teachers.  Removal of ineffective teachers 
remains a difficult process and it will remain that way until state laws change.”87  Soon 
after this, beginning in early 1998, Vallas explored options for an alternative step 
between probation and reconstitution. Vallas explained the move: “The board is not 
giving up its right to reconstitute, but the board is open to a union proposal to establish an 
alternative step or an interim step between probation and reconstitution.”88 
In October of 1997, Vallas and the Chicago Public Schools received high praise 
from President William Clinton.  During a visit to Chicago, Clinton stated: “You’ve 
strengthened curriculum, renovated buildings, expanded pre-school education, kept 
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schools open longer and in summertime to give children who need it extra help.”89  
Vallas admitted that he and his team felt an adrenaline rush after those statements, and 
early in the following year, he took advantage of the positive statements to remind the 
federal government of its responsibility to education: “I think the federal government 
should play a larger role in providing assistance to local school systems.  Education is a 
national security issue.  If you don’t invest in education, you’re not going to be able to 
compete internationally.”90 
In response to violent outbursts in areas surrounding the Robert Taylor Homes 
leading up to the December holiday break, a Chicago low-income housing area, Vallas 
and the CPS leadership team launched a program which kept some schools open during 
the winter holiday break so that students could participate in recreational camps.  The 
board also planned to hire parent workers to help escort children from the Robert Taylor 
Homes to school. Vallas’s stated his rationale: “I’m not suggesting here that what we’re 
offering is going to solve all the problems.  We’re making a contribution.  If the kids 
aren’t in school, they’re not going to get educated.  If we have to go out and get them 
escorted, then that’s what we’re going to do.”91 
When school resumed in January, Vallas kicked started the efforts to escort 
students to school by personally assisting.  Vallas climbed the stairwells of the dangerous 
Robert Taylor Homes that Monday several times to assist kids to and from school.  Vallas 
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described the conditions at the Taylor Homes: “Does it affect their education?  
You’re darn right it does.  It’s all the more reason to have after-school programs.  It’s 
going to take time but you’ve got to have school-based all-day programs.  Do I feel safe?  
I don’t even think about it.”92  By the following week, the program was expanded to 
include additional schools near the Robert Taylor Homes and a shuttle bus program 
began, which transported students to the nearby Phillips High School through gang 
territory.   
 Also in the month of January, Vallas launched a Saturday detention program for 
students that were found to be in violation of serious first time non-violent offenses.  The 
Saturday Morning Alternative Reach-out and Teach (SMART) program was staffed by 
off-duty police officers, counselors and ministers.  Vallas described what the program 
would not be, as well as his vision:  
This is not going to be ‘The Breakfast Club.’  The kids are going to have 
vision and hearing tests, and they are going to have drug counseling if they 
need it.  There’s going to be someone there to evaluate their academic 
record and school prospects and career options and then they are going to 
get a dose of character education and drug education.  So this is going to 
be pretty thorough.93 
 
 In April of 1998, Vallas was presented an award during the Chicago Business 
Opportunity Fair for what was described as his unprecedented support and commitment 
to minority and women owned businesses.  This was in response to his selection of a high 
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percentage of minority business for school construction business and other service 
contracts.  
Daley and Vallas Display First Signs of Public Disagreement 
 The triumvirate of Mayor Daley, CEO Paul Vallas and Board President Gery 
Chico led a slew of reform efforts in a harmonious fashion during the first years of the 
reform effort.  Vallas was in the forefront, handling the day-to-day operations while 
Chico mainly dealt with policy issues.  While Chico and Vallas did not always agree, 
they maintained a public respect for one another.  Mayor Daley supported the team, and 
publicly praised their efforts and mostly stayed out of affairs.  However, when asked if 
students who fail the Iowa test for a second time would be held back for a second year, 
Mayor Daley said yes: “I will not socially promote children to high school, to allow them 
to drop out and go on…You want to promote them?  You go promote them.  And then 
you’ll see them in the criminal justice system and you’ll be complaining about your 
taxes.”94 
 Vallas’ opinion on the matter was not as definitive.  By that time, the board had 
altered the promotions policy; giving principals and regional officers input on a case-by-
case basis as to if it would be advantageous to hold a particular student back.  Vallas 
stated: “After the first retention, the social aspects of the retention are less of a concern.  
But when you are talking about flunking for a second consecutive time, then obviously 
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the social aspects have a much greater impact.95  Later, when asked about a possible 
difference in philosophy between him and the mayor, Vallas was reluctant to 
acknowledge a disagreement:  
I was pretty clear over and over again that I did not feel that the mayor’s 
statement was in any way inconsistent with the policy.  But you can take 
the mayor’s strongest statement and take our weakest statement and imply 
that there is some sort of contradiction…I’ve had conversations with the 
mayor and we’re very consistent.  We would like to think that (the student 
promotion) policy is tough, but yet the policy does have the needed 
flexibility so that we can make decisions in the best interests of the child.96 
 
Although the minor disagreement between the men was downplayed by Vallas, it would 
serve as the first sign of tension to come between him and the mayor.   
Vallas Continues to Speak 
The outspoken Vallas continued to speak on issues related to CPS and its 
students.  After the athletic shoe company Puma featured a CPS basketball player on a 
commercial, Vallas weighed in on possible consequences: “The promotion, or over 
promotion, of sports can shift students’ attention away from investing time and effort in 
things of greater importance.  Some students have a greater chance of being struck by a 
meteorite than of making the NBA.”97  The commercial prompted a policy that banned 
CPS students from promoting athletic products.   
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Notable Events to Follow 
After learning that three of Chicago’s seven charter schools scored poorly 
on the Iowa test, Vallas stated: “We have enough poor-performing schools so 
their charters will be revoked if they don’t make gains.”98 
 In May of 1998, Vallas installed a busing plan that was designed to save 
money by requiring that two schools share one school bus.  The plan affected 
several magnet schools, which resulted in parent complaints.  Vallas stated 
“The basic policy is, in effect, done.  If people want to communicate their 
displeasure about the busing policy (at public hearings on the budget) they 
can.  But this is already our policy.”99 
 In June of 1998, CPS announced that ten new day-care centers for teen 
mothers would be opened.  Critics wondered if the centers would encourage 
teens to have sex and have babies.  Vallas believed that: “Rather than losing 
two generations of children, this is an opportunity to save two generations of 
children.”100 
 Paul Vallas, along with other officials were appointed by Governor Edgar to 
examine the problem related to educational funding in the south suburbs of 
Chicago. 
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 A special advisory council recommended that 15 CPS schools be 
reconstituted.  Although Vallas stated that he wanted to ensure that the board 
did not make the same mistakes as they had with previous reconstitutions, he 
would claim that he planned to rid the school of teachers and principals: “Will 
there be staffing changes?  Absolutely.  The issue is if you are not going to 
reconstitute, how are you going to get at ineffective teachers?  Could there be 
personnel changes?  Yeah, there could be.”101 
 During an interview with Chicago Tribune education reporter Michael 
Martinez, he was asked about his formula for success in the district, and about 
his critics.  One of his responses was:  
When I came in, everybody made excuses why the kids couldn’t learn.  
Now they are making excuses why the kids are learning.  Really, that’s 
an important issue: For example, supposedly we’re scaring the hell out 
of everybody.  Is fear a factor?  Well, if fear is synonymous with 
accountability, then I’ll take fear anytime.102 
 
 Vallas was given the authority to choose an interim principal when the LSC 
has reached an impasse.103 
 In August of 1998, the CPS central office moved from Pershing Road to 125 
S. Clark St. in Chicago’s downtown loop.   
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 A large number of students would be retained for a second time in 1998.  
Vallas stated: “The point is we’re hanging tough.  We’re not compromising on 
our standards.  Overall, I’m pleased with the progress, but we’re not satisfied 
because we have a long way to go.  The next year, you will ask the question, 
will kids be triple retained?  Ask me that next year.”104 
 As of October of 1998, the number of CPS schools on the Illinois State Board 
of Education’s academic early warning list was significantly reduced.  Along 
with that, the district’s enrollment was up, and improvements were made in 
attendance, dropout, truancy, and mobility rates.  Vallas stated:  
What’s making a difference is, first of all, labor peace and financial 
stability.  What’s making a difference is that we now have a system 
that holds everyone accountable for the performance of the students.  
And now we have more support programs such as extension of the 
school day and after-school and summer school programs.  I think it’s 
a combination of things.105 
 
Vallas Seeks Final Approval in Firing Principals 
 Vallas had made no secret of his wishes to have more input regarding the 
selection and retention of CPS principals.  In March of 1999, Vallas backed a bill that 
was introduced in the Senate Education Committee to amend the 1995 Amendatory Act 
to give central administration the final say in firing a principal.  Advocates for the LSCs 
created by the original 1988 Chicago School Reform Act were outraged, arguing that this 
takes the LSCs most important power away from them.  Vallas ultimately wanted LSCs 
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to have the authority to renew a principal’s contract only if they receive a satisfactory 
rating from central office, and cripple their ability to fire principals without their 
approval: “I’m trying to reduce the selection of bad principals and prevent good 
principals from being intimidated or influenced by overzealous members of LSCs.  This 
isn’t anything new, because I’ve been talking about this for four years.”106 
Tension With Board President Emerges 
 Behind closed doors, it was common knowledge that CEO Paul Vallas and Board 
President Gery Chico did not always see eye-to-eye on every issue, and tension would 
build from time to time.  Both men always publicly respected one another and played 
down any difference of opinion.  However, in May of 1999, their difference would be 
made more public.  During a three day educational conference headed by the mayor, 
Vallas became upset when a video played at the conference labeled him as “deputy 
superintendent.”  City Hall, who produced the video, called it a production film error, but 
it was reportedly the subject of jokes at the conference.  A glossy brochure for the 
conference reportedly included Chico’s name but omitted Vallas.  Those behind-the-
scenes gaffes as well as other tension regarding personnel issues caused reporters to ask 
Vallas about the tension and his future with CPS.  This time, Vallas acknowledged that 
there was tension, but claimed that he wanted to stay: “It’s really up to the mayor whether 
or not he’s going to keep the team together.  And he also has to make a decision 
regarding the board too….So I’m not the only person whose fate is yet to be determined.  
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If I was asked to stay, I would.  I would be inclined to keep the management team 
intact.”107 
Other Notable Events 1999–2000 
 CPS decided that it would not retain students in the same grade for a third 
time in a row.108  Vallas stated: “Let’s be realistic, this is not backing off (the 
policy against social promotions).  All policies have to be flexible.  Look, our 
retention policy is probably the toughest in the nation.  It would be more of an 
issue if we had more triple retainees.”109 
 CPS posted the fifth straight year of gains on the Iowa tests 
 When asked about his future, Vallas stated: “I personally feel that I need two 
more years to institutionalize the changes and after the two years, we’ll see.  
In two years, the system will probably have had enough of me.”110 
 CPS students posted low scores on the newly administered Illinois Standards 
Achievement Test (ISAT) in 1999, which contrasted the improvements made 
on the national Iowa test.  This trend continued in the year 2000 as well.  
                                                            
107Michael Martinez and Ray Quintanilla, “Vallas Talks of `Tension' with School Board Chief – 
Job Future in Doubt Amid Rift with Chico,” Chicago Tribune, 1999. 
 
108Chicago Public Schools, Board of Education Proceedings.  Board of Education, City of 
Chicago, August, 1999.  Harold Washington Library, Chicago, Illinois, pp. 61-64. 
 
109Michael Martinez, “Schools Won’t Hold Back Pupils Flunking 3rd Time – Chicago Officials 
Likely to Place Many in Special Education,” Chicago Tribune, 1999. 
 
110Michael Martinez and Ray Quintanilla, “Gains in City School Test Scores Clouded – Most 
Students Below Nationwide Norms,” Chicago Tribune, 1999. 
  
142
 In May of 2000, Vallas introduced a “parent report card” which would be 
implemented during the following school year.  Vallas gave specifics 
concerning the program:  
I am referring to it as a check list.  Every five weeks, we’ll send a 
check-off list home to parents: is your child bringing his eyeglasses to 
school?  A lot of our kids have health problems like asthma: Do kids 
have their inhalers?  Have kids been vaccinated? Are kids bringing 
books to school?  Are kids dressed appropriately?111 
 
 Fewer students required summer school after the 1999-2000 school year than 
in previous years based on Iowa test results. 
 CPS received the highest rating that it had experienced in over forty years 
from Standard and Poor’s, an A-plus.  This would allow the board to save 
money on borrowing for school construction.   
 CPS placed six schools under their direct control, implementing a measure 
called intervention.112  Vallas described the intervention process: 
“Intervention may prove to be the most controversial because intervention 
allows you to go in and selectively remove staff for non-performance.  After 
you do the evaluation, you can dismiss individual teachers based on the 
evaluation.”113 
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 In July of 2000, CPS announced a change to the promotions policy, adding 
an element that allowed teachers to evaluate a student’s classroom grades, 
classroom reading and math tests, attendance, homework completion 
percentage and conduct in determining a final decision regarding a student’s 
promotion status.  Vallas explained: “This is the natural progression of our 
rising standards.  This is something we have wanted to do for a long time.”114 
Vallas and Daley Bump Heads Again 
 Despite a major back-to-school campaign for the 2000-2001 school year 
publicized by Mayor Daley, a record number of students were absent on the first day – 
over 100,000 students.  CPS officials believed that the reason for the low turnout was 
related to a possible backlash to the back-to-school rally, which asked that parents walk 
their children to school for the first day.  The result was a higher than normal turnout of 
parents to go along with the low turnout of students.  Vallas believed that the rally may 
have been a factor, but blamed the low turnout on the earlier than normal start: “While I 
think those are factors, I think the major factor is the very early start.  We have to figure 
out a way to have a three-week break instead of a two-week break.”115 
Mayor Daley did not quite agree with Vallas’ rationale for the low first day 
attendance.  Daley commented: “It’s like saying, ‘Do I have to go to work at 9 o’clock?’ I 
mean, ridiculous.  I mean we know school’s going to start.  They can’t keep making 
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excuses now ‘Well, it started too early.’ ‘Well, we should start Oct. 1.’”116  Vallas 
continued to publicly disagree and stated that he would start school later the next year.  
The End of the Tenure of Paul Vallas 
 Leading up to the end of the tenure of Paul Vallas as CPS CEO, reports of a 
flattening of test scores surfaced, as well as reports of continued poor performance by 
CPS students on the state’s new ISAT test.  One particular Tribune newspaper article 
written in November of 2000, which title began: Another Bad Year for City Schools 
highlighted the districts’ failure to produce positive ISAT test scores.117  Vallas took 
exception to the article, and in particular the headline.  He did not think that it was fair to 
judge the success of the school year according to ISAT test results, as evidenced by an 
article that he wrote for the Chicago Tribune a week later.  He argued that the following 
facts did not constitute a “bad year” for CPS (in his words): 
 This is the fifth consecutive year that Chicago Public Schools 
elementary school students have improved their scores on the Iowa 
Test of Basic Skills 
 
 This is the fourth consecutive year that Chicago Public Schools high 
school students have improved the scores they earned on the Test of 
Achievement and Proficiency 
 
 This is the third consecutive year that the number of Chicago Public 
Schools students taking and passing the advanced placement tests has 
increased 
 
 This is the third consecutive year that our dropout rate has declined 
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 This year’s increase in the graduation rate puts it as a 15-year high 
 
 This is the third time in the last four years that ACT scores have risen 
while the national composite scores have remained the same.118 
 
Vallas went on to state: “Our students, teachers, principals and administrators have 
worked too long and too hard to achieve the positive results as listed above to be labeled 
as failures, based on the results of a single test administered before the standards could be 
covered.  This is neither responsible nor fair.”119 
 Mayor Daley did not seem satisfied with the state of affairs for CPS.  At his 
annual State of the City speech in February of 2001, he expressed frustration with the 
slow progress in CPS student reading abilities and claimed that schools would need to 
utilize non-traditional ideas and think “outside of the box” to help students improve:  
When you go into a school, you see kids who deal with technology faster 
than any of us, who can sing a rap song better than anyone else, but they 
have a problem reading…With every child there is ability.  How do we get 
it out of them? ... I think we have to go outside of the box.120 
 
Vallas claimed that he was planning three initiatives that would enhance performance.  
He revealed that one of his proposals would include a standardized curriculum from 
central office: “The studies have indicated that the schools where we go in and dictate 
curriculum are the schools that seem to be doing the best.”121  He also took a shot at 1988 
decentralization efforts: “This whole concept of having 600 schools doing 600 different 
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things, the whole premise of the first school reform movement in 1987—what we are 
learning is that the probationary schools, the schools where we intervene and go in and 
dictate models, are the ones making the most significant gains.”122 
 At this point, speculation regarding Vallas’s future with CPS increased.  In 
addition, there were several rumors regarding Vallas’s possible interest in running for 
governor of Illinois.  Vallas dispelled those rumors on several occasions, which did not 
stop the speculation.  A supposed reconciliation between Vallas and Daley took place 
after a couple of weeks of comments between the two after the mayor’s statement 
regarding the direction that the reform efforts should be focused.  Vallas stated: “We’re 
frustrated too.  The mayor’s call for new ideas and new innovations, we don’t shy away 
from those things.  My response was to be defensive about what we’ve accomplished and 
the gains we have made, but to also acknowledge that we need to do more.  So the mayor 
and I are in full agreement.”123  However, the speculation continued.   
 Adding to the speculation was the surprise resignation of CPS Board President 
Gery Chico.  Chico stated: 
Six years is actually a lengthy period of service in this position.  Of the 80 
prior presidents of this board, only three have served longer 
continuously…This is a natural break point.  You would like to leave 
when there is sufficient time to find a successor, prepare that successor to 
go and start the next school year as smoothly as possible.124 
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Daley praised Chico for his dedicated service and stated that his departure meant that 
other people would have the opportunity to serve.  Questions directed towards Mayor 
Daley regarding Vallas’ immediate future surrounded Chico’s resignation.   Daley was 
asked by reporters if Vallas had done a good job and he stated: “I think they have all done 
a good job.  Like anything else, we can do a better job.”  The mayor was then asked if he 
wanted Vallas to stay.  He said “Yes.”  A reporter then commented that his answer was 
not a glowing endorsement, and he commented: “I am glowing.  What do you want me to 
do, put a moon face on?”125 
 Two weeks later, after weeks of speculation and rumors, Vallas announced that it 
would be the end: “Am I going?  Yeah, I’m going, OK?  Simple as that.  I don’t want to 
play these games for another year.  … I’ve tried not to respond to the anonymous this and 
the anonymous that or the high-level sources close to the mayor this and the close to the 
mayor that…”126  Vallas continued: “So you want to know if I’m leaving?  Yeah.  I’m 
leaving.  Yeah, I’m gonna be gone.  End of story.  So put it in the paper tomorrow.”127  
Soon after his comments, Daley hinted that the leadership team may have grown 
complacent:  
When you committed to change, you risk failing.  But unless we’re willing 
to change, we’ll never succeed.  I also hope no one has fallen into the trap 
of believing we’ve already done the best that we can.  If you believe that, 
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then you’ve given up on our children.  And I, for one, will never give up on 
any child in Chicago.128 
 
Many people believed that Vallas got a raw deal, and praised his efforts.  In 
summary, he was praised for “living, eating, and breathing” the job he was given, 
achieving six consecutive balanced budgets, a 2.65 billion dollar construction program, 
achieving net gains in reading and math standardized test scores over his tenure, banning 
social promotions, creating after-school and summer programs and improving the athletic 
program.  Daley added to the public praise, stating: “Teachers, students and principals 
will tell you there’s a new spirit in the Chicago Public Schools.  The old sense of 
defeatism and failure is a thing of the past.”129   Several letters surfaced in Chicago’s 
newspapers thanking and praising Vallas and many contained statements that the mayor 
should have retained him and warned him that he had “big shoes to fill.” 
The future of CPS was highly discussed in Chicago in June of 2001.  Who would 
take over the helm of CPS CEO to lead the next wave of reforms?  With a balanced 
budget, labor peace with CPS teachers, improved accountability, but stagnated 
standardized test scores, who would be the right individual to develop programs designed 
to produce the reading gains that Daley was looking for?  Who would be willing to utilize 
non-traditional methods and “think outside of the box?”  Daley did not take long to make 
his decision.  He would select an obscure, unassuming, 36-year-old former chief of staff 
to Vallas, Arne Duncan.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
ARNE DUNCAN AND THE NEW WAVE OF REFORM 
 
Background 
 
 In June of 2001, Mayor Daley selected Arne Duncan, who functioned as Chief of 
Staff under Paul Vallas, to replace him as CPS’ next CEO.  Duncan was primarily in 
charge of aligning elementary and high schools into clusters and ensuring that each 
cluster had a magnet program.  The magnet cluster program was created primarily to 
attract middle class families to enroll their children in the district who would opt for 
private or parochial schools, and to help reduce the cost of busing by featuring high 
quality magnet programs closer to their homes.  Duncan was also an administrator of the 
service learning program.   Duncan revealed his motivation behind taking on the 
responsibility of CEO after a few months into the job:  
This is it for me; I don’t want any other job.  It’s a big responsibility, 
making sure kids who deserve an education really get one.  For a long 
time I looked at the public schools as the enemy because they weren’t 
doing the job.  That’s why I am passionate about this job and come to 
work to make sure every child receives an education they deserve.1 
 
The mayor’s choice surprised many, including individuals within the district 
office.  One top official reportedly stated: “A lot of us didn’t find out about the 
appointment until a few minutes before the mayor held his news conference.  People 
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around here were very surprised.  Arne has a lot to learn.”2  Daley explained his 
selection, describing Duncan as “someone who starts with an understanding of how to get 
things done,” and praised his ability to “work with people and groups with different 
views to find the common ground that puts our children first.”3  During a news 
conference with Mayor Daley, Duncan claimed that he was ready to improve the 
academic progress of the students in the system: “I am optimistic that the public schools 
can offer every child a good education.  I don’t accept this responsibility lightly.  I want 
to be an advocate for every child and provide every child with a good education.”4 
Arne Duncan graduated magna cum laude from Harvard University in 1987 with 
a major in sociology.  He played for Harvard’s basketball team where he also functioned 
as co-captain.  After college, Duncan played professional basketball in Australia for four 
years.  After his professional basketball career, Duncan ran the Ariel Education Initiative, 
which was a non for-profit organization.  He was also was part of a team that founded a 
public elementary school which was named the Ariel Community Academy.5 
In addition to the selection of Arne Duncan as CEO, Mayor Daley selected 
Michael Scott as CPS Board President to replace Gery Chico.  Scott was previously a top 
executive with AT&T and the board president of the Chicago Park District.  Also joining 
the fold would be the newly elected CTU president Deborah Lynch-Walsh.  Her victory 
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came after two unsuccessful attempts to unseat the incumbent Thomas Reece.  While 
Reese enjoyed a seven-year run as president and helped facilitate a period of labor peace 
between the union and the Board, Lynch-Walsh announced that there was dissatisfaction 
with the old guard: “It’s a new day for the Chicago Teachers Union. … Many of our 
members felt there was not respect, that reforms were being done to them instead of with 
them.”6  The new triumvirate of Duncan, Scott and Lynch-Walsh would direct the next 
wave of CPS reforms.   
Duncan’s tenure as CPS CEO would be marked mainly by his handling of five 
major issues: Improvement of student performance in reading, the closing and 
consolidating of schools, funding issues, the No Child Left Behind Act, and the 
Renaissance 2010 plan launched by Mayor Daley.  While Paul Vallas took the office of 
CEO aggressively from the very beginning, Duncan worked behind the scenes and did 
not provide a high volume of media statements as his predecessor.  This style would 
immediately draw some criticism from local media outlets, who wondered if Duncan was 
operating with a sense of urgency.  Duncan answered those criticisms in a written 
statement published in the December 21st issue of the Chicago Tribune, in which he took 
a shot at Paul Vallas by stating that self-promotion was not his principal concern:  
Perhaps some would say that I have erred by concentrating on substance 
over style, and on making headway rather than headlines.  Informing the 
public of our many initiatives surely is an important task, and one on 
which I will work even harder in the months to come…But ultimately, our 
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success or failure will be measured on the basis of the ongoing progress we 
make, starting with student performance.7 
 
Throughout his tenure, Duncan would utilize written communications as a primary means 
of informing the public of his opinions regarding decisions and policies.    
Duncan called the post of chief education officer the most important in his 
cabinet.  In August of 2001, he appointed Dr. Barbara Eason-Watkins to the position.8  
Eason-Watkins was the principal of McCosh Elementary school, who led her school to 
standardized test scores that were double what they were when she began.  Duncan 
stated: “That is exactly the model I’m looking for.  I’m passionate about incremental 
change over time.”9  Duncan claimed that Eason-Watkins was an authority in reading and 
stated that he planned to utilize her to help him produce the innovative reading programs 
that the mayor asked for.  During his tenure, Eason-Watkins would serve as a catalyst 
behind the educational initiatives at CPS.   
The End of Interventions  
 One of Duncan’s first attention-grabbing decisions came with the announcement 
that CPS would end the practice of intervention, a practice that Vallas implemented 
towards the end of his tenure.10  A school slated for intervention would undergo a process 
where central office performed an evaluation of all teachers and unilaterally determined if 
                                                            
7Arne Duncan, “School Reform is Well Under Way,” Chicago Tribune, 2001. 
 
8Chicago Public Schools, Board Action 01-0822-EX21. Retrieved from 
http://www.cps.edu/About_CPS/The_Board_of_Education/Pages/Actions2001_08.aspx 
 
9Michael Martinez, “Duncan Adds to Schools Team - McCosh Principal Replaces Buckney,” 
Chicago Tribune. 2001. 
 
10Chicago Public Schools, Board Action 01-0822-PO1.Retrieved from 
http://www.cps.edu/About_CPS/The_Board_of_Education/Pages/Actions2001_08.aspx 
  
153
a teacher would be dismissed for non-performance.  Duncan disassembled Vallas’ 
intervention teams, stating: “Last year, it wasn’t always clear who was on first base.  I 
want to find the best ways to use our scarce resources and support our teachers, principals 
and students.”11  Duncan held meetings with CTU president Deborah Lynch, before 
announcing the decision.   
Early Education Initiatives 
The Implementation of CPS Reading Specialists 
 The first major academic initiative of Duncan’s tenure would be implemented to 
address a problem that Mayor Daley wanted central administration to fix immediately: 
the fact that only one-third of CPS students could read at grade level.  The new plan 
required that every elementary school spent two hours per day teaching reading, and high 
school students with low reading scores would also have two hours of reading classes per 
day.  In addition, reading specialists would be sent to the schools to work directly with 
school staff as well as students.  Duncan commented on the individuals that he planned to 
send to the schools: “The people we are going to send are not going to be the principal’s 
best friend or some Joe Blow either.  This is going to be an elite corps of people focused 
on one subject.”12 
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Small Schools Initiative 
 An initiative that began before the tenures of Vallas and Duncan, the creation of 
“small schools” was intend to provide students with smaller class sizes, more attention 
from school staff, and a safer school environment.  At the beginning of Vallas’ tenure, 
small schools were more specifically characterized, stating that no more than 200-350 
students would occupy an elementary school and no more than 500 in a high school.13  
The small schools would also feature a self-selected faculty, have a great deal of 
autonomy concerning curriculum, budget, organization, and personnel, possess a 
coherent curricular focus which provided continuity across the grade levels, and an 
admissions policy which required student and parental commitments to the school 
mission.  Under those guidelines, a small number of small schools were opened under 
Vallas’ tenure without much scrutiny from Vallas.   
 In August of 2001, Mayor Daley and CPS announced that they would begin 
taking larger, failing high schools and splitting them up into smaller schools.  Daley 
provided an explanation for the initiative: “Despite all of our efforts, many children in 
our high schools are not prepared.  We won’t be building new school buildings, we will 
be creating smaller, independent schools within existing buildings.”14  Duncan also 
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weighed in: “We want to take the successes we have had with small schools and 
duplicate that success across the system.”15 
Expanded Report Card 
Shortly after Duncan took over the CPS CEO post, Mayor Daley and Duncan 
attempted to downplay the significance of the high-stakes test scores that was a hallmark 
during Vallas’ tenure.  Daley stated: “Test scores may not improve as much as we would 
like.”  Duncan agreed that testing should be “a piece of the equation, not the entire 
equation.”16  In November of 2001, Duncan announced that CPS would use a new 
“accountability report card” which would continue to post state test results, and also other 
information such as school dropout rates and teacher qualifications.  Duncan described 
the purpose of the new report cards: “This is not an attempt to divert attention from test 
scores, but to put tests in perspective.  You don’t buy a car or a house and just look at the 
door.  This will give a 360-degree view of a school.”17  Duncan went on to state that he 
wanted his success or failure to be measured by the newer wider accountability scale: 
“Do I want to be judged on this?  Absolutely.”18  Duncan believed that the new report 
cards would allow for the tracking of the results of individual student growth which he 
hoped would be considered when the state determined the criteria for probation.  Duncan 
stated: “Schools may look good in terms of the percentage of students who are 
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performing at national norms or meeting standards, but are their individual students 
really gaining?  If a teacher can take a bunch of third graders all reading at the first-grade 
level and move them up two grade levels, now that’s an enormous thing to do.”19  
Duncan and Board President Michael Scott also spoke of using incentives to help 
motivate students to improve.   
Duncan Eliminates Jobs 
 At a meeting located at the Illinois governor’s mansion in November of 2001, 
educators, business leaders, legislators and higher education officials gathered to develop 
strategies to discuss how to improve the quality of the state’s teachers.  When the topic of 
additional pay for teachers arose, Governor George Ryan challenged the group to come 
up with plans that involved more than just money: “We can talk all we want about putting 
more money into our classrooms, but a classroom full of eager students will not succeed 
without a good teacher.  The harsh reality is we face limitations in the coming years, 
there won’t be a lot of new money.  Real education reform involves more than money.”20 
Duncan would soon have to adapt to that thinking.  In December of 2001, Duncan 
announced that the Department of Learning Technologies would be eliminated.  The 
department was responsible for helping schools integrate computers and the Internet into 
curriculum.  Duncan stated: “We are trying to streamline the bureaucracy in the central 
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office, and we are not done.  The duties of Learning Technologies can be handled in 
other departments, across our entire system.”21 
The next round of cuts was soon to follow.  In February of 2002, Duncan 
announced plans to cut approximately 80 non-teaching positions.  Duncan stated: “This is 
more streamlining of the bureaucracy that I have been talking about…I take saving the 
taxpayers money very seriously.”22  Daley praised Duncan’s decision regarding the cuts.  
However, Shirley Woodward, a former principal who was removed from her school and 
reassigned to duties at central office, claimed that the system wasted funds in other 
administrative areas.  She claimed: “I just sit around all day and read the newspapers and 
I get paid…And I’m not the only one out there like me either.  There’s at least three 
teachers at Austin (High School) who don’t do anything.”23  Duncan denied that the 
system was wasting money on administrative salaries and did not comment publicly on 
Woodward’s statements.   
In April of the same year, Duncan froze the hiring of what was called “non-
essential” employees in central office, as well as spending on consultants, travel and 
advertising for the rest of that school year.  Duncan explained that the freeze was done in 
preparation for a lack of funding from the state.  Duncan made it clear that he did not 
want funding issues to directly affect classrooms:  
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None of this impacts the schools.  This is all central office.  We’re preparing 
for the worst, although we’re absolutely committed to that not happening.  
We’re doing everything we can to streamline the central office so nothing 
we do impacts what’s most important, our classrooms.24 
 
Duncan explained that the freeze was the result of a lack of property tax revenues 
received from the state, which was a result of the federal government’s economic 
stimulus act.  He also cited a reduction of investment returns, as well as an increase in 
health care costs.   
 Within a month, Duncan announced deeper cuts to fill a 170 million dollar gap in 
funding.  The cuts would be made in the central and regional offices in a variety of 
different departments.  Duncan claimed that even if the state continued to fund Chicago 
at the current levels (at that time), there would still be a funding gap because of rising 
costs.  CPS leadership began to wonder out loud why one of the richer states in the 
country was almost dead last in educational funding.  Duncan expressed his disgust: “It’s 
not just embarrassing.  It’s shameful.  We cannot absorb deep cuts without affecting our 
core educational program.”25 
 By the end of the month, Governor Ryan announced that he had no choice but to 
cut education funding, due to a reduction in state revenues of over one billion dollars.  
Duncan responded: “Academically and morally, this is the wrong thing to do.  Any 
decrease in state education funding will be extraordinarily difficult for us to absorb, and 
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will negatively impact teaching and learning across the state.”26  Despite the funding 
gap, CPS approved a 4.6 billion dollar budget, which was slightly higher than the budget 
allotted for the previous year.  The new budget included the creation of Area Instructional 
Officers (AIO) whose task would be to directly supervise academic instruction in 
schools.  Along with the AIO positions, additional reading “coaches” were added to serve 
all schools, and would be directly supervised by AIO’s.   
CPS Sports 
 Just as his predecessor, Duncan was passionate about being involved in the 
district’s sports program.  Also, just as Vallas, Duncan expressed a desire for CPS sports 
to be equal to sport programs in affluent districts: “I want to compete with the New Triers 
and Evanstons of the world.  I really want participation in the Public League to be a 
tremendous source of pride for all our students that they are a part of something special, 
something different.”27  Duncan continued to express his passion about the importance of 
extracurricular activities:  
Playing sports and being part of a team absolutely shaped who I am, my 
character and sense of values.  You learn leadership, hard work, 
unselfishness and teamwork.  If we are really serious about young people 
being productive citizens, those are skills they need to learn, and they are 
not easy to teach in the classroom…I want to understand what our 
competition looks like, how we can be more competitive with them—and 
not just in basketball.  I want to be very, very competitive with them in the 
range of opportunities and teams and number of participants, and most of 
all in the quality of experiences we offer.28 
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He would exhibit his passion in a proposal sent to the Illinois High School 
Sports Association (IHSA).  He proposed that public league schools play in the regional 
and sectional postseason tournaments rather than its own qualifying tournament.   The 
significance of the proposal was its financial implications.  By hosting its own qualifying 
tournament, CPS avoided having to pay ISHA’s tournament qualifying fees.  The league 
would then have to pay tens of thousands of dollars for each team in the district to enter 
the tournament.  Also, CPS would lose revenues generated by hosting tournament games 
at Chicago’s United Center, the home stadium of Chicago’s professional basketball and 
hockey teams.  Duncan defended the use of additional resources: “If we are doing the 
right things, that’s an investment we’re happy to make.  If we’re providing more quality 
opportunities for our kids, it’s a tremendous use of our resources.”29  Duncan argued that 
although the fierce state competition would initially overwhelm CPS athletes, student 
athletes would become more competitive though the process.   
Duncan’s Collaborative Approach 
 Before sending the sports proposal to IHSA, Duncan announced that he would 
seek input from others before making a final decision: “After that (making a presentation 
to the IHSA board) I will make a final determination on whether to make a formal 
proposal to the IHSA.  Before then I will be talking to principals, athletic directors and 
coaches to get their feedback on the idea…”30  Duncan displayed evidence of several 
instances of collaborative decision making from the very beginning of his tenure.  One of 
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the first major instances of collaborative decision making took place before making a 
decision regarding the disbanding of intervention teams. Duncan met with CTU president 
Lynch to gather her input before making a decision.  He also agreed to hold meetings at 
each of the five schools that were in intervention status to discuss alternatives to improve 
instruction.   
Duncan’s collaborative approach would also be extended to Local School Council 
members.  In February of 2002, Duncan advocated for parent participation on LSC’s 
before elections: “Now, more than ever, we need parents and the community to step to 
the plate.  Our children’s future relies on your involvement.  This is where the important 
decisions are made.”31  Duncan’s statements were in direct contrast with Vallas’ 
treatment of LSC’s, who did not show evidence of involving them in decision making 
and fought to take some of their powers away during his tenure.  When the filing deadline 
for LSC elections approached, and the turnout proved to be low, Duncan extended the 
deadline.  He rationalized: “Since the election is still so far out, there was no reason not 
to give everyone more time so we can get more people involved.  We have to have strong 
local involvement to create strong schools.”32 
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Teacher Retention 
 Teacher retention in the Chicago Public Schools would be an issue during 
Duncan’s tenure.  For the 2001-2002 school year, CPS had to fill approximately 3,000 
teaching positions.  One of the issues that would be raised on several occasions was the 
residency requirement for teachers.  As a part of CPS policy, the residency rule required 
CPS teachers to live in the district in order to teach in the district.33  It was argued that the 
residency requirement effectively limited the teacher hiring pool by excluding top quality 
teachers that did not reside in Chicago.  Duncan initially did not believe that the 
residency requirement had to be altered.   
 Another issue contributing to the teacher shortage was the tightening of the 
certification policy.  Uncertified teachers would typically be utilized in hard to staff 
content areas, special education, and in hard to staff schools where teacher turnover was 
rampant.  Duncan proposed a two-year limit for the city’s uncertified teachers to pass 
state teacher examinations.34  Duncan contended: “The bottom line is in all of this is there 
is simply no room in our system for teachers who are not fully qualified to teach in their 
respective subject areas.”35  Substitute teachers made up a large percentage of the 
unlicensed teachers, who did not have an education degree at all, but still functioned as 
regular teachers.   
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 In December of 2001, Duncan proposed that in areas where there are teacher 
shortages, teachers should be allowed to apply for a one-year exemption from the 
residency requirement.  Duncan stated: “This is one of a series of innovative strategies 
we plan to bring the best teachers to Chicago.”36  He also stated: “At the end of the day, I 
want the best teachers in front of our students.  That’s the most important thing.”37  Union 
President Lynch was critical of the proposal, arguing that suburban teachers who took a 
position in CPS could lose their exemption if the teacher shortage no longer existed.  She 
contended: “If they were being serious about addressing the shortage of teachers, they 
would just lift the requirements altogether.  That would be the best thing.”38  The policy 
was approved without debate.39 
Food Safety 
 In December of 2001, the Chicago Tribune newspaper published a report alleging 
that rodents and bugs infested CPS kitchens and cafeterias, and food was routinely 
mishandled causing student illnesses.40  The in-depth report alleged that incidents that 
were suspected as being food poisoning instances were not reported to state or federal 
officials.  It also alleged that least affluent students were more at risk for contamination.  
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The report also contained statements from parents that alleged that their children were 
diagnosed with food poisoning but the principal failed to act on allegations.   
 The report continued to cite that CPS was the largest school district in America to 
privatize its meal program, but it caused a situation where the individuals who were in 
charge of training staff to keep the lunchroom facilities in sanitary condition and maintain 
proper food temperature did not have authority over the lunchroom staff.  In addition, 
another private firm handled the rodent problems.  Also, school overcrowding was cited 
as a problem related to food safety.  Some schools had to convert their lunchrooms into 
classroom spaces, causing them to prepare their food off-site, and have it delivered to the 
school.  In many instances, the transport vehicle did not provide proper warming 
temperatures for the food, and the food was not properly covered.   
 The report claimed that there were many instances of food poisoning that 
sickened students, but school authorities claimed that they were not able to link any 
illnesses to school meals.  Part of the problem was related to the fact that such a small 
amount of students at any given time would display signs of illness while the vast 
majority of the school’s students would eat the same meal without signs of illness.  That 
pattern would cause inspectors to note that they could not determine if a complaint was 
justified in those instances.   
 The Tribune report caused a public relations nightmare, and Duncan would have 
to act swiftly.  The next day following the report, Duncan announced a series of reforms 
that would address the issues raised by the report.  The reforms included more 
inspections of school kitchens and cafeterias, better training for food staff, and a thorough 
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examination of the food service contracts by CPS top management.  Duncan stated: 
“Nothing is more important than the health and safety of our children.  We are absolutely 
committed to doing what is necessary to ensure that.”41  Duncan and team members met 
with the Chicago Department of Public Health Commissioner John Wilhelm, and 
determined that school officials would get immediate access to data related to suspected 
food-borne illnesses.  Duncan stated: “In the past, we would get these reports in batches 
and we were not hearing of problems in a timely manner.  The communication has to be 
immediate.”42  Duncan also stated that he would launch a wholesale review of the city’s 
meal plan program and look “at the best practices around the country to evaluate what we 
need to do.”43  He also stated that his staff would hold mandatory meeting with principals 
to discuss food service procedures and would require that principals directly supervise 
their kitchen workers and ensure that they adhered to proper procedures.   
Duncan Closes Three Schools 
 Although Duncan ended the practice of intervention, the less-severe reconstitution 
reform measure would be utilized a great deal.  This practice would begin with the 
closings of the worst performing elementary schools in the city—Terrell, Williams, and 
Dodge.44  All three schools were chronically low ISAT test performers.  Although Vallas 
utilized reconstitution on a number of occasions when he determined that a school was in 
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educational crisis, this would mark the first time in CPS history that schools would be 
closed for poor academic performance.  Duncan stated: “We don’t believe these schools 
as they currently exist, will ever measure up.  There are better education alternatives 
within walking distance.”45  The decision invoked instant praise from the United States 
Secretary of Education Rod Paige: “Schools exist for one reason: student achievement.  
This is a model that people should pay attention to.  For too long and in too many 
communities, we’ve subsidized failure.”46  
Union president Lynch felt that Duncan went against his word that he would not 
close schools that school year.  She retorted: “This is no partnership.  They want to look 
like they are doing something instead of the years of hard work that it takes to turn 
around a school.”47  Within a month, she led CTU efforts in a proposal to take 
responsibility for the improvement of the three schools slated to close.  The union 
intervention plan would be for the purpose of stalling the closure of the schools while the 
union implements programs to raise academic achievement.  Duncan commented on their 
efforts: “I’m interested and open to the union’s idea.  The key for me is that I want them 
to show me that they have the necessary support of the staff at the schools.”48  Duncan 
would not rescind his decision to close the three aforementioned schools but claimed that 
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he would be open to the union helping to overhaul schools that would be considered 
for closing in the future.   
No Child Left Behind 
 Representing the largest change in federal education policy in over 35 years, and 
the subject of great debate and controversy, the Senate passed a bill that included 
educational reforms that would drastically affect school performance accountability by 
implementing mandatory testing requirements and harsh sanctions for poor performance.  
The short title of the bill would be named “The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001.”49  Its 
acronym, NCLB, would be often used to reference the act.  Education reform was on U.S. 
former President George Bush’s campaign agenda when running for office.  Bush 
described NCLB: “These historic reforms will improve our public schools by creating an 
environment in which every child can learn through real accountability, unprecedented 
flexibility for states and school districts, greater local control, more options for parents 
and more funding for what works.”50 
 The hallmark of the No Child Left Behind Act was that it was originally designed 
for the stated purpose of “improving the academic achievement of the disadvantaged.”  In 
section 1001 of the act, the statement of purpose is outlined: 
The purpose of this title is to ensure that all children have a fair, equal and 
significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and reach, at 
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minimum, proficiency on challenging State academic achievement standards 
and state academic assessments.51 
 
According to NCLB, this purpose would be accomplished by: 
 
 Ensuring that high quality academic assessments, accountability 
systems, teacher preparation and training, curriculum and instructional 
materials are aligned with state academic standards 
 
 Meeting the educational needs of low-achieving children in the 
nation’s highest poverty schools, limited English proficient children, 
migratory children, children with disabilities, Indian children, 
neglected or delinquent children, and young children in need of 
reading assistance 
 
 Closing the achievement gap between high and low performing 
children, particularly between minority and non minority children and 
advantaged and disadvantaged students 
 
 Holding schools, local educational agencies and states accountable for 
improving the academic achievement of all students, and identifying 
and turning around low-performing schools while providing 
alternatives to students in such schools to enable the students to 
receive a high quality education 
 
 Distributing and targeting resources sufficiently 
 
 Improving and strengthening accountability, teaching and learning by 
using State assessment systems 
 
 Providing greater decision making authority and flexibility to schools 
and teachers in exchange for greater responsibility for student 
performance 
 
 Providing children an enriched and accelerated educational program, 
including the use of school-wide programs or additional services that 
increase the amount and quality of instructional time 
 
 Promoting school-wide reform and ensuring the access of children to 
effective, scientifically based instructional strategies and challenging 
academic content 
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 Elevating the quality of instruction by providing school staff with 
substantial opportunities for professional development 
 
 Coordinating services with other educational services, and other 
agencies providing services to youth, children and families 
 
 Affording parents substantial and meaningful opportunities to 
participate in the education of their children52 
 
Initially, Duncan stated that he was generally pleased with the bill because it 
provided a major increase in funding for Title I funds, whose purpose was to help local 
education agencies provide a quality education to disadvantaged students.  However, 
Duncan would soon find himself frustrated with the execution of the various provisions 
of the act, including the provision to provide students in failing schools with alternative 
placements and the provisions which stipulated how Title I funds were to be spent.   
Problems with Student Transfers from Failing Schools 
In July of 2002, Chicago would begin its struggle with the NCLB provision which 
required that upon request, students be allowed to transfer out of a failing school to a 
higher performing school.  The obvious problem was approximately two-thirds of all 
CPS schools posted failing scores on the previous year’s ISAT examination.  This would 
severely limit the choices for parents who opted to apply for a transfer.  Duncan spoke 
out: “You could give every kid a bus and bus them all over the city, but that’s not going 
to improve the quality of education in Chicago.  Our goal here is to continue to 
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strengthen neighborhood schools.”53  CPS would take advantage of loopholes in the 
law, which put caps on transportation spending and allowed for district to exempt some 
school from transfers.  CPS convinced state legislators to pass a bill that effectively 
barred students from transferring into schools that were crowded, and exempted the 
majority of the city’s magnet and selective enrollment schools from taking students.  
These loopholes ultimately narrowed the “student choice” provision to schools that only 
performed slightly better than their home school.   
 Reform groups such as Designs for Change admonished CPS officials, claiming 
that Duncan was not following the spirit of the law by failing to provide a wider number 
of options.  Don Moore, director of Designs for Change argued: “This plan falls short of 
honoring the federal commitment to leave no child left behind.  Most troubling, this plan 
makes it impossible for students to attend many of the best schools located on the city’s 
North, Northwest and Southwest Sides.”54  Duncan justified Chicago’s plan: 
We fully support the spirit of the law, but there is a practical reality here 
that we have to deal with.  If every student in every school exercised 
choice, there would be a great deal of chaos in the system.  We simply 
don’t have enough space for the students, and we do not think busing kids 
across the city is the answer for better schools.  Our goal is to help every 
neighborhood school become one of choice.55 
 
For students that were not offered choice, Duncan planned to spend federal funds on 
tutoring programs, reading initiatives and professional development for teachers. 
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In August of 2002, it was determined that roughly seven percent of all eligible 
CPS students requested transfers.  Duncan stated that the number of applicants was about 
what the board expected: “The number of families who have applied so far is right in line 
with what we anticipated.  I think it wasn’t larger because fully one-third of our students 
are already exercising choice.  Chicago already has the most extensive choice options of 
any major urban district in America.”56  Observers noted that the relatively small turnout 
was a result of Chicago’s restriction of the school choices for students.  Chicago School 
Board President Michael Scott gave a different viewpoint: “Sometimes stability is more 
important than mobility.”57 
 Just prior to the start of the 2003-2004 school year, the scramble to find spots for 
student transfers continued.  Superintendents across the country complained that NCLB 
provisions provided nice goals, but unrealistic.  Duncan began to take shots at federal 
funding: “If the federal government is now going to suggest that we provide enhanced 
services, I’d like to see enhanced funding.  While I agree with the idea in theory, it is 
unrealistic because there are not enough resources.”58  The district experienced similar 
issues with figuring out how to accommodate transfer requests.  For that school year, 
there were roughly 19 applicants for every available seat in a better performing school.  
Duncan continued to promise to improve neighborhood schools: “We will work as hard 
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as we can to make all those schools better.”59  Mayor Daley also expressed frustration 
with the requirements of NCLB: “Don’t give us more legislation.  Just give us some 
money.”60 
Issues With Tutoring 
 An additional component of NCLB required that schools that received Title I 
funds must offer extra tutoring in addition to opportunities to transfer.61  In September of 
2003, CPS officials claimed that they could only afford to provide tutoring for roughly 
one-fifth of all eligible students.  Duncan argued that CPS did not receive enough federal 
money to provide the tutoring: “The reality is, this is an underfunded mandate.”62  The 
expectation from the state superintendent was to use other federal monies to help pay for 
tutoring.  Duncan claimed that federal monies were being spent on existing programs to 
help children such as reading and math specialists and after school programs.  He 
commented: “It’s not like it’s money sitting around not being spent.  Every single dollar 
we have is going into providing the additional support our children need.”63 
 Another issue related to the required tutoring component of NCLB would be the 
low number of students that would initially sign up for the extra help.  CPS officials 
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argued that they aggressively recruited parents with fairs, radio ads as well as 
collaboration with churches and community groups.  Parents claimed that they were 
given a very short amount of time to fill out complicated paperwork.  Non-English 
speaking parents were not given paperwork in their native language.  Duncan decided 
that he would set up district sponsored tutoring programs for those students: “We can’t 
wait any longer for parents to come to us.”64 
 By the end of October of 2003, during the 47th annual fall conference of the 
Council of Great City Schools, Mayor Daley expressed frustration with the No Child Left 
Behind Act, making several inflammatory statements against it.  He argued that the 
lawmakers did not formulate the law from the proper perspective:  
The law is not written into concrete.  I firmly believe this law has to be 
looked at from the eyes of the students and those that are out here in our 
school system…When it come to Washington D.C., talking about school 
reform, they didn’t have to talk to anybody in the country with the 
exception of Washington D.C.  They could’ve walked about eight blocks 
and went to a local school and asked the principal and asked the 
administrators asked the teachers: what about education?  How can we 
improve education?”65 
 
Representative John Boehner, chairman of the U.S. House Education and the Workforce 
Committee had a response: “No Child Left Behind focuses federal resources on ensuring 
that disadvantaged students are learning.  Congress will not amend the law to leave these 
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students behind.  The federal government promised to dramatically increase federal 
spending for education and we are meeting that promise.”66 
 By December of 2004, CPS learned that the federal government demanded that 
they cease to provide their own tutoring programs and utilize outside tutors or risk losing 
federal funding.  Their rationale was that Chicago had failed to show sufficient 
improvement in using their own teachers and staff to provide tutoring services.  Previous 
to the federal government’s directive, a frustrated Duncan stated:  
It infuriates me when bureaucrats in Washington make laws and set rules 
that make no sense and, in the end, harm kids.  The way the law is being 
implemented creates disincentives and discourages those who are trying to 
do the right thing.  It is wrong morally and intellectually, and it harms 
public education.67 
 
Duncan initially refused to comply with the upcoming directive.  Duncan refuted the 
demands and stated:  
Halfway through the school year, to deny children who most need help is 
staggering to me.  It shows how disconnected the federal bureaucrats are 
from the reality of teaching kids in urban areas.  I plan to continue to serve 
these children and work with the feds to help them come to their senses.68 
 
By the time that U.S. Government ruled that CPS would have to outsource their tutoring 
program, Duncan became so infuriated with the barring of the usage of federal funds that 
he threatened to sue the U.S. Department of Education.   At a news conference, he stated: 
                                                            
66Ibid. 
 
67Stephanie Banchero and Darnell Little, “Schools Pass, But Law Fails Districts - More Than Half 
the State's Systems Could Face Sanctions, Such as Losing Tutoring Programs, Under Changes Related to 
No Child Left Behind Act," Chicago Tribune,  2004. 
 
68Stephanie Banchero, “Schools Told to Outsource Tutoring - Duncan Calls U.S. Ruling 
`Ludicrous',” Chicago Tribune, 2004. 
  
175
“We’re not backing down because this tutoring program is so important to our 
children.  We hope we can sit down and talk with them and that cooler heads will 
prevail.”69 
 Duncan argued that the deadline of replacing its own tutoring programs with 
private ones would not be feasible because outside agencies would not be prepared 
enough to send enough qualified individuals to provide proper tutoring services.  In 
addition, private tutoring would cost between double and triple the amount that it had 
currently cost the district.  Duncan stated: “We are providing the most cost-effective, 
efficient and popular tutoring program.  Now, they are telling us that we’re not qualified 
to provide tutoring to our own students…I cannot believe that this is the law that 
promises to leave no child behind.”70  Eugene Hickok, a U.S. undersecretary of 
education, responded: “The first thing Arne needs to do is take a deep breath and calm 
down.  His statements really attempt to play to the concern and fear of parents, saying 
they are going to lose services, there are going to be kids on the street.  Arne is better 
than that, and these kinds of statements are not necessary.”71 
 Duncan and his team decided that they would forego the federal funding and 
continue to provide their own tutoring services.  The Illinois Board of Education agreed 
to give Chicago grant monies to help offset some of the cost.  But the Board would have 
to dig deep to find money to pay for the tutoring program.  Duncan argued that it would 
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be best to run the program without the interruption that would be associated with 
finding private companies, and they would not have to pay the additional cost that would 
be associated with the change.   
By September of 2005, the U.S. Department of Education would have a change of 
heart.  They reversed the decision and allowed CPS to use federal funding to run its own 
tutoring program.72  This allowed CPS to continue to provide tutoring help from private 
vendors as well as the district-run program.  An elated Duncan claimed that it was a 
victory for CPS students: “This is a major victory for students both in Chicago and 
around the country.  This is the most significant change in policy since No Child Left 
Behind was enacted, and it is the right thing to do for kids.”73  The “victory” would come 
with stipulations.   After one year, CPS would have to allow an independent group to 
analyze CPS’ tutoring program to determine its effectiveness, and enroll more students in 
the program.  Initially, the analysis conducted in 2005 determined that students who did 
not enroll in tutoring services outperformed students that did.74  However, the data 
showed that the sample size of students who did not enroll in tutoring programs had 
higher ISAT scores to begin with.  An analysis done in 2009 determined that students 
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tutored in CPS’s Aim High program outperformed students tutored by private 
providers.75 
Every Child, Every School 
 At the beginning of the 2002-2003 school year, Duncan unveiled an education 
plan that would illustrate the new goals of the district during the new wave of reform.  
This plan was developed as a result of numerous discussion groups with administrators, 
principals, teachers, LSC members, parents, students, members of community groups and 
social service organizations, and members of foundation, education and civic 
communities.76  The plan was called Every Child, Every School: An Education Plan for 
the Chicago Public Schools.  “Every Child, Every School” would become the district’s 
motto, and it emphasized that teaching and learning in all CPS schools would become the 
new priorities of the district.  Chief Education Officer Dr. Barbara Eason-Watkins 
oversaw the development of the document.   
 The process of developing the plan was described within the document, along 
with members of the planning and development advisory committee.  According to the 
document, over fifty discussion groups were held for two hours per session.  Participants 
were asked their opinions regarding the most important challenges that schools in the 
district faced.  They were also asked where the district should place their priorities, 
barriers to progress, and how to develop sustained school improvement.  Discussion 
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groups also conducted site visits to various schools to solicit parent, community and 
local school staff input.  One of the members of the committee was listed as “The 
Honorable Senator Barak Obama.”  Seven years later, this member would make a 
decision that changed the course of Arne Duncan’s career, and altered the educational 
leadership for CPS as well as the entire country. 
 The districts’ new education plan emphasized teaching and learning strategies, 
and clearly was a break from the priorities emphasized during the Vallas administration.  
Duncan articulated the difference: “From day one, I have not thrown lots of sexy bells 
and whistles that sound nice but do not help kids learn.  My goal is to be the best urban 
school district in America.  Nothing easy is going to get you there.”77  The districts new 
goals, according to the plan, included the following: 
1. Building instructional capacity 
2. High quality teaching and leadership 
3. Learning communities and professional development 
4. Support for student development and postsecondary training and education 
5. Schools as centers of communities in partnership with families 
6. Strengthening existing high school programs 
7. Expanded choice within neighborhoods 
8. Accountability to support improvement in all schools78 
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Accountability, a hallmark during Vallas’ tenure, was posted last on the list of new 
goals.  The district’s goals as outlined in the new educational plan remained consistent 
during Duncan’s tenure.   
 One of the key initiatives of the plan was listed under Year 2 (2002–2003) of the 
Chicago Public Schools Reading Initiative.  Listed as just one of many key initiatives, the 
creation of Instructional Areas would dramatically alter the structure of CPS leadership 
and accountability within the individual schools.  Previous to the 2002–2003 school year, 
CPS schools were split up under the supervision of six regional offices.  Each region 
contained approximately one hundred schools, and provided support on administrative 
matters such as bus schedules, disciplinary matters and facilities management.  The new 
structure would split schools among twenty-four “areas,” and would be led by an “area 
instructional officer” (AIO).79  The AIO was to concentrate on issues related to teaching 
and learning, and day-to-day operations that were unrelated to instruction were to be 
handled by a management support director (MSD) who reported directly to the AIO.   
 Each AIO would be in charge of an instructional support team.  Members of that 
team were to have a diverse collection of content experience in reading, math, science 
and technology.  According to the plan, the instructional support team was to provide: 
 Assistance in implementing initiatives within the reading and mathematics 
framework 
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 Assistance in implementing the goals and strategies outlined in the 
education plan 
 Instructional coaching and mentoring 
 Support for building professional learning communities at the school level 
 Organizing study groups for common problems and providing common 
professional development activities 
 Analyzing student data and monitoring of school improvement plans 
 Planning and monitoring of the implementation of district level initiatives80 
In addition to those supports, AIOs and their teams were to conduct instructional 
“walkthroughs” in schools and meet with school leadership teams to discuss progress and 
analyze goals.  During a “walkthrough,” the team of individuals from the area office 
would enter into individual classrooms within a school, and analyze items such as how 
instruction was delivered, the instructional goals, how technology was used during a 
lesson, student engagement, and student work that was posted.  Area walkthroughs 
caused a great deal of trepidation among teachers, administrators and parent groups.  
Teachers and administrators argued that the board was “micromanaging” them.  Parent 
groups were fearful that local control of LSCs would be altered by the presence of area 
teams.  Despite those fears, Area teams remained and reported to the chief education 
officer, Dr. Eason-Watkins.   
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The Commercial Club Strikes Again 
 In July of 2003, the Civic Committee of The Commercial Club of Chicago 
published a report that summarized the ISAT test scores for the CPS in 2002, and argued 
that the district “had a long way to go” to meet the standards as dictated by NCLB.  The 
report, entitled Left Behind: Student Achievement in Chicago’s Public School, argued the 
following: “Chicago’s system of public schools is radically dysfunctional.  The problems 
lie in the system, and the system must be changed.”81  The report also contained 
disaggregated data related to impoverished students, and argued that the data exhibited 
high correlations between poverty, ethnicity and test scores.     
 There was an argument within the report that correlation did not lead to causation.  
The authors argued that there was not credible evidence that proves that children from 
families of low socioeconomic status or from particular ethnic groups have a lower 
capacity to learn.  The authors pointed out that evidence existed that all children can learn 
when they are exposed to high-quality teaching consistently.  They contended that 
Chicago’s schools did not have a high number of quality teachers, as evidenced by the 
high percentages of teachers without proper certification.  One important factor 
contributing to the lack of quality teachers was a poor evaluation system, according to the 
report.  Teachers were not given incentives for great performance, nor were they paid less 
for weak performance. 
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 The authors of the report noted that the problems with the system were not the 
fault of Duncan or the Reform Board of Trustees.  The authors described Duncan as a 
talented and dedicated CEO, and the Board as intelligent, conscientious volunteers.  They 
attributed the problem to the system itself: 
The problem lies in the system, which lacks competitive pressures pushing 
it to achieve desired results.  It responds more to politics and pressures 
from the school unions than to community or parental demands for 
quality.  Schools, principals and teachers are largely insulated from 
accountability or responsibility for results.  The system is largely 
decentralized with limited ability or willingness on the part of the central 
administration to intervene in failing schools.82 
 
To solve the problem, parents would need choice in schools to create effective 
alternatives for their children’s education.  The authors argued that choice would put 
pressure on schools to perform better. Although parents could send their children to 
private schools or move to the suburbs, most did not have the financial means to exercise 
those choices.  To remedy that problem, they proposed that CPS open at least 100 charter 
schools in Chicago’s inner-city neighborhoods.   
Renaissance 2010 
 In June of 2004, Mayor Daley and Arne Duncan unveiled Renaissance 2010, 
which was a plan which would create a combination of 100 charter schools, 
independently operated contract schools, and CPS-run small schools.  Mayor Daley 
articulated the reason for the overhaul: “Despite our best efforts and the hard work of 
teachers, principals, parents and students, some schools have consistently 
underperformed.  We must face the reality that—for schools that have consistently 
                                                            
82Ibid., 3. 
  
183
underperformed—it’s time to start over.”83  Julie Woestehoff, director of school 
reform group Parents United for Responsible Education (PURE) immediately criticized 
the plan: “This is a wholesale experimentation on poor children.  The problem is the 
mayor and the Chicago Public Schools have been doing one initiative after another, and 
they’ve been leaving shambles in their wake.  Private industry has no proven track record 
for fixing schools.”84  R. Eden Martin, president of the Civic Committee, who played a 
key role in selling the initiative to Daley and Duncan, was thrilled: “We think it’s the best 
development to come along for Chicago—ever—and puts Chicago in the forefront of 
school improvement in major American cities.  This will offer real choices to families in 
Chicago.  And in the long term, having these schools will create examples of success and 
create pressure on the rest of the system to improve.”85 
 According to the description of the basic principle surrounding the Renaissance 
2010 plan, the goal is “autonomy for accountability.”  The schools created under the 
initiative would be held accountable for performance by the usage of five-year contracts, 
while being given autonomy to create their own unique learning environments.86  
According to the Renaissance 2010 website, the basic principles and the goals of the 
initiative were that: 
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 Every new school is held accountable to a 5-year performance plan or 
agreement 
 Every school’s achievement is measured by a standard set of metrics, beyond 
test scores 
 Schools enjoy freedom over: curriculum, length of school day and school year 
and budget 
Goals 
 Strong test scores 
 Active parent involvement 
 High attendance 
 Low mobility rate 
 Low teacher turnover 
 High graduation rate 
 High college attendance87 
In order to create the schools under the Renaissance 2010 program, CPS would 
have to close some underperforming schools.  One of the first areas slated for the closure 
of schools was on Chicago’s south side.  In July of 2004, plans were unveiled to close 20 
of 22 schools in the area, and replace them with Renaissance 2010 schools with expanded 
programs in buildings with state of the art equipment.  The area had recently consisted of 
high-rise housing-project buildings, but was transforming into an integrated, mixed-
income neighborhood that was not far from downtown Chicago.  Some community 
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advocates and planners claimed that CPS was moving ahead without gathering the 
input of the community residents.  John Ayers, executive director of Leadership for 
Quality Education, a Chicago school reform organization, argued: “I don’t think they 
would have done it this way in Lincoln Park.  It’s just a mistake not to engage the 
community … instead of handing it to them and saying ‘Hey, we’ve figured this out 
downtown, now give us your blessing.’”88  Duncan’s called the plan a work in progress 
that could change based on the community needs: “This is a historic opportunity to 
rebuild the community from the ground up.  There is always going to be fear.  But we 
really have the luxury of time here.  We can be thoughtful and deliberate, learn from our 
mistakes and make mid-course adjustments.”89 
In August of 2004, CPS announced that they would use nine million dollars of 
federal grant money to create five new magnet schools under the Renaissance 2010 plan.  
Duncan stated: “We want to make every neighborhood school a school choice.  We have 
some good schools here, but we want them to be great schools.  We need to invest in 
schools across the board.”90  Critics again contended that the Board was moving without 
gathering input from the communities about the process.  Critics also argued that the 
initiative claimed that its objectives were to offer choice in inner-city neighborhoods with 
                                                            
88Tracy Dell’Angela, “South Side Faces School Shake-Up - Residents Skeptical of City's Plan,” 
Chicago Tribune, 2004. 
 
89Ibid. 
 
90Tracy Dell’Angela, “City to Add 5 Magnet Schools - U.S. Funds to be Used to Attract Middle-
Class Students,” Chicago Tribune, 2004. 
  
186
impoverished children, but the two of the magnet schools in the latest plan were 
located in more affluent areas of the city.   
Many critics of the reform continued to ask questions about the process, leading 
the Duncan and the Board to ask for public feedback regarding future decisions.  Duncan 
stated: “There are hard choices to make, and there will always be differences of opinion.  
There’s no single formula for getting there, but as long as we all have an open mind and a 
commitment to work together, I’m confident we will achieve that goal.”  Marilyn 
Steward, president of the Chicago Teachers Union, announced that she would not offer 
ideas: “The plan is moving forward so they are asking us to be a rubber stamp on 
something they have already decided to do.  We’ll dialogue about improving schools.  
That should be our focus.”91 
CPS officials quickly realized that funding the Renaissance 2010 project would be 
inconsistent.  Although the schools received funding from the Board, there were a 
number of initiatives featured at the schools that would require additional funding, such 
as the longer school day and school year.  Renaissance 2010 schools were free from 
Union intervention because they were free to hire non-unionized teachers, but that also 
meant that they would have to use non-unionized maintenance staff members, which 
needed to be paid additional funds to cover a longer school day and school year.  The 
new schools would also need additional funding for staff development, math and science 
programs, reading initiatives, summer school, tutoring, and early childhood programs.  
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All of these programs would cost the independent schools more money, which caused 
those schools to have to raise a substantial amount of their funding from the private 
sector.  This practice worried individuals in charge of Renaissance 2010 schools, because 
it was not a sustainable model for funding.   
A non-profit organization, New Schools for Chicago, came to the aid of the 
Renaissance schools.  By February of 2005, they raised 24 million dollars to be used 
exclusively by the new schools.  Arne Duncan praised the efforts: “There are no other 
cities where the business community is stepping up with this level of support.”92  The 
group promised that they would raise $50 million to help fund Mayor Daley’s vision of 
creating the 100 new schools by 2010.  Funds were to be used for teacher and principal 
salaries, educational materials and professional development costs, and not capital or 
rehabbing costs.   
Problems with the Small School Initiative 
In June of 2006, a report was published entitled Small High Schools on a Larger 
Scale: The First Three Years of the Chicago High School Redesign Initiative.  The study 
was a quantitative analysis of how small schools compared with the rest of CPS schools.  
The researchers examined student experiences, teacher experiences, and student 
outcomes, such as student absences, on-track to graduate data, dropout rates, and scores 
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on the Prairie State Achievement Examination.93  The analysis provided a background 
on previous studies concerning small schools, and argues that not all findings are 
positive.   
The authors of the study argued that characteristics consistent with successful 
small schools, such as personalization, interactive and authentic instruction, challenging 
curriculum, and equitable student learning opportunities are difficult to promote.  In the 
case of Chicago, they argue, communal change took place but not a change in 
instructional focus.  Communal change brought about a decrease in the dropout rate and 
student absences, due to a more personalized environment.  The lack of a change in 
instructional practices was the culprit for the lack of improvement of standardized test 
scores in the small schools environment.  Duncan expressed encouragement regarding the 
improved attendance and dropout rate and promised better academic results: “First you 
have to change the culture.  Students have to want to come to school and stay in school, 
and that is happening.  I’m confident the academic achievement will follow.94 
Technology Magnet Schools 
In October of 2007, CPS announced that they would utilize $22 million dollars in 
grant monies to turn another ten elementary schools into new magnet schools.  Five of 
them would be converted into new technology magnet schools, and the remaining five 
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would be converted into various magnet schools of varying themes.  The technology 
magnet schools would be different than traditional magnet schools.  Instead of creating 
selective enrollment schools, the schools would either accept students citywide or 
function as a “neighborhood school,” where they would accept all students within the 
schools’ neighborhood attendance boundary.  To gain entry, parents would have to enter 
a lottery to be selected.  Mayor Daley described the plan: “The magnet makeover plan is 
our latest strategy aimed at creating high-quality options for all students across Chicago.  
These schools are part of a bigger picture that includes turnaround schools, high school 
transformation schools and accelerated programs within schools designed to get more 
students ready for the workplace and college.”95 
The distinction of becoming a technology academy would bring a vast assortment 
of technological enhancements, designed to help teachers infuse technology throughout 
the school’s curriculum.  Teachers would receive enhancements such as laptop 
computers; schools would receive projectors, Apple IPods, and classrooms with sound 
enhancements.  Another important distinction of the technology academy would be 
controversial.  Technology academies would fall under the category of a school that was 
redefined, which meant that all of the teaching positions within those schools would be 
redefined to technology academy teaching positions.  With the new distinction, teachers 
at those schools would have to reapply for their positions.  This reform initiative was 
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unique in that it allowed a principal to “handpick” his or her staff, which normally 
took place only after a school has been closed and reopened.   
Despite teacher resistance, the schools would open in the fall along with 30 other 
new schools for the 2008-2009 school year.  The district would move rapidly in opening 
the new schools under the Renaissance 2010 plan.  The new goal would become 150 new 
schools by 2010.  In addition to the five technology magnet academies, CPS would 
announce the conversion of five additional schools into technology academies.  These 
schools would be a part of the “CPS Technology Magnet Cluster.”  The schools that 
would be included in the cluster would have to apply for the opportunity to gain that 
status with CPS’s Office of Academic Enhancement.  These schools would receive 
technological enhancements, position redefinitions, and a change in the educational 
focus, but would have to continue to serve students currently attending the schools.  The 
schools that were selected were Dunne, Dvorak, Nicholson, Dumas, and Spencer.96 
Notable Events and Decisions 
 During his tenure, Duncan spent a great deal of time opening new schools and 
reorganizing old ones under the Renaissance 2010 initiative, complying with NCLB 
provisions and guidelines, and implementing strategies to improve reading performance 
across the board.  Besides those major issues, Duncan made several other decisions that 
reflected his decision making processes: 
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 A Harvard college mate of Duncan, Steven Levitt, developed a 
computerized model that detected patterns that helped identify if certain 
teachers provided assistance to students during ISAT testing.  The patterns 
were discussed in Levitt’s book Freakonomics.97  Duncan launched an 
aggressive investigation which determined that there was cheating at seven 
schools.  The teachers would face firing by Duncan: “We need to stand for 
something, to teach values to our students.  The overwhelming majority of 
teachers do a fantastic job.  These are isolated incidents, but we will deal with 
them aggressively and honestly.”98 
 In October of 2002, CPS officials announced that the 60 schools that exhibited 
the most improved ISAT scores from the prior year would receive $10,000.  
Duncan stated his rationale for implementing the incentive:  
For years, people have asked how you can compare a Whitney Young 
High School (which admits only high achieving students) to a Harper 
High School (a neighborhood school)?  They are right.  But you can 
absolutely compare Harper to itself, and that is what this new system 
will do.  It is a much more comprehensive approach.99 
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 In October of 2002, Duncan recommended that the board remove five high 
schools from intervention status.100  An evaluation of the schools determined 
that all achieved “significant educational progress.”  Three of those schools, 
Bowen, Orr, and South Shore, were converted into small schools.  Duncan 
asked that substantial improvement still be made at each of the schools.   
 In January of 2003, after a fight in the stands among the spectators at a 
basketball game hosted at Crane High School, Duncan suggested that 
principals limit admission to students with CPS identification and their 
relatives.  He stated his rationale: “Unfortunately, you have some people 
coming in…who are there to cause trouble.  We have to eliminate that element 
so the vast majority can enjoy the game in a safe and secure environment.”101  
Duncan’s suggestion did not become a mandate. 
 In June of 2003, district-wide ISAT scores showed a decline in reading.  In a 
statement, Daley expressed confidence in the CPS team and explained the 
scores: “Of course we’d like to see every single score increase in every 
school, year after year, but we know that’s not realistic.  We’ve said all along 
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that there would be ups and downs along the way, and this year’s scores 
showed exactly that: some ups and some downs.”102 
 In June of 2003, Duncan eliminated several jobs in a department that he 
created when he took over the post of CEO, the accountability office and 
research division.  All would have to reapply for their positions, and some 
would not be rehired.  Another 12 would be moved from central office to area 
regional offices.   Duncan claimed that this move was designed to fit in with 
the philosophy of moving resources closer to the schools.   
Duncan Removes Principals for Poor Performance 
 In August of 2003, Duncan decided to remove three elementary school principals 
because of poor performance.  The schools were Cather, Sojourner Truth and Bethune 
elementary schools.  Duncan placed these schools on probation in 2002 because fewer 
than 25 percent of the students in those schools were reading at or above national norms 
on the Iowa test, and have exhibited low student achievement in the recent past.103  
Removing a principal for lack of performance was a seldom-used intervention that was 
granted to the CPS Board of Education by the Illinois School Code.  A principal who was 
subject to removal was entitled to a hearing before an independent officer appointed by 
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the CEO.  Duncan stated: “We’re taking a very hard look at performance.  We’re 
holding ourselves and them accountable.”104 
A Break in Labor Peace 
 In September of 2002, CPS and CTU leaders announced a deal which would alter 
the 1995 Amendatory Act by allowing teachers to bargain issues that were taken away 
such as class size, layoffs, and teacher schedules.  Duncan stated that the proposal would 
ensure that “important labor issues will not get in the way of the more important issue of 
educating our children.”105  After the bill was signed into law in April of 2003, CPS 
schools opened in September without a teachers’ contract in place.  Supposedly, teachers 
were not happy with the last contract that was negotiated by former CTU president 
Thomas Reece.  CPS and CTU agreed not to discuss the issue in the media.  CPS had not 
had a teacher’s strike since 1987, and had not even been close since Mayor Daley took 
over CPS in 1995.   
 By September, CPS and CTU reached a tentative contract agreement, which 
included a four percent salary increase, longer school days, higher health care costs and 
duration of five years.  Duncan stated: “This means five more years of school opening on 
time, five more years of progress in the classroom.”106  However, CPS teachers voted to 
reject the tentative contract, and after a lack of progress during mediation discussions, 
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teachers authorized CTU delegates to authorize a teacher strike.  Duncan felt that 
teachers did not understand the settlement offer, which he felt was fair given the 
economic conditions: “There would be very few people in the public or private sector 
who would turn that kind of deal down.  We think it is a good deal, very fair, very 
reasonable.  But we will continue to negotiate and try to bring this to a good 
resolution.”107  Mayor Daley was concerned about a possible break in stability: “If there 
is crisis after crisis like we had before 1995, people lose confidence.”108 
 One of the issues raised was respect, or the lack there of for teachers.  Mayor 
Daley scoffed at that notion.  He argued that taxpayers show respect by paying the bulk 
of teacher salaries through property taxes: “If they didn’t have respect, they would tear it 
up.”109  Duncan, however, would address the notion directly.  Through an article in the 
Voice of the People section of the Chicago Tribune newspaper, Duncan attempted to 
sway teachers to accept the contract offer while expressing appreciation for their work: 
I understand that many teachers feel unappreciated.  They work hard and 
have tough jobs and face everyday challenges that can never be 
appreciated by anyone who has not stood in front of a classroom.  Every 
day I see the extraordinary hard work teachers do under challenging 
conditions.  Both Mayor Richard Daley and I know that they deserve 
credit for our success over the last eight years.110 
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Duncan expressed that there was too much at stake to allow frustrations to interrupt 
the educational process, including breaking the confidence that was built in the system.   
 As the weeks progressed, the NAACP would get involved, urging the CTU and 
CPS to try arbitration to avoid a teacher strike.  CTU would file an unfair labor practice 
complaint against school officials because of letters that had been sent to teachers by 
central office designed to sway a strike vote.  Finally, with a shortened contract length, a 
freeze on health insurance premiums, class size reductions, and the addition of a fourth 
“prep” period (a free period for teachers designed for them to prepare lessons, grade 
student work or meet with colleagues), a close vote resulted in the approval of a four-year 
contract which would mean that a teacher strike would not occur.  
Principal Portfolios 
 During his tenure, Paul Vallas changed the principal selection process, making it 
tougher to become a CPS principal.  Prospective principals would have to complete 
academy training created by the Chicago Principal and Administrators Association to be 
qualified for placement on a “principal’s list.”  Once placed on that list, the individual 
was eligible to be considered for a school principal position by a local LSC.  Duncan 
would add additional requirements for the purposes of narrowing principal candidates.  
Duncan’s rationale: “My goal is not to send dozens of resumes, many of which are 
mediocre, and make (local school councils’) already tough job more difficult.  I want to 
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send extraordinary candidates so they do not have to spend tons of time weighing 
through masses of paperwork.”111 
 The new policy would require that eligible candidates submit a portfolio that 
demonstrated various aspects of the individual’s instructional leadership and managerial 
experience.  Their experience would be judged by a scoring rubric that was developed by 
the Office of Principal Preparation (OPPD) and the CPAA.112  The requirements to 
become a CPS principal now included the following: 
The candidate must: 
1. Pre-register with OPPD of intent to apply for a principalship in the Chicago 
Public Schools 
2. Pass a candidate background check 
3. Possess a master’s degree in addition to an Illinois Type 75 certificate 
4. Successfully complete a writing sample 
5. Successfully complete a rigorous program of study approved by CPS that 
relates directly to school leadership and the principalship 
6. Successfully demonstrate relevant instructional and managerial leadership 
experience113 
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Principal candidates who were originally on the “principal’s list” were not 
“grandfathered” in, so if they did not complete the requirements, they were taken off of 
the list.   
 Principal candidates who had previously worked as assistant principals, lead 
teachers, reading specialists, and area instructional coaches would easily have the 
instructional and managerial leadership experience necessary to remain eligible.  
However, the change in the principal selection process made it more difficult for teacher 
candidates to become principals because of the requirement related to managerial 
experience.  According to the new policy, individuals who did not gain that necessary 
experience would be provided to gain the experience in a performance based internship 
program at a Chicago Public School.  The internship program had a very limited number 
of seats in comparison to the number of candidates.  
Changes to the Student Promotion Policy 
 In March of 2004, Duncan proposed a new promotion policy that reduced the 
requirements necessary for student promotion to the next grade.  The new policy would 
automatically promote students in benchmark grades (3rd, 6th, and 8th) whose scores were 
at or above the 35th national percentile ranking in reading, had passing grades, and fewer 
than twenty unexcused absences.114  Students would no longer have to post passing ISAT 
test scores in math.  Another wrinkle to the policy would apply to students who were not 
automatically promoted.  If students posted ITBS scores ranging from the 24th through 
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the 34th percentile, they could be promoted to the next grade if they posted classroom 
grades of “B” or better, passing reading unit test scores, completion of their homework 
assignments during the school year, posted at least a 90 percent attendance percentage, 
and exhibited satisfactory conduct during the school year.115  Those promotion decisions 
would be made by the Chief Education Officer.  The new policy would also end “double 
retentions,” which occurred when a student repeated the same grade multiple times.   
 The change in policy reignited a controversy surrounding the effectiveness of 
retaining students for poor academic performance that started soon after Vallas 
implemented the retention policy.  The change in the policy significantly lowered the 
number of students who would have to attend summer school.  Duncan stated: “Our goal 
is to reduce the number of retentions in schools with high rates.  But obviously, where 
children aren’t ready to go on, we absolutely will be retaining them.  But we also want to 
support them and create more learning opportunities for them.”116  Those who supported 
retention wondered if CPS was lowering the expectations for students in regards to math 
performance.  Duncan stated his position: “I think it is the thing to do educationally.  
Reading is the foundation, the skill you need to do everything else.  If they can read, they 
can make it in the next grade.  They can improve in math if we continue to work with 
them.”117 
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Other Notable Events and Decisions 
 In June of 2004, Marilyn Steward was narrowly elected president of the 
Chicago Teacher’s Union.  Upon winning, Steward proclaimed that CTU was 
a labor union, not a university, referring to the many school reform efforts 
promoted by Lynch.   
 In 2004, Duncan donated $5,000 in scholarship money from his own personal 
funds for two high school seniors.  Duncan called it a gift from him and his 
wife that would be given each year for their commitment to the community. 
 In October of 2004, CPS toughened the teacher residency policy, despite the 
fact that there was a teacher shortage.  The new policy required that school 
administrators would have to verify that new employees lived in the city.118  
Employees that were found to live in other areas were subject to being fired.  
Opponents to the teacher residency policy argued that it made it difficult for 
CPS to attract and retain high quality teachers, and new teachers couldn’t 
afford to live in Chicago.  Duncan defended the residency policy in a letter 
published in the Chicago Tribune in November of 2004: 
Since 1996, we have required our teachers to live in Chicago, a policy 
some see as an obstacle in recruiting and retaining the best teachers.  
The facts, however, suggest otherwise.  Every year our schools are 
performing better, the stacks of resumes grow and our teacher-vacancy 
rate drops.  We received a record number – 15,000 – teacher 
applications this year, up 67 percent from two years ago, and our 
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teacher-vacancy rate is less than 5 percent, a significant accomplishment 
for a system of 26,000 teachers.119 
 
 In late 2004, CPS unrolled a new screening tool called DIBELS to screen 
kindergarten students that may be at risk for reading difficulties.  Chief 
Education Officer Barbara Eason-Watkins proclaimed that the tool would 
provide a uniform method of collecting data on primary aged children in order 
to trigger intensive attention for those students.   
 A program for pregnant teens and teen parents, “Cradle to Classroom,” 
implemented by Paul Vallas, was ended by Duncan, despite the fact that it 
was considered successful and its cost was mostly reimbursed by the state.  
The program provided care for the infants of teen mothers and boasted that the 
vast majority of the participants of the program did not get pregnant again 
before graduation.  Duncan did not believe that the school system was 
equipped to handle the responsibility of providing that service: “When a girl 
gets pregnant, that’s a symptom of 98 things that are going wrong in that kid’s 
life.  CPS is not a pro at dealing with all those issues.”120 
 In April of 2005, Duncan would consider cutting 800 teacher positions in 
preparation for massive cuts in educational funding.  Duncan empathized with 
other districts in the state:  
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The pain we’re feeling in Chicago mirrors that of other schools statewide.  
The horror stories we’re hearing out there are chilling. That’s 
infuriating to me given all the progress we’ve made.  It’s simply not 
good enough for [the state] to say ‘We tried.’ Our children can’t afford 
to wait no longer.121 
 
 In 2005, standardized test scores revealed that nearly 44 percent of all 
Chicago Public School students were meeting national norms for reading, the 
highest percentage in the district’s history. 
 Also in 2005, CPS decided to stop issuing the Iowa tests.  Instead, the district 
implemented three short reading assessments called Standard Learning First.  
Duncan gave his rationale: “These assessments are a tool for teachers, not a 
punitive measure.  Testing is important, but we want to test … in a way that 
gives our teachers and our principals useful information about their 
students.”122 
 For the beginning of the 2005 school year, Duncan implemented an incentive 
plan designed to encourage better attendance.  CPS students could win prizes 
such as IPods, computers, concert tickets or movie passes for improving their 
attendance.  Duncan gave his rationale for this plan: “I’m a firm believer in 
rewarding hard work.  We want to do everything we can to encourage families 
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to do the right thing.  The reality of it is that not everyone has the 
mentality (that school is an obligation).”123 
 A Chicago Tribune article written on May 20th of 2006 alleged that high 
schools that had accepted students from schools that had closed under the 
Renaissance 2010 initiative struggled with violence issues as a result of the 
meshing of the different students from different areas.  The article alleged that 
CPS had not properly prepared the teens to transition into their new schools.  
Duncan responded to the article by defending the decision to close the high 
schools in a letter published in the June 2nd issue of the Chicago Tribune: 
The process of closing and phasing out high schools has been a tough 
one.  Drastic changes such as these, which impact so many families, 
are always difficult.  We have been and will continue to be thoughtful 
and careful in planning the transition to new schools for the affected 
families, and we have committed to limited the number of freshman 
going to any single new high school… But we will continue to close 
and phase out schools that have become schools of last resort for their 
communities…124 
 
 Board President Michael Scott resigned after five years of service. Rufus 
Williams, then head of a financial consulting agency that catered to athletes 
and entertainers, and former chief financial officer for HARPO Entertainment 
Group, a production company owned by Oprah Winfrey, was selected to 
replace him.   
                                                            
123Tracy Dell’Angela, “Show Up at School, Win Cash and Prizes,” Chicago Tribune, 2005. 
 
124Arne Duncan, “Making Schools Ones of Choice,” Chicago Tribune, 2006. 
  
204
 On July 12, 2006, the Chicago Tribune reported that 62 percent of CPS 
students “passed” the ISAT examinations.125  However, the article pointed out 
that city and school officials allegedly attributed the gains to the Illinois State 
Board of Education (ISBE) making the test easier to pass, and because 
students were given more time to take the exam.  Duncan took exception to 
the comments and wrote a letter to the Chicago Tribune which detailed his 
view of how progress was made: 
The fact that the percentage of kids meeting these standards rose by an 
unprecedented 15 points clearly shows that the strategies we have 
diligently pursued for several years now are working—a back-to-
basics curriculum through the reading initiative, an end to social 
promotions, an expansion of pre-school and after-school programs, 
and better recruiting and training of teachers and principals.126 
 
Principal Firing – Duncan Takes Side 
 When Duncan first assumed the position of CPS CEO, he spoke about the 
importance of community involvement, and displayed outward support for local school 
councils.  Vallas, on the other hand, challenged the power of LSCs and attempted to 
assume veto power on some of their decision-making powers, particularly related to the 
retaining or dismissal of school principals.  However, after the contract of Curie Metro 
High School principal, Jerryelyn Jones was not renewed after a 6-2 LSC vote in March of 
2007, Duncan would take the side of the ousted principal, which sent a message that he 
was against the decision of the Curie LSC. 
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 Duncan told a group of individuals who were protesting the decision that he 
wanted to “clone her” in order to have effective principals such as Jones at more schools.  
Duncan stated: “This is one we’re losing a lot of sleep over.  Curie is a great school with 
a great principal.  This is very, very troubling to us.  But I don’t have any easy 
answers.”127  At that time, Curie functioned as an “autonomous” school, meaning that the 
principal was able to exhibit more freedom in decision making because of the school’s 
success.  Curie sustained improved student attendance, higher test scores and lower 
dropout rates under Jones’ tenure as principal.  With all of the school’s accolades, 
advocates for Jones wondered why her contract was not being renewed.  Tom Ramos, the 
LSC chair at Curie gave a vague answer: “I think she’s a fine lady.  I don’t have a 
problem with her.  And I don’t think she’s a bad principal.  Just because they are a very 
good principal doesn’t mean you have to retain them.”128 
 Mayor Daley even weighed in on the issue, showing support for the ousted 
principal and questioning the absolute power of local school councils when it came to 
terminating principals.  Daley remarked that Jones was one of the best principals in the 
school system, and stated that she “has done a tremendous job” (at Curie) and called 
Curie a “great, great school.  Every year, attendance is up, academic performance is 
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up.”129  Julie Woestehoff, executive director of PURE felt that Daley was using this 
situation to advance an already existing agenda to destroy LSCs.   
 Duncan personally met with the Curie LSC chairman Ramos to attempt to 
mediate the situation.  As a result, Ramos announced that he planned to reconsider his 
vote to replace Principal Jones.  Duncan gave his rationale for taking sides: “This is not 
about personality.  I’m not doing this because I like Jerryelyn.  I’m doing this because 
she’s doing a great job of making an effective school better.”130  Ultimately, Ramos was 
removed from his post of LSC chair after being found guilty of soliciting commissions 
from a Curie contractor.  Duncan promoted Jerryelyn Jones to serve as a regional high 
school official who oversaw 15 to 20 CPS high schools.   
More Notable Events and Decisions 
 Duncan and the CPS leadership team decided to close two additional schools 
under the Renaissance 2010 reform plan, LeMoyne Elementary and Harvard 
Elementary Schools.131  LeMoyne Elementary would be closed for good, and 
Harvard would be turned over to a private management company who would 
“turnaround” the school – replacing all teachers and administrators with new 
staff members, but keeping the children in place.  Duncan stated: “This truly 
is a day of celebration and a new beginning for the students and families at 
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Harvard.  This school is in desperate need of a fundamental change.  We 
owe it to the students to do better.”132 
 In May of 2007, Duncan recommended that the Board of Education adopt a 
new policy on the closing of schools.133  The policy outlined reasons for 
school closings due to non-academic reasons, academic reasons, and a need 
for a change in educational focus.   There were two notable changes to the 
policy on closing schools.  One would be the closing of schools due to a need 
for change in educational focus, which allowed for the extensive reassignment 
of school faculty and staff which would allow a principal to rehire her or his 
entire staff.  The second would be a provision that prevented the closure of a 
school if that school had a new principal who had been in place for two years 
or less.   
 CPS teachers agreed to a five-year labor contract that included a four percent 
wage increase.   
 In September of 2007, CPS reported a figure of 93 percent attendance for the 
first day of school, the highest ever for the district.  Duncan and school board 
president Rufus Williams visited homes of students who did not attend.   
 In February of 2008, CPS would vote to close or consolidate eighteen schools 
due to low enrollment or low performance, causing the need for hundreds of 
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students to be relocated and hundreds of teachers would have to reapply 
for their jobs or find new ones.134  Supporters of the schools were not happy, 
feeling that the Board of Education did not consider the community in their 
decision making.  One supporter stated: “We need to fire all of you and get an 
elected school board.  CPS, you are not God…”135  Duncan stated:  “We set 
out to do what was best for children and would be the least disruptive.  What 
we got in return was a much stronger plan.”136 
 As a reward for her strong school attendance record, a CPS student won an 
automobile, prompting a debate on the usage of rewards to encourage children 
to come to school.  Opponents of the usage of incentive for attendance argued 
that students should want to come to school because they love learning, not 
because of rewards.  Duncan responded to those opponents: “We’re never 
going to apologize for that.  It’s really important for kids to be in school every 
day.  You could have the best teachers in the world, the greatest curriculum, 
but if they’re not in school, it doesn’t matter.”137 
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 CPS also developed a pilot program to pay the freshmen at twenty CPS 
high schools cash for “good” grades.  As a part of the program, a student 
could receive $50 per grade of “A,” $35 per grade of “B,” and $20 per grade 
of “C.”  Students would receive half of the money immediately, and the other 
half upon graduation.  Duncan stated the reasoning behind the program: “The 
majority of our students don’t come from families with a lot of economic 
wealth.  I’m always trying to level the playing field.  This is the kind of 
incentive that middle-class families have had for decades.”138 
Senator James Meeks Proposes CPS Student Boycott  
 Throughout his tenure as CPS CEO, Duncan lobbied the state of Illinois for 
additional funding for the district on several occasions.  In April of 2003, Duncan joined 
forces with several suburban superintendents to lobby state legislators for more funding, 
including Harry Rossi of the Northbrook-Glenview district, Jim Steyskal of Central 
Stickney and Jon Mink of West Chicago.  Duncan also has several quotes on record that 
illustrated his passion regarding his opinion regarding funding inequities. 
In August of 2004, Duncan spoke on the state government’s unwillingness to ease 
the school funding system’s reliance on property taxes: “Unfortunately, as everyone here 
knows, the state system for funding education is seriously and fundamentally flawed.  
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Until the legislature fixes that, we’ll have to turn to our taxpayers.”139  In February of 
2005, Duncan discussed funding issues: Every year, we talk about the problem.  Every 
year, we sweep it under the rug and balance the budget on the backs of children.  It can’t 
go on forever.”140  In February of 2006, Duncan wrote a letter to the Chicago Tribune in 
which he related school funding issues to equity for children: 
Our children are being hurt because Illinois underfunds education, forcing 
schools to rely on local property taxes.  As a result, the poorest districts in 
Illinois spend less than $5000 per child while the wealthiest districts spend 
up to $23,000.  At $6500 per child for basic education, Chicago is near the 
bottom, forcing tax hikes each year since the mayor took control of the 
schools in 1995.141 
 
In May of 2007, Duncan optimism regarding increased funding for schools that 
year would vanish after believing that the state was close to providing additional funding: 
“Every year, we face rising costs and deep uncertainty over what dollars will be coming 
from Springfield.  And every year that’s meant patchwork budgets and program cuts and 
property tax hikes.  Our schools, our taxpayers and our children deserve better.”142  In 
February of 2008, Duncan again gave his opinion about school funding in Illinois: “Our 
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schools are desperately underfunded around the state, and every child is not getting 
the education they need to compete and succeed in life.”143 
In August of 2008, Duncan would gain a powerful ally in his battle for 
educational funding.  Illinois State Senator James Meeks, one of Chicago’s most 
influential pastors and head of Illinois’ legislative black caucus, proposed that families of 
CPS students should keep their students from attending CPS schools and instead to 
attempt to register their children in schools in a nearby wealthy north suburban district.  
Although Meeks and Duncan were united in their belief that inequities were evident in 
the funding formula for the district, Duncan did not want the boycott to undermine CPS’ 
efforts to improve attendance: “I am very grateful for the attention [Meeks] has brought 
to this issue.  But I think we can fight his battle and win this battle without doing 
anything that puts students on a course of behavior that is self-destructive.”144 
Over a thousand students and parents met outside New Trier High School in 
Winnetka, Illinois to participate in the protest.  A sign was posted in the windows of the 
school in anticipation for the boycott: “Welcome to New Trier CPS Students.”  Students 
were provided with water and cookies and were allowed to attempt to register, though the 
effort was purely symbolic given the fact that students had to live in the district to be 
allowed to attend.  Many parents and students at New Trier made comments in support of 
the efforts to bring attention to educational inequities, and some spoke about the question 
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of culture.  One parent was quoted in speaking about a culture of wanting to learn and 
wanting to be in school as being just as important as money in a school district.   
The debate regarding the antidote for schools that serve a high number of students 
of low socio-economic status is a long-standing one.  The debate sparked by the boycott 
proposed by Meeks brought up the issue of funding versus culture.  While many 
individuals who spoke or wrote about the issue were in agreement with the need for 
additional funding for CPS schools, some individuals were of the opinion that money 
wasn’t the only issue that plagued CPS students.  Richard D. Kahlenberg, a senior fellow 
at The Century Foundation, immediately weighed in on the issue.  Kahlenberg wrote a 
book prior to the boycott called All Together Now: Creating Middle-Class Schools 
through Public School Choice, which discussed this very issue.  At the beginning of his 
book, he argued that: 
…all schoolchildren in America have a right to attend a solidly middle-
class public “common school.”  They may not have a right to middle class 
parents, or a right to live in a middle-class neighborhood, or a right to a 
middle-class income or life-style.  But every child in the United States—
whether rich or poor, white or black, Latino or Asian—should have access 
to the good education that is best guaranteed by the presence of a majority 
middle-class student body.145 
 
After Meeks announced plans of the boycott, Kahlenburg made the argument that 
Chicago students needed middle class environments more than higher per capita 
spending: “It’s an advantage to have peers who are academically engaged and expect to 
go to college; parents who actively volunteer in the classroom and hold school officials 
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accountable; and highly qualified teachers who have high expectations.”  Despite the 
differing opinions on the matter, the boycott lasted two days, and ended on the promise 
that Governor Rod Blagojevich would meet with Senator Meeks.  Governor Blagojevich 
ultimately argued that he did not have the power to re-write the school funding formula 
and that the state legislature had to be convinced to do it.   
The Nation’s New President Chooses a New Secretary of Education 
 In 2008, a young charismatic Illinois senator named Barack Obama would be 
elected to become the 44th president of the United States of America.  Obama would 
make history in becoming the first African-American president of the United States.  
After he won the election, speculation began to surface regarding his plans for the post of 
Secretary of Education.  Duncan was a friend to Obama and played basketball with him 
on occasion, and he served as an adviser to the Obama campaign on educational issues.  
Duncan was considered a less controversial choice of all candidates considered by 
Obama because they saw eye to eye on many important educational issues.  Both felt that 
teachers should be paid more, and should earn more for better performance.  Both also 
felt that teachers should be held accountable for their performance, and school districts 
should have the ability to get rid of ineffective teachers.146  In December of 2008, 
President-elect Obama selected Duncan as his pick for Secretary of Education. 
 Paul Vallas immediately weighed in on Obama’s selection:  
He has the brains, courage, creativity, and temperament for the job.  And 
he’s very close to the president [-elect], which is an important thing, 
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too…I told him to go for it.  He’s got an opportunity to really impact millions 
of lives in a really positive way.  Arne has the capacity to bring people 
together—he’s always demonstrated that skill—but he’s a reformer.”147 
 
So who was this, Arne Duncan?  Outside of Illinois, Duncan was a very little known 
figure.  Duncan’s tenure as CPS CEO would soon be summarized for the rest of 
Americans, and included the following: 
 Improved CPS first day attendance levels from 76 percent to 93 percent  
 Led the district to steady incremental gains on state standardized tests, with 65 
percent of CPS’s elementary students meeting or exceeding standards by 2008 
 Closed, consolidated or turned around 61 schools while opening 75 new 
schools under the Renaissance 2010 initiative 
 Improved the high school graduation rate by six percentage points 
 Consistently lobbied for additional educational funding; spoke out against 
NCLB mandates  
 Launched a program to pay students for good grades 
 Implemented an incentive plan for students with improved attendance 
 Discontinued the popular Iowa test, using the ISAT test as a sole indicator of 
student academic achievement.   
 Added additional rigor to the principal eligibility process, requiring portfolios 
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 Split the district into smaller academic “areas,” placing area officers in 
charge of smaller clusters of schools and sent reading specialists to schools to 
help teachers improve student reading performance 
 Implemented an “accountability report card,” which reported student 
performance in greater detail 
 Implemented a system rewarding schools with additional funding for 
improved student academic performance 
In 2009, Duncan while being asked about his plan for the improvement of the 
academic achievement of students in the nation, Duncan was asked about mayoral 
control.  Duncan was asked to describe the connection between mayoral control and 
improving student learning.  Duncan’s response included the following: 
It’s not always the right answer.  It’s a piece of an answer.  It’s not a 
magic bullet.  In some places, it might be the wrong answer.  But I would 
argue that in large urban cities with a history of fairly dysfunctional school 
systems, the work is so hard and the challenges are so intractable that you 
have to have strong leadership at the top to give you a chance to get 
there…The best person I can think of to rally all those different sectors 
together to achieve that is the mayor.148 
 
In regards to the No Child Left Behind Act, which Duncan has been on record for 
criticizing, there has not been a reauthorization as of this writing.  However, Duncan has 
promised that the nation would “get accountability right” and eliminate prescriptive 
interventions, measuring academic growth instead of current performance levels, and 
how schools are closing the achievement gap.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
 This chapter will analyze the words and actions of CEOs Paul Vallas and Arne 
Duncan through the lens of Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of Authority.  This analysis 
section will not argue for or against any particular source of authority; instead, this 
analysis will utilize the framework to organize the words and actions of the two CEOs to 
determine if they are in congruence with what was intended for the CEO model for CPS 
leadership.  This analysis will make certain assumptions that will be listed here in 
preparation for the analysis: 
 Major decisions made and described in the previous chapters are the under the 
leadership of each CEO, and are therefore treated as decisions made by the 
CEO themselves.  Even if a top official made the decision and the CEO 
merely signed off on it, it will be treated as a decision made by the CEO 
himself. 
 The Board and the CEO will be considered unilateral for the purposes of the 
analysis.  Beginning with the Amendatory Act of 1995, the Board was 
reduced to five members, and the Mayor gained the ability to handpick each 
of them as well as the CEO.  This did not mean that they were always in 
agreement when it came to decision making.  However, the unique unity 
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forged between the Board and the CEOs as a result of all being selected by 
the mayor created a unified decision making entity.  Decisions will be 
considered collaborative when outside entities are included. 
 Decisions will be judged based on the source of authority that the CEO 
utilized to ensure the compliance of CPS employees regarding the decision.  
The decisions will fall into a particular source of authority based on “why” 
they should follow the directive.   For example, if a CEO unilaterally created 
and implemented a homeless education program without input from 
stakeholders, and it requires that teachers and administrators work an 
additional hour each school day, this would be considered a bureaucratic 
decision, but requires that people follow it because of their moral obligations 
to the school/district.  This decision would fall under the moral source of 
authority.    
Paul Vallas: Words and Actions 
Words/Action(s) - “No one.  No one is to order anything new unless it is 
specifically authorized by me.” 
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic 
 
Analysis - Upon taking over as CEO, Vallas knew that he had inherited a fiscal 
mess, and CPS would have to gain credibility as a fiscally responsible district in order to 
gain additional funding.  Lifting the autonomy of the manner in which Chief Officials 
could spend money would set the precedence for belt-tightening in all aspects of the 
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district.  It also sent a message to taxpayers that Vallas would take the spending of 
taxpayer dollars seriously.     
Words/Action(s) - “There will be no more coffee and rolls paid for out of the 
schools budget.  And there is plenty of furniture here.  We don’t need any desks or 
cabinets built.  We don’t need anything new.”  A food and beverage policy followed. 
Source of Authority - Bureaucratic 
Analysis - After learning that almost $100,000 was spent on refreshments for 
meetings in half a year’s time in central office in 1995, Vallas unilaterally put an end to 
that practice, and set guidelines regarding when Board money could be used for food.   
Words/Action(s) – Shuttered CPS’s main shop facility located at Central Office 
Source of Authority - Bureaucratic 
Analysis - Before Vallas took office, CPS provided full time employment for 
laborers such as carpenters and painters.  Vallas found that they charged a premium for 
services rendered to schools.  He decided to exercise an authority granted to him by the 
new laws embedded in the amendatory act which allowed him to privatize those services.  
This would mean that services were put up for bid, which would result in savings for the 
district.   
Words/Action(s) – Ended heating of main garage at central office, instituted travel 
policy, instituted telecommunications policy 
Source of Authority - Bureaucratic 
Analysis - Vallas found more instances of wasteful spending and instituted 
policies which provided a check and balances system of spending funds. 
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Words/Action(s) – Downsized Desegregation Commission to seven members 
and subjected the new commission to the school board’s ethics guidelines 
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic 
Analysis – Vallas found additional instances of wasteful spending after auditing 
the Desegregation Commission.  Vallas found that he would need to closely monitor 
special interest groups which had gone unmonitored in the past to ensure that funds were 
spent in accordance to Board guidelines.   
Words/Action(s) – Cutting of over 1700 positions  
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic 
Analysis – Within weeks of assuming the post of CPS CEO, Paul Vallas balanced 
the budget, constructed a teacher’s contract which included high salary increases, and 
freed up additional funding for additional programming.  This would require a careful 
analysis of the non-teaching personnel by Vallas and his team.  Vallas found that by 
trimming the bureaucracy, he could accomplish two important feats: freeing up additional 
monies, and repairing the public’s confidence of how CPS spent monies.    
Words/Action(s) – The promotion of J.W. Smith to oversee the sports program for 
CPS high schools  
Source of Authority – Psychological, Moral  
Analysis – It would have been easy to ignore the CPS sports program amidst the 
financial crisis that CPS was embedded in upon Vallas’s assumption of the CPS CEO 
post.  Vallas argued that CPS students should have quality sports programs like their 
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affluent suburban peers, and they would serve as incentives for students to stay off 
the streets.   
Words/Action(s) – Declaring Larry Jackson ineligible to play basketball upon 
transferring to a CPS high school from another district  
Source of Authority – Professional, Moral 
Analysis – With this decision, Vallas utilized a committee to examine this issue 
and used their recommendation to influence his decision: “J.W. and the principals’ 
committee gave me no reason to decide otherwise.  This was not a question of eligibility; 
it was a question of ethics.”  This decision was designed to send a message to the entire 
district that if a student is to be involved in CPS Sports, they are to follow a strict code of 
rules and guidelines.  This also sent a message that star athletes would not receive 
preferential treatment.   
Words/Action(s) – Ten day suspension of Landon Cox from coaching and 
assistant principal duties at King High School: “I’m putting all the coaches on warning.  
This has to be cleaned up once and for all.  The first time they mess up, it’s a suspension.  
The second time, they get fired as coaches and could lose their teaching jobs.”  
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic 
Analysis – Vallas utilized the bureaucratic source of authority to address Cox’s 
failure to follow policy.  Cox received consequences for his non-compliance of the rules. 
The suspension of Cox would serve as an example to the district that no one would be 
able to break rules with impunity.   
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Words/Action(s) – “There is a big problem with busing.  People don’t like it, 
and it causes confusion.  I’m not comfortable implementing it.  What I want to do is meet 
Monday and assess overcrowding school by school and come up with alternatives that 
will minimize the need to bus.”  The purchase of 20 mobile units to help relieve 
overcrowding soon followed  
Source of Authority – Professional 
Analysis – Vallas and his team initially decided that busing would be the easier 
approach to alleviating the overcrowding that was taking place in schools.  Instead of 
sticking to their decision upon hearing criticism from parents, the team would come back 
to the table and use the criticism to take a double look at the problem from a school by 
school basis and decide on a solution that was best for the communities involved.   
Words/Action(s) – “What if a school principal is absent and a gang is taking over 
the third floor of a school?  We can’t just sit around and wait for 20-some (parent) groups 
to reach consensus.  We’re not trying to be vindictive or dictatorial.  We’re not trying to 
undermine school reform.  But we can’t sit around fiddling while Rome burns.”  This 
statement was made in defense of the passing of a policy related to how a school would 
be determined of being in “educational crisis.”     
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic 
Analysis – With the approval of the educational crisis policy, Vallas would gain 
the power to decide if a school would receive intensive intervention from central office, 
the principal fired and the LSC members removed if certain conditions existed as 
outlined in the policy.   
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Words/Action(s) – In 1996, Vallas determined that several of Chicago’s 
lowest achieving schools were in educational crisis.  “You can call it whatever you want, 
but we have the authority to take action when schools are not functioning for whatever 
reason and that’s what we’re going to do.” 
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic 
Analysis – Reform groups and community members were outraged about the 
changes that were taking place at schools that were determined to be in educational crisis.  
Vallas exercised his right to make those decisions and placed probation teams in those 
schools that were to help the schools produce positive student outcomes.   
Words/Action(s) – Changing the principal selection process: “These principals are 
brain surgeons—they are molding the minds of our children.  If you have a bad principal, 
you are going to have problems no matter how good a local school council is.” 
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic, Professional 
Analysis – The decision to revamp the principal selection process in itself was 
bureaucratic in nature.  Vallas had made many public statements against LSCs, and this 
decision was considered a move that was made to limit the powers of LSCs in regards to 
principal selection.  The process of developing the new principal selection process was 
rooted in professional authority.  Vallas and his team collaborated with the CPAA to 
create an academy for leadership training.   
Words/Action(s) – Ending social promotion: “Social promotion was a disaster, 
and we can see it with the dropout rate, which is 42 percent.  When you’re talking about 
social promotion, there’s no pressure on the child or the school to reach the standards you 
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much reach before you go to the next level.  So what social promotion did was take 
away the incentive for the kid and the system to ensure what the kids should be doing, 
and it also devalued our diplomas.” 
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic 
Analysis – Considered one of the hallmarks of Vallas’s tenure, he determined that 
additional accountability was necessary on the student level.  He determined that the 
advancement to the next grade should be based on student academic readiness, rather 
than the student’s age.  Students who did not have the test scores and grades to advance 
would be required to attend mandatory summer school, and the penalty for not 
successfully completing summer school would be retention in the grade.  
Words/Action(s) – Implementation of reconstitution: “This is a pretty bold step, 
but we have schools that are not showing progress and not improving and we have to use 
every instrument at our disposal.  Sometimes you just have to start over.” 
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic 
Analysis – This was another measure that was utilized to intervene in failing 
schools.  Vallas used this measure to combat low test scores, poor attendance, high 
dropout rates, and when he determined that a school did not follow improvement plans.  
Reconstitution was controversial because the utilization of this measure sent a message 
that the lack of performance for teachers within a school contributed to the school’s 
failing status.   
Words/Action(s) – Promotion of Englewood Principal Tommye Brown to post of 
director of alternative schools: “He had heart surgery, and he wanted a promotion, and he 
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wanted to take over the alternative schools, and I’m not going to deny it to him.  He’s 
earned it.” 
Source of Authority – Psychological 
Analysis – Vallas’s decision to promote Tommye Brown after he requested a less 
stressful job was a reward for his hard work for the district.   
Words/Action(s) – Vallas takes over Clemente High School for safety reasons: 
“I’m taking over the school.  The bottom line is that Clemente has brought this on 
themselves.  We have been very patient with Clemente.  Clemente is going to have its 
independence of politics.  The political exploitation of Clemente students is over.” 
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic 
Analysis – After a potential principal candidate turned down the position because 
of death threats from a violent Puerto Rican gang, Vallas acted swiftly by taking over the 
school and inserting his own interim principal.  The goal was to rid the school of the 
political exploitation of students by special interest groups.   
Words/Action(s) – The development of a character education program: “I’ve had 
a religious upbringing where values and ethics and morals were being reinforced.  The 
most dynamic personality outside my father was our parish priest.  He’s an institution.  
He’s kind of our moral guiding light.  There are so many individuals like that in our 
communities who have for all practical purposes been barred from our schools.” 
Source of Authority – Moral 
Analysis – Vallas had made references to his religious upbringing on a number of 
occasions, and freely spoke about partnering with parochial schools.  Vallas felt that there 
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was not enough emphasis placed on the teaching of ethics, values and morals in CPS 
schools.   
Words/Action(s) – Modification of the magnet school program: “People across 
the city have felt for years that only the elite get into magnet schools.  What we are trying 
to do here is demystify the magnet school program.” 
Source of Authority – Moral 
Analysis – Vallas proposed a plan that would mandate that magnet schools would 
have to reserve 30 percent of the enrollment for students who lived in the neighborhood.  
Opponents were outraged, contending that it defeated the purpose for magnet schools.  
Vallas would ultimately have to compromise, and the number of reserved slots was 
reduced to 15 percent.  Vallas provided neighborhood students with the opportunity to 
attend school with higher performing students that they may not have gotten otherwise.   
Words/Action(s) – Vallas launches program which kept some schools open during 
the winter holiday break (1997) and hired parent workers to help escort children from 
Robert Taylor Homes to school: “I’m not suggesting here that what we’re offering is 
going to solve all the problems.  We’re making a contribution.  If the kids aren’t in 
school, they’re not going to get educated.  If we have to go out and get them escorted, 
then that’s what we’re going to do.” 
Source of Authority – Moral 
Analysis – In response to violent outbreaks in the communities surrounding the 
Robert Taylor Homes, Vallas implemented programs in schools over the winter break to 
help keep students safe.  He also hired parent workers to escort children to school when 
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school resumed after the winter break.  Vallas personally assisted in the efforts, which 
prompted many other community volunteers to join.   
Words/Action(s) – Vallas implements the SMART program 
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic 
Analysis – The SMART program served as an interim intervention for first time 
offenders of serious student disciplinary violations.  The SMART program was a 
necessary intervention that was to function as a punitive measure without expelling the 
student or putting them into alternative schools which were overcrowded.  
Words/Action(s) – Altered promotions policy to give principals and regional 
officers input regarding the retention of a particular student.   
Source of Authority – Professional 
Analysis – The previous promotions policy dictated that test scores, grades and 
attendance were the sole indicators of a student’s promotion status.  After altering the 
policy, an exception could be made for a student who was on the borderline by principals 
and regional officers.   
Words/Action(s) – Vallas installs new busing plan for certain magnet schools to 
save money: “The basic policy is, in effect, done.  If people want to communicate their 
displeasure about the busing policy (at public hearings on the budget) they can.  But this 
is already our policy.” 
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic 
Analysis – Despite parental disagreement with the new busing policy, Vallas 
unilaterally decided to install a newer plan that saved the district millions. 
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Words/Action(s) – Vallas was given the authority to choose an interim 
principal when a school’s LSC is deadlocked in reaching a decision.  
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic 
Analysis – Vallas publicly vocalized that he was not in favor of the selection 
process of principals: “I’m trying to reduce the selection of bad principals and prevent 
good principals from being intimidated or influenced by overzealous members of LSCs.  
This isn’t anything new, because I’ve been talking about this for four years.”  This policy 
gave him another manner in which he could influence the selection of principals. 
Words/Action(s) – Vallas places six schools under his direct supervision, with the 
implementation of a measure called intervention: “Intervention may prove to be the most 
controversial because intervention allows you to go in and selectively remove staff for 
non-performance.  After you do the evaluation, you can dismiss individual teachers based 
on the evaluation.” 
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic 
Analysis – The intervention process differed from reconstitution in that Vallas 
and his team could individually evaluate teachers and dismiss for non-performance based 
on their determination.  They did not have to conduct interviews with teachers.   
Words/Action(s) – Proposed that the Board adopt a standardized curriculum 
created at central office: “The studies have indicated that the schools where we go in and 
dictate curriculum are the schools that seem to be doing the best.” 
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic  
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Analysis – After Mayor Daley express dissatisfaction with stagnant test score 
improvement and continued poor student performance in reading, Vallas suggested a top-
down solution which would require that central office create and dictate the curriculum 
for all CPS schools.  His argument was that the probationary schools were making gains, 
but the other schools are all doing different things, which was the cause of inconsistent 
performance.   
Arne Duncan: Words and Actions 
Words/Action(s) – Duncan sent reading specialists to schools to work with 
teachers to improve instructional practices in reading: “The people we are going to send 
are not going to be the principal’s best friend or some Joe Blow either.  This is going to 
be an elite corps of people focused on one subject.” 
Source of Authority – Professional 
Analysis – This decision was intended to utilize the professional source of 
authority.  Duncan’s initial remedy for the improvement of reading was to utilize 
individuals who were specialists in reading to help teachers to improve instructional 
practices.  However, many teachers felt that the implementation of reading specialists 
was a bureaucratic move, because some felt that they did not need additional assistance to 
teach reading, some felt that specialists reviewed strategies that they had already learned 
in previous professional development sessions, and some felt that central office sent 
reading specialists to evaluate their teaching strategies, creating a relationship of mistrust 
between teachers and reading specialists.   
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Words/Action(s) – Elimination of the Department of Learning Technologies: 
“We are trying to streamline the bureaucracy in the central office, and we are not done.  
The duties of Learning Technologies can be handled in other departments, across our 
entire system.” 
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic 
Analysis – Duncan began the process of trimming positions at central office in 
order to “save taxpayer’s money.” 
Words/Action(s) – Duncan froze the hiring of non-essential employees, as well as 
spending on consultants, travel and advertising:  “None of this impacts the schools.  This 
is all central office.  We’re preparing for the worst, although we’re absolutely committed 
to that not happening.  We’re doing everything we can to streamline the central office so 
nothing we do impacts what’s most important, our classrooms” 
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic 
Analysis – Duncan continued to make cuts in preparation for a reduction of 
funding from the state.  Duncan characterized the positions that were cut as non-essential.  
The argument was that none of the cuts would impact the schools.   
Words/Action(s) – Seeking input before making a final decision regarding the 
submittal of a sports proposal to the ISHA: “After that (making a presentation to the 
IHSA board) I will make a final determination on whether to make a formal proposal to 
the IHSA.  Before then I will be talking to principals, athletic directors and coaches to get 
their feedback on the idea…” 
Source of Authority – Professional  
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Analysis – In this instance, Duncan displayed that he was willing to utilize a 
collaborative approach when it came to making certain decisions.  In talking with 
principals, athletic directors and coaches before making a sports-related decision, Duncan 
solicited the input of the professionals who were experts in athletics.   
Words/Action(s) – Duncan imposed a two year limit for uncertified teachers to 
pass state teacher examinations: “The bottom line is in all of this is there is simply no 
room in our system for teachers who are not fully qualified to teach in their respective 
subject areas.” 
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic 
Analysis – Upon taking the helm of CPS CEO, one of the major problems for the 
district was teacher retention.  Hard-to-staff schools regularly had to staff classrooms 
with uncertified teachers, subs and aides.  By tightening the certification policy, Duncan 
ultimately exacerbated the teacher shortage issue by creating additional shortages.   
Words/Action(s) – Duncan proposed that teachers in areas of teacher shortage be 
allowed to apply for a one-year exemption from the residency policy.  “This is one of a 
series of innovative strategies we plan to bring the best teachers to Chicago.”  
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic 
Analysis – Opponents of this proposal argued that a one-year exemption would 
not attract teachers from other areas because they would be forced to move to the city.  
Some potential teacher candidates did not want to move to Chicago.  CTU president 
Lynch wanted the requirements lifted altogether.   
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Words/Action(s) – Duncan’s response to allegations of CPS’s lack of food 
safety by the Chicago Tribune: “Nothing is more important than the health and safety of 
our children.  We are absolutely committed to doing what is necessary to ensure that.” 
Source of Authority – Technical rational, Professional, Bureaucratic, Moral 
Analysis – Duncan took a multifaceted approach to developing solutions for the 
food safety issue that arouse as a result of a series of investigations by the Chicago 
Tribune.  Among the solutions, he and team members met with the Chicago Department 
of Public Health Commissioner to identify solutions and determined that better 
communication between the department and central office was necessary.  He also 
planned to launch a review of the city’s meal plan and look at the best practices around 
the country to determine how they would make necessary changes.  Also, he required that 
central office meet with principals to discuss food service procedures and required that 
principals directly supervise kitchen workers.   
Words/Action(s) – Duncan closes three schools: “We don’t believe these schools 
as they currently exist, will ever measure up.  There are better education alternatives 
within walking distance.” 
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic 
Analysis – For the first time in CPS history, schools would be closed strictly for 
poor academic performance.  When Duncan announced that he would end the practice of 
reconstitution, many believed that he would not close schools.  However, the district 
would quickly learn that Duncan would ultimately reconstitute more schools than his 
predecessor.  
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Words/Action(s) – Implementation of the Every Child, Every School 
education plan: “From day one, I have not thrown lots of sexy bells and whistles that 
sound nice but do not help kids learn.  My goal is to be the best urban school district in 
America.  Nothing easy is going to get you there.” 
Source of Authority – Professional 
Analysis – Duncan’s education plan was the result of the collaboration between 
central office and numerous stakeholders.  The new plan placed teaching and learning at 
the forefront of reform efforts.  Duncan remarked that his approach would not include 
lots of “sexy bells and whistles,” but strategies that would help kids learn.  One key 
initiative would be the creation of instructional areas.  Schools would be split among 24 
instructional areas, and each would be led by an AIO.  The creation of the AIO ultimately 
increased accountability to a degree that CPS had not ever experienced.  For the first 
time, there would be the systematic and consistent monitoring of schools by the area 
offices.  Principals would be directly supervised by AIOs, which was another aspect that 
school based administrators had to adapt to.  Some principals considered the area office 
as watchdogs for central office.  The creation of instructional areas provided a new layer 
of accountability for neighborhood schools.   
Words/Action(s) – Mayor Daley’s statement regarding the implementation of the 
Renaissance 2010 plan: “Despite our best efforts and the hard work of teachers, 
principals, parents and students, some schools have consistently underperformed.  We 
must face the reality that—for schools that have consistently underperformed—it’s time 
to start over.” 
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Source of Authority – Bureaucratic 
Analysis – The Renaissance 2010 plan was a plan that would create 100 
Renaissance schools which would operate differently from existing CPS schools.  The 
schools would function as charter schools, independently operated contract schools, and 
CPS-run small schools.  The major difference between Renaissance schools and existing 
schools was that Renaissance schools would be granted additional autonomy in exchange 
for increased accountability.  The creation of the small schools would involve the closing 
of many underperforming CPS schools.  Opponents to the Renaissance 2010 plan 
contended that Mayor Daley was behind the plan, intending to close traditional 
neighborhood schools in order to create elite privately run schools that would attract 
middle class whites back to Chicago.   
Words/Action(s) – Duncan launched an investigation to determine if there was 
cheating on ISAT tests at seven schools: “We need to stand for something, to teach 
values to our students.  The overwhelming majority of teachers do a fantastic job.  These 
are isolated incidents, but we will deal with them aggressively and honestly.” 
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic 
Analysis – This is an example of the motto: “What isn’t inspected isn’t 
respected.”  With school closure decisions based on ISAT test performance, the district 
found that it would have to closely monitor standardized testing for cheating by teachers 
in fear of losing their jobs.  
Words/Action(s) – CPS awarded the 60 schools that exhibited the most improved 
ISAT scores $10,000: “For years, people have asked how you can compare a Whitney 
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Young High School (which admits only high achieving students) to a Harper High 
School (a neighborhood school)?  They are right.  But you can absolutely compare 
Harper to itself, and that is what this new system will do.  It is a much more 
comprehensive approach.” 
Source of Authority – Psychological 
Analysis – In order to facilitate improvement efforts, Duncan utilized a utilitarian 
method of motivating schools to improve.   
Words/Action(s) – Elimination of several jobs in the accountability office and 
research division.  All would have to reapply for their positions, and many were not hired 
back.    
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic 
Analysis – Duncan’s rationale for this move was to move resources closer to the 
schools 
Words/Action(s) – Duncan removed three elementary school principals because 
of poor performance: “We’re taking a very hard look at performance.  We’re holding 
ourselves and them accountable.” 
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic 
Analysis – The removal of principals because their schools performed poorly was 
a very controversial and seldom used intervention strategy.  Once a principal was subject 
to removal, he or she was entitled to a hearing before an independent officer appointed by 
the CEO.  This almost ensured that the process was a unilateral decision by the CEO.  
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Words/Action(s) – The requirement of portfolios for principal candidates: 
“My goal is not to send dozens of resumes, many of which are mediocre, and make (local 
school councils’) already tough job more difficult.  I want to send extraordinary 
candidates so they do not have to spend tons of time weighing through masses of 
paperwork.” 
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic 
Analysis – With this decision, Duncan argued that he wanted to send more 
qualified candidates for LSC consideration in the selection of school principals.  Vallas 
used a similar rationale when he changed the principal selection process.  Ultimately, this 
decision gave provided the CPAA with the ability to screen and provide LSCs with the 
potential candidates that they would be able to select from, which reduced their input into 
the process.  Additionally, several potential candidates became ineligible for principal 
consideration because it became harder to gain the necessary administrative experience 
that the portfolios required.   
Words/Action(s) – Duncan donated $5,000 in scholarship money for two high 
school seniors 
Source of Authority – Moral 
Analysis – In this instance, Duncan is modeling a core value to employees in the 
district, which is related to his belief that all students should have the opportunity to 
learn.   
Words/Action(s) – In 2004, CPS toughened the teacher residency policy:  “Since 
1996, we have required our teachers to live in Chicago, a policy some see as an obstacle 
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in recruiting and retaining the best teachers.  The facts, however, suggest otherwise.  
Every year our schools are performing better, the stacks of resumes grow and our 
teacher-vacancy rate drops.” 
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic 
Analysis – With the new residency policy, school administrators would have to 
verify that new employees lived in Chicago.  Opponents argued that the residency policy 
was not appropriate for CPS, but Mayor Daley did not want to adjust the policy for CPS 
employees because he would have to adjust it for other city departments, which could 
cause an exodus of middle class city workers from the city to the more affordable 
suburbs.   
Words/Action(s) – Implementation of DIBELS screening assessment tool 
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic 
Analysis – For the purposes of uniformity, the district implemented this 
assessment tool in order to collect data regarding the reading levels of primary aged 
students.  Teachers were initially resistant to the tool because many used their own 
assessment instruments to assess student reading levels, and felt that DIBELS did not 
sufficiently assess all areas.   
Words/Action(s) – Duncan ended a program for pregnant teens and teen parents 
implemented by Vallas: “When a girl gets pregnant, that’s a symptom of 98 things that 
are going wrong in that kid’s life.  CPS is not a pro at dealing with all those issues.” 
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic 
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Analysis – The “Cradle to the Classroom” program was considered successful 
as well as cost-efficient. 
Words/Action(s) – In 2005, Duncan implemented an incentive plan designed to 
encourage better attendance for students: “I’m a firm believer in rewarding hard work.  
We want to do everything we can to encourage families to do the right thing.  The reality 
of it is that not everyone has the mentality (that school is an obligation).” 
Source of Authority – Psychological 
Analysis – Opponents of the usage of incentives argued that CPS was sending a 
bad message by “bribing” kids to come to school.  Duncan argued that “hard work” 
should be rewarded. 
Words/Action(s) – In 2005, CPS stopped using the IOWA test as a form of 
student assessment and replaced it with three shorter reading assessments called Standard 
Learning First: “These assessments are a tool for teachers, not a punitive measure.  
Testing is important, but we want to test … in a way that gives our teachers and our 
principals, useful information about their students.”  
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic 
Analysis – The state mandated ISAT test lessened the need for the district to 
utilize two major standardized assessment tests.  However, the need for additional data 
prompted Duncan to adopt the Learning First assessment tests.   
Words/Action(s) – In 2007, Duncan changed the policy on the closing of schools 
by specifically outlining reasons why a school could be closed.   
Source of Authority – Bureaucratic 
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Analysis – One important change to the policy on the closing of schools was 
the need for change in educational focus.  A school slated to undergo a change in 
educational focus would allow for the principal of that school to re-interview and rehire 
his or her entire staff.  This created a situation where the principal could circumvent the 
normal process of removing a teacher.  This is an example of bureaucratic decision 
making on the school level.   
Words/Action(s) – CPS implemented a pilot program which would pay the 
freshmen at 20 CPS high schools a sum of money for “good” grades “The majority of our 
students don’t come from families with a lot of economic wealth.  I’m always trying to 
level the playing field.  This is the kind of incentive that middle-class families have had 
for decades.” 
Source of Authority – Psychological 
Analysis – This serves as another example of Duncan’s usage of rewards to 
motivate students to perform. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Research Questions 
 In examining the CEO model under the leadership of Paul Vallas through the 
framework of Serviovanni’s Five Sources of Authority, Vallas utilized Sergiovanni’s five 
sources in decision making analyzed in this dissertation at the following rates: 
Bureaucratic: 60 percent; Psychological: 7 percent; Technical rational: 0 percent; 
Professional: 13 percent; and Moral: 17 percent.   
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Research Question 1:  Through the lens of Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of 
Authority, what were the skills, knowledge and dispositions that Mayor Daley sought 
from the CEO position for Paul Vallas during the years of 1995-2001 
 Upon taking over the leadership helm of CPS under the new revamped CEO title, 
Paul Vallas was expected to perform the duties of the new position under guidelines that 
were outlined in the Amendatory Act.  The 1995 Amendatory Act directed the CEO to 
increase the quality of educational services, reduce the cost of non-educational services, 
develop a long-term financial plan which would balance the budget, streamline the 
bureaucracy, and enact policies that ensured that the system ran in an ethical as well as 
efficient manner.   
 Mayor Daley made statements which revealed the characteristics that he would 
expect from the CPS CEO.  First, the CPS CEO would have to address the overall 
management of the district, as well as central office: “You have to change management,” 
Daley said.  “There’s a lot of management problems there.”1  He also revealed that how 
he wanted the CEO to address special interests groups surrounding the district: “Business 
as usual is over.  The special interests will move to the back of the line.  The bureaucrats 
who stand in the way of change will be removed and their powers dissolved.”2  Daley 
also vocalized the importance of cutting costs in order to balance the budget: “We must 
continue to fight for every dollar in Springfield, because the state has not met its 
(funding) responsibility.  But clearly we must also make progress here in controlling 
                                                            
1Oclander and Spielman. 
 
2Kass, “Daley Names School Team.” 
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costs before expecting any further help from the state.”3  Daley would also lend his 
opinion regarding the retention policy during Vallas’ tenure.  After being asked if 
students would be retained for a second year in a row, Daley responded: “I will not 
socially promote children to high school, to allow them to drop out and go on…You want 
to promote them?  You go promote them.  And then you’ll see them in the criminal 
justice system and you’ll be complaining about your taxes.” 
 Through the lens of Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of Authority, all of the 
characteristics that were revealed by the Mayor fell under the bureaucratic source of 
authority in that they were all related to finance, resource allocation, and management.  
Furthermore, his opinion regarding the manner in how to deal with students who would 
be retained for a second time called for a bureaucratic approach in regards to making 
promotion determinations.    
In examining the CEO model under the leadership of Arne Duncan through the 
framework of Serviovanni’s Five Sources of Authority, Duncan utilized Sergiovanni’s 
five sources in decision making analyzed in this dissertation at the following rates: 
Bureaucratic: 69 percent; Psychological: 12 percent; Technical rational: 3 percent; 
Professional: 15 percent; and Moral: 0 percent.   
Research Question 2: Through the Lens of Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of 
Authority, what were the skills, knowledge and dispositions that Mayor Daley sought 
from the CEO position for Arne Duncan during the years of 2001-2008? 
                                                            
3Ibid. 
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 Upon taking the helm of CPS CEO, the district experienced a state of financial 
stability, due to the work of Vallas.  Mayor Daley was ready for the district to go in 
another direction in relation to student performance.  At the end of Vallas’ term as CEO, 
reading scores had not improved at the same rate as they had during the first years of his 
administration.  Daley stated that schools would need to utilize non-traditional ideas and 
think “outside the box” to help improve student performance:  
When you go into a school, you see kids who deal with technology faster 
than any of us, who can sing a rap song better than anyone else, but they 
have a problem reading…With every child there is ability.  How do we get 
it out of them?... I think we have to go outside of the box.4 
 
 Daley would also reveal his opinion regarding how the district should address 
failing schools.  After unveiling the plans surrounding the Renaissance 2010 initiative, 
Daley stated: “Despite our best efforts and the hard work of teachers, principals, parents 
and students, some schools have consistently underperformed.  We must face the reality 
that—for schools that have consistently underperformed—it’s time to start over.”5  Daley 
also endorsed the magnet makeover plan, which would transform neighborhood schools 
into “magnet-style” school options: “The magnet makeover plan is our latest strategy 
aimed at creating high-quality options for all students across Chicago.  These schools are 
part of a bigger picture that includes turnaround schools, high school transformation 
                                                            
4Washburn, “Schools Told to Think ‘Outside of Box’.” 
 
5Dell’Angela and Washburn, “Daley Set to Remake Troubled Schools.” 
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schools and accelerated programs within schools designed to get more students ready 
for the workplace and college.”6 
 Daley’s expectations of the CPS CEO position for the time period of 2001-2008 
were from both the professional and bureaucratic sources of authority.  In regards to 
“thinking out of the box” when it came to the improvement of teaching and learning 
strategies, Daley wanted for the leadership team to utilize non-traditional thinking to help 
bolster student achievement.  Duncan would enlist the assistance of several different 
individuals to help him accomplish that sort of thinking and to implement those ideas.  
From a bureaucratic standpoint, Daley endorsed the closing and reorganization of 
schools.   
Research Question 3: Through the lens of Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of 
Authority, how did Paul Vallas fulfill the CEO role based on Mayor Daley’s criteria for 
the CPS CEO position?  
 Based on Mayor Daley’s criteria for the CPS CEO position, which was 
formulated by stipulations in the 1995 Amendatory Act, Paul Vallas experienced great 
success in fulfilling the role of CPS CEO, but hit a wall when it came to formulating 
teaching and learning strategies.  He accomplished this by first restoring public 
confidence in the district by displaying financial prudence and responsibility.  He quickly 
identified instances of wasteful spending and discontinued those practices.  He fired 
union laborers and established systems which required that CPS solicit bids from private 
                                                            
6Briggs, “10 Selected as Magnets.” 
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companies in order to retain services in a cost-efficient manner.  He led by example 
by demonstrating that he would not waste taxpayer dollars with expensive drivers and 
food budgets for meetings.  He distributed equipment that was collecting dust in 
warehouses that CPS had to rent, which saved the district some money.   
 Vallas made tough personnel decisions in order to free up money to settle the 
teacher’s contract and to create necessary programs to support student learning.  He 
realized that he could trim positions at central office to accomplish that goal.  By cutting 
positions at central office, Vallas fulfilled two expectations outlined by the Amendatory 
Act: Streamlining the bureaucracy, and balancing the budget.  This move also helped to 
restore the public’s confidence in the district, as evidenced by the increased credit rating 
awarded to the district as a result of Vallas’ efforts.  Vallas knew that CPS would not be 
able to ask for additional funding until it illustrated that the district would spend the 
money that it was allotted responsibly.   
 Vallas made decisions that reflected that the district would operate in an ethical 
and efficient manner in a number of ways.  Vallas enacted revamped ethics policies for 
LSC members, sport coaches and players, as well as special interest groups who worked 
with CPS.  Vallas ran the district in an efficient manner with decisions such as the 
sharing of school buses, the allocation of resources, and his monitoring of the district’s 
finances.     
 Vallas believed that improvement would be realized through accountability.  
Vallas demanded accountability from everyone, including students and parents.  Vallas’ 
ending of social promotions was considered one of the hallmarks of his administration, as 
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well as controversial.  Opponents of retention cited research that indicated that 
students who were retained were not likely to improve performance and were more likely 
to drop out of school.   
 The majority of decisions made by Vallas that were analyzed in this dissertation 
were made from the bureaucratic source of authority.   Given the stipulations identified 
for the CEO position in the Amendatory Act, bureaucratic decision making was 
inevitable.  To properly manage a bureaucracy, there must be tough, bureaucratic 
decision making.  The closing and reorganization of schools reflected bureaucratic 
decision making designed to strike fear in individuals to influence them to perform better.  
Vallas admitted that he was not opposed to utilizing fear to stimulate performance: “Is 
fear a factor?  Well, if fear is synonymous with accountability, then I’ll take fear 
anytime.”7  The usage of fear to motivate performance meant that there was a 
fundamental belief that the goals of the supervisor and the subordinate were not the same.  
If teachers “do their jobs,” then their school would not be closed.  The usage of 
reconstitution and intervention struck fear throughout the district, and impacted school-
based decision making as a consequence.  Fear of sanctions became the “stick” by which 
all employees would follow.  Performance would be stimulated through the use of fear.  
If schools fail, teachers could lose their jobs.  Tenured teachers who were historically 
protected by the CTU would also be subject to losing their positions.   
At the end of Vallas’ tenure, student performance results became stagnant.  This 
reflected that improvements in teaching and learning involved the bulk of the CPS 
                                                            
7Martinez, “A Painful Steady Climb.” 
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workforce: teachers.  Fear of sanctions had reached its limit.  Paul Vallas had not 
effectively developed programs which affected how teachers taught and how students 
learned.   
Research Question 4: Through the lens of Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of 
Authority, how did Arne Duncan fulfill the CEO role based on Mayor Daley’s criteria for 
the CPS CEO position?  
 Based on the combination of expectations for the CEO role outlined in the 
Amendatory Act and new expectations for the role as dictated by Mayor Daley, Arne 
Duncan also experienced great success in the fulfillment of the role of CPS CEO.  
Duncan was charged with moving the district forward by focusing on teaching and 
learning strategies.  Duncan relied on the professional source of authority to accomplish 
this.  He began by hiring Dr. Barbara Eason-Watkins to function as his Chief Educational 
Officer.  Eason-Watkins was the former principal of McCosh Elementary School, who 
was known as a dynamic leader that led her school to great gains on their standardized 
tests.  Duncan would use her expertise to help shape the educational reforms that were 
put in place during his tenure.     
 Duncan’s Every Child, Every School education plan was also an example of his 
usage of the professional source of authority.  Mayor Daley demanded improvement in 
student reading performance, and this plan was designed to meet that challenge.  The plan 
was formulated with the assistance of LSC members, parents, students, community 
members, social service organizations, and other relevant stakeholders.  Eason-Watkins 
oversaw the development of the plan.  The development of instructional areas was a 
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major component of the plan.  With instructional areas, the Area Instructional Officer 
was created, which provided another layer of instructional leadership for schools.  The 
new instructional area model required that AIOs report directly to Eason-Watkins, which 
provided her with an increased influence on instructional practices of individual schools.   
 Overall, 69 percent of decisions made by Duncan that were analyzed in this study 
were made from the bureaucratic source of authority.  The No Child Left Behind Act 
brought stipulations and sanctions that greatly affected decision-making, particularly in 
struggling urban districts.  The fear of sanctions that could be imposed by the district was 
used to motivate teachers and administrators to improve student performance just as the 
fear of sanctions that could be imposed by the federal government were designed to do 
the same.  The fear of school closure would become even greater under the tenure of 
Arne Duncan due to the implementation of Renaissance 2010.   
 With the implementation of Renaissance 2010 coupled with the powers given to 
the CPS CEO as outlined in the 1995 Amendatory Act, the district utilized the 
bureaucratic source of authority to provide sanctions that were supposed to motivate 
employees within the district to increase student outcomes.  CPS schools that were poor 
performers were constantly made aware of the fact that their school could be closed.  
Teachers learned that there were several ways that they could lose their jobs, through 
reconstitution, a change in educational focus, and school closings.  Some CPS employees 
wondered if Mayor Daley was truly trying to improve schools, or increase the middle 
class population in Chicago by creating schools populated with higher performing 
students, for the purposes of promoting gentrification.   
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 Mayor Daley demanded that CPS leadership think “outside the box” to 
develop programs that would increase student performance.  During his tenure, Duncan 
displayed several instances of non-traditional programming and ideas while 
implementing programs for CPS students.  Beginning with the small schools initiative, 
the school within a school concept was utilized to help individualize the educational 
program for high school students in the district.  Small schools would normally feature a 
special area of interest, such as communication, technology, entrepreneurship or college 
prep.  The schools featured a smaller student body (500 students or fewer), and lower 
student to specialty staff ratios than traditional schools.  Students in small schools often 
wore uniforms, which further strengthened the unifying themes of the schools.  The small 
school concept was designed to give students a more personalized educational experience 
in high school, where some students get lost in the shuffle.   
 The specialty magnet schools, as well as magnet cluster schools were further 
examples of non-traditional thinking in the management of the district.  Daley stated that 
students dealt with technology faster than adults, and the technology magnet cluster 
schools provided students with the opportunity to utilize technological enhancements 
during their learning experiences.  Schools within the technology magnet cluster 
emphasized the integration of technology within the curriculum.  Teachers at technology 
academies were to receive a minimum of 90 hours of professional development related to 
technology integration.  Those schools were allotted smart boards, projectors, enhanced 
classroom sound systems, laptop carts, teacher laptops, as well as Elmo® devices.  
Principals at those academies would also spend their own discretionary funds to provide 
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their students with additional technological enhancements.  Spencer Technology 
Academy, located on Chicago’s west side, even has a virtual gymnasium, featuring 15 
Nintendo Wii® video game systems.  Teachers who wanted to utilize the virtual 
gymnasium would work with a technology coordinator, who would help them to develop 
lesson plans designed to use the game systems to enhance their lesson.   
 Despite receiving criticism, Duncan utilized the usage of incentives as an 
additional means to exhibit “out of the box” thinking.  His usage of incentives supported 
the overall usage of the psychological source of authority.  Schools received incentives 
for growth on ISAT results.  Students received cash for grades, and one student even won 
a car as a reward for her attendance, even though she was not old enough to drive at that 
time.  Duncan argued that students could not learn if they were not in school.  Despite the 
criticism, Duncan continued to utilize incentives, and attendance climbed to the highest 
that it had ever been in the history of the district.     
Research Question 5: How did the leadership styles of the Paul Vallas and Arne 
Duncan compare through the lens of Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of Authority?  
 In terms of leadership styles, the two CEOs were different in approach but similar 
in function.  Vallas took the office of CPS CEO with a brash, direct style and 
implemented aggressive changes from the beginning of his tenure.  Duncan, on the other 
hand, took a more laid back approach, preferring to work behind the scenes during his 
first months.  Vallas was extremely transparent with his decision making and the changes 
that he implemented during his tenure, and was extremely media-friendly, providing the 
media with several interesting quotes.  Duncan was not as transparent with the rationale 
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behind decision making, and was not as media-friendly.  Duncan only provided media 
outlets with short responses to questions, and preferred to communicate through writing.   
 Vallas exhibited the characteristics of a very decisive decision maker.  When 
faced with situations which required a solution, Vallas delivered quickly and efficiently.  
Vallas displayed this by quickly balancing the district’s budget and ensuring that the 
district would experience labor peace with the quick settlement of the teacher’s contract.  
As situations and circumstances presented themselves, Vallas developed policies 
designed to solve the problems that were presented as a result.   
 Although Vallas showed some instances of utilizing the professional, 
psychological and moral sources of authority, he mainly led under the bureaucratic 
source of authority.  Vallas did not display many instances of collaboration when it came 
to decision-making for major issues experienced by the district.  The decisions that were 
made by Vallas that had the greatest impact on the district were made without the input of 
other stakeholders in the district.  Some of Vallas’ quick decisions would have to be 
restructured after being challenged.   
 Duncan displayed a sharp contrast in style from Vallas.  Duncan admitted that he 
needed to work on being more transparent regarding the direction that he planned to take 
the district, but he never really seemed comfortable with being vocal about the districts’ 
plans and his decision-making.  Duncan claimed that he did not throw “lots of sexy bells 
and whistles that sound nice but do not help kids learn,”8  This implied that he believed 
                                                            
8Anonymous, “Schools Take No-Frills Line on Reforms.” 
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that Vallas’ approach to running the district was to implement programs that “looked 
good on paper,” but lacked substance and quality.   
  Duncan was more adept with utilizing “specialists” to help advance his 
educational agenda.  Beginning with the hiring of Eason-Watkins to the post of Chief 
Educational Officer, and the role he defined for the position, Duncan exhibited that he 
was willing to share decision-making responsibilities regarding educational initiatives.  
Duncan also utilized reading specialists to help teachers learn new strategies to improve 
reading instruction.   The creation of instructional areas led by the newly-created AIOs 
provided another layer of instructional leadership which displayed Duncan’s willingness 
to utilize specialists.  Before the creation of instructional areas, the district was divided 
into six regions, each of which contained close to 100 schools.  The regional officers 
provided support on management issues such as the scheduling of buses, disciplinary 
issues and facilities management.  The new structure split schools among 24 areas, which 
would provide an AIO for instructional matters, and a management support director who 
took care of all management related matters and reported to the AIO.  The AIO was 
empowered to make decisions for the purposes of improving instruction in their areas.   
 Duncan was very active in closing and reorganizing schools.  Although he was 
more willing to listen to supporters of the particular school who fought to keep the school 
open, and allowed CTU to get involved with the improvement of schools before closure, 
Duncan ultimately closed more schools during his tenure than Vallas did.  The 
bureaucratic source of authority utilized in these instances was very powerful.  The 
decision to close individual schools was bureaucratic, and the impact of their closures 
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sent a strong message to the district that no one was safe and no one was untouchable.  
Vallas would remove principals and LSCs mainly if he determined that improvement 
efforts were not being followed.  Duncan closed schools for non-performance, which was 
a first in the history of the district.  For the first time, teachers and administrators would 
not be able to say “Well, we tried, but our kids can’t learn.”  Teachers and administrators 
would be held accountable for student performance, regardless of their socioeconomic 
status, their environment, or their past performance.  This was extremely frustrating for 
district employees who did not quite know how to address those issues.   
 The Renaissance 2010 plan exacerbated the already existent fear among district 
employees by setting a preemptive plan for the closing and reorganization of schools.  
Not only would schools face sanctions for poor performance, but there was now an 
ambitious plan in place to restructure schools and displace teachers.  Teachers and 
administrators felt even more insecure regarding their careers with CPS, and also felt that 
the improvement effort placed the total blame of poor student performance solely on 
teachers.  The bureaucratic decision to close schools for poor performance coupled with 
the psychological impact that the fear of school closure had across the district contributed 
to the lowering of the morale of teachers and administrators district-wide.   
Research Question 6: What implications does the CEO model have for school 
governance and school leadership? 
 This study has illustrated how the CEO model implemented by CPS has affected 
school governance and school leadership outcomes both explicitly and implicitly.  From a 
school governance standpoint, the CEO was granted powers by the business-influenced 
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1995 Amendatory Act that granted the two CEOs the authority to make decisions that 
previous superintendents were not able to make.  The new CPS CEO was given a bit 
more latitude to make decisions affecting the district similar to CEOs in the private 
industry.  Three important similarities were related to resource allocation, finance and 
relation with the board of directors.  In chapter two, the nature and scope of the 
accountabilities reserved to CEO positions in private industries were summarized.  The 
accountability of the CEO to resource allocation required that the CEO establish a 
strategic framework for the allocation of the resources of the corporation.  The finance 
accountability required that the CEO ensured the soundness of the organization’s 
financial structure, monitored indications of the company’s financial health, determined 
the company’s present and future capital requirements, and arranged for outside 
financing.  The relations with the board of director’s accountability required that the CEO 
gained the board’s full understanding, constructive review, or final approval of 
management policies, direction and objectives.  Beginning with the tenure of Paul Vallas, 
the CEO model would affect how those three areas would be managed after the 1995 
Amendatory Act.   
 The CEO affected resource allocation by ensuring that the district’s limited 
resources were efficiently allocated.  Vallas determined that the best way to allocate 
resources was to protect teaching positions as best as possible while reducing the higher 
paid administrative positions within central office.  Vallas also allocated resources 
efficiently by using the powers outlined in the Amendatory Act to privatize non-
educational services.  This required that Vallas fire union workers who traditionally held 
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careers with CPS for decades.  From then on, services rendered would require that 
private companies bid for the contract, which saved the district millions of dollars.   
 From a financial perspective, the CEO was required by the Amendatory Act to 
develop a long-term financial plan that reflected a balanced budget for each year.  
Previous to the Amendatory Act, the district’s finances were in a constant state of flux.  
The district employed poor financial practices which consistently left the district in debt, 
and put the district in a situation where it could not always make ends meet, causing 
many teacher strikes.  During the tenure of the two CEOs, the district has enjoyed an 
unprecedented period of labor peace as a result of sound financial practices.  During 
Vallas’ tenure, the credit rating of the district was increased, which saved the district a 
great deal of money by allowing the district to borrow more money at a reduced rate.  
Although the Amendatory Act did not grant the district additional funding, it allowed the 
CEO more flexibility in how to allocate and spend funds.  Displaying prudence in 
handling the finances of the district helped the district gain additional funds in 1997, and 
set the stage for future outside financing because of the district’s new reputation for 
sound financial decision-making. 
 In regards to board relations with the CEO, the CEO model included a board that 
was reduced and handpicked by the mayor just as the CEO, which helped to reduce 
friction and increased the amount of productivity in regards to decision making among 
the board.  Although critics of the new governance structure argued that board merely 
functioned as a rubber stamp for the CEOs decisions, it undeniably allowed for quicker 
decision making which allowed for the quicker implementation of initiatives.  Now, when 
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there were problems in the district, the CEO could quickly implement a solution 
instead of waiting for a massive board to come to a resolution.   
 In private industry, the CEO can fire an employee for poor performance.  In the 
CPS bureaucracy, it was not as easy to dismiss a poor performing teacher.  The process 
for teacher dismissal was often long, and extremely costly to the district.  However, 
school closures for poor performance gave the CEO some semblance of the ability to 
influence the contents of the workforce just as CEOs in private industry.  As outlined in 
the Amendatory Act, the CEO was granted the power to close schools for a number of 
reasons, including poor student academic performance.  The fear of school closure did 
help to raise the level of accountability on teachers and administrators.  However, higher 
performing teachers that taught at a school that could close were not as likely to stay or 
apply to teach at those particular schools.  Teachers did not want the stigma that would be 
attached to them if their school closed.  Research shows that the need for great teachers 
increases in schools with students who are performing below standards.  The unintended 
effect of school closures contributed to a large number of unfilled positions in schools 
with struggling students.   
 The CEO model also implicitly affected school leadership outcomes.  The major 
actions of the CPS CEO that had the greatest impact on school leadership was the 
increased emphasis on test scores, the fear of school closure, the implementation of the 
AIO and area offices, and the changing of the principal selection process.   
 Beginning with the tenure of Paul Vallas, the increased emphasis on student test 
performance created a sense of urgency never before felt across the district.  On one 
  
255
hand, teachers would be held accountable for ensuring that their students learned.  
Teachers could no longer make “excuses” for why students were not performing, and 
teachers could not lower the bar in regards to student expectations.  On the other hand, 
the increased emphasis on standardized testing caused principals to change how they led 
teachers.  Standardized testing, which was previously utilized to provide educators with 
consistent data regarding student mastery of content, now became high-stakes tests.  
Normally, a test is considered “high-stakes” based on the consequences for the test taker.  
However, in this instance, poor test results would carry serious consequences for the 
schools.  Those negative consequences may have been a factor in causing principals and 
local education agencies to cut back programs in the arts, cut recess, social studies, and 
science courses in order to make the time for high-stakes test preparation.  The emphasis 
on high-stakes test scores also may have caused principals to endorse direct instructional 
techniques in some instances which included an endless amount of practice tests.   The 
fear of negative consequences that arose from high-stakes testing that were emphasized 
by central office were now emphasized by principals, which greatly affected teaching and 
learning by deemphasizing teaching methods that fostered genuine student understanding.  
Student circumstances were also deemphasized.  Teachers in low-income areas who have 
students with real barriers to learning such as poverty, crime-ridden neighborhoods, 
inadequate living situations, language barriers and special needs would now be required 
to teach with little support to address those barriers.  This caused teachers to rely on “drill 
and kill” methods, and drove good teachers who entered the field to help students, out of 
the profession.   
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 The increased emphasis on high-stakes test scores also greatly affected the 
instructional focus of the principal because of the conversion of the principal’s contract to 
a performance-based contract which took place as a result of the Chicago School Reform 
Act of 1988.  Previously, principals were a part of the teacher’s union, and gained tenure 
just as teachers did.  Under the performance-based contract, principals now were issued 
four year contracts.  The principal’s performance was mainly tied in to standardized test 
results.  If a principal did not adequately raise test scores, their contract may not be 
renewed.   
 The fear of school closure also affected school leadership outcomes by using the 
power of fear as motivation for performance.  Principals now constantly warned their 
staff that their schools could close if students did not perform well on their tests.  
Professional development opportunities for teachers would be related to increasing test 
scores.  In many cases, principals would look the other way if teachers “helped” students 
while taking standardized tests.  New ideas, collaborative teaching methods, project-
based learning, real-life experiences for students, and differentiated learning were all 
deemphasized because of the fear of school closures.    
 The implementation of the AIO and the area office support personnel also 
affected school leadership outcomes.  The AIO was the instructional leader for a cluster 
of schools in their area.  To ensure that Board of Education mandates were being 
followed, area teams led by the AIO performed school walkthroughs at least twice per 
year.  The walkthrough process was a very uncomfortable process for many teachers.  
Teachers felt that the process was designed to catch them doing something wrong.  The 
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process involved a team of up to nine area team members who would walk into a 
teacher’s room and record several aspects of the classroom including the objectives of the 
lesson, technology usage, the amount of student work displayed in the classroom, student 
engagement, student behavior and many other items.  After conducting several 
walkthroughs within a school, the AIO would compile all recorded data and give it to the 
principal, with a deadline as to when corrections should take place.  Failure to correct 
areas of need within the timeframe would result in sanctions imposed on the principal.   
 With the principal faced with sanctions for the improvement of teacher areas of 
need, in many cases, the principal would utilize the same method to motivate teachers to 
correct areas of need.  If the teacher did not correct areas of need, then they faced 
sanctions.  This created a model which encouraged the usage of the bureaucratic source 
of authority to motivate teacher performance.  This also caused a great deal of resistance 
between teacher and area teams, as well as teacher and principal.  It was “us” (the 
teacher) versus “them” (the area teams, school administration).  The general feeling in 
most instances, was that the principal and the area teams were “out to get them.”  This 
caused teachers to be very defensive towards suggestions for improvement.  Many 
teachers did not feel that supervisors wanted them to improve in their craft, but rather, 
supervisors only wanted to catch them doing something wrong so that they could dismiss 
them.  This affected teacher creativity in the classroom, made teachers extremely afraid 
of making mistakes, and caused teachers stay within their comfort zones.  The area teams 
that were intended to support instruction were seen as Board watchdogs by administrators 
and teachers.   
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 The changing of the principal selection process ultimately gave principals 
power to allow teachers to gain the necessary experience to become eligible for 
consideration in regards to principal positions.  In Illinois, a principal candidate must 
have a valid Type 75 certificate issued by the Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE).  
In addition to this, CPS required that principals who are interested in becoming a 
principal were on the “principal’s list.”  During Duncan’s tenure, he required that 
prospective principals complete a portfolio process prior to being considered for the list.  
As part of the requirements for the portfolio, prospective principals needed administrative 
experience documented in their portfolios.  Some teachers found it difficult to gain the 
necessary experience if their principals did not give them the opportunity.  In some 
instances, principals would not allow prospective principals to gain administrative 
experience for personal or political reasons.  This greatly reduced the pool of eligible 
principal candidates.   
In some instances, the pool of candidates was so small that LSCs would be 
deadlocked in making a decision.  Vallas gained the authority to insert interim principals 
in those instances.  Many times, area coaches were selected to serve as interim principals.  
This caused a greater amount of distrust between area teams and principals.  Many area 
coaches were aspiring school administrators, but yet, as area coaches, they maintained of 
supervisory authority over school administrators.  The changing of the principal selection 
process caused it to become highly political and directly affected the type of leaders that 
led CPS schools.   
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Conclusions 
 This study examined the tenures of CEOs Paul Vallas and Arne Duncan to 
determine the skills, knowledge and dispositions required of the CPS CEO position, and 
examined the sources of authority utilized in decision-making for the CPS CEO model.  
Both CEOs primarily utilized the bureaucratic source of authority for decision-making as 
well as to motivate the employees of the district.  Wong and Sunderman, who performed 
an analysis of the CPS system, argues that bureaucratic organization can facilitate 
effective management by creating an efficient means to perform financial and 
management related tasks, and gives top administration the ability to address the 
collective interests of the system as a whole.  In this analysis of the CPS CEOs, 
bureaucratic decision-making contributed to the success of the district in regards to 
improving the way in which resources were allocated and the improvement of the 
financial health of the district.  Wong and Sunderman also argue that the exclusive focus 
on bureaucratic aspects of administration causes a tendency to equate the size of the 
organization with efficiency.9  This tendency could be the cause of the utilization of 
downsizing by both CEOs.   
 Wong and Sunderman also contend that bureaucratic organization is the proper 
structure in regards to the completion of financial and managerial functions that are 
required in order to run a school system as large as CPS.  A system as large as CPS 
requires a system by which to monitor the activities of the various departments 
                                                            
9Wong and Sunderman, 21. 
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throughout the district.  An example of the lack of sufficient supervision was the 
Desegregation Commission that Paul Vallas downsized.  The commission spent taxpayer 
dollars on expensive dinners, massages, and other extravagant items.  Without a system 
to monitor those departments, Vallas found that the members of the commission spent 
funds without displaying fiscal responsibility.  Utilizing the bureaucratic source of 
authority seemed appropriate for management and financially intensive tasks for the 
district.   
 However, when it came to teaching and learning, the bureaucratic source of 
authority utilized to motivate district employees was only somewhat effective.  
Ultimately, if district success was primarily judged by standardized test scores, then the 
decision-making models that were utilized was largely effective in increasing test scores.  
However, if district success was judged by high school readiness, ACT test scores, high 
school graduation rates, and postsecondary figures, then the district would not be 
considered very successful.  Under the CEO model, student learning outcomes have 
improved, but the achievement gap has not been sufficiently closed.   
Recommendations for Further Research 
 Based on the research and the findings of this study, other recommended areas of 
research were identified.  One area for further research is to compare the CPS CEO 
model with the Chancellor model utilized in New York City since 2002.  The New York 
City school system has been credited for making a dramatic turnaround, and has been 
hailed as a national model for big city urban school districts.   
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 Another possibility for further research is to examine 90/90/90 schools (90 
percent minority, 90 percent on free and reduced lunch, and 90 percent of students who 
are reading at or above grade level), and examine the leadership model through the lens 
of an interpretive framework such as Sergiovanni’s Five Sources of Authority.  Is there 
more of a tendency to utilize professional and moral as primary sources of authority in 
those systems? 
 Another possibility for further research is to conduct interviews of CPS principals 
during the tenures of Paul Vallas and Arne Duncan to analyze how the CEO model 
affected their decision-making practices on the school level.  Did they utilize 
bureaucratic, psychological and technical-rational sources of authority primarily, or were 
they able to utilize professional and moral authority?  If it was the latter, how did they do 
it? 
 A final recommended area for further research is to examine CEO Ron Huberman 
and the performance management model.  How does the model affect student learning 
outcomes?  How does the model affect the practices of teachers and administrators within 
CPS?  What sources of authority were emphasized during his tenure?  Does the emphasis 
of data collection and analysis help to improve student high school readiness and lower 
high school dropout percentages?   
Epilogue: The Future of CPS 
Ron Huberman 
 At his first board meeting in January of 2009, Ron Huberman, the new CPS CEO, 
was booed by a packed audience at his first board meeting.  The audience called him an 
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educational novice and a political appointee of Mayor Daley.  Huberman graduated 
from the University of Wisconsin, after which he entered the Chicago Police Academy 
and was quickly promoted to Assistant Deputy Superintendent, making him one of the 
youngest officers to reach that rank.  While working as a Chicago Police Officer, 
Huberman obtained master’s degrees in Business Administration and Social Service 
Administration from the University of Chicago.   
 In 2004, Mayor Daley appointed Huberman as Executive Director of the Office of 
Emergency Management and Communication.  In 2005, Mayor Daley appointed 
Huberman to serve as his Chief of Staff.  In that role, Huberman implemented a system of 
performance management which accentuated results and accountability.  In 2007, 
Huberman was appointed as President of the Chicago Transit Authority before accepting 
the post of CPS CEO in 2009.  In February of 2009, Michael Scott returned to serve 
another stint as Board President, after Rufus Williams resigned.   
Performance Management 
 Upon taking the post of CEO, Huberman told teachers and administrators on a 
number of occasions that he was not a professional educator, nor would he attempt to 
figure out how to become one.  In meetings with administrators upon taking over as 
CEO, he explained that the overarching goal of the district is to aspire to be the best 
urban education system and to prepare Chicago’s students to compete locally, nationally 
and globally in the 21st century.  Efficient and effective management of the organization 
is the cornerstone of creating an effective learning environment according to Huberman.  
The framework for effective school management begins with building an infrastructure to 
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support a performance-based educational system that is focused on developing and 
incorporating 21st century world-class standards, he stated.   
 Before the beginning of the 2009-2010 school year, Huberman explained the 
performance management process to all CPS administrators, and how he planned to 
implement it.10  He explained that a culture of excellence is attainable at all levels when 
there is support for innovation, decision making is based on evidence, the organization is 
willing to face the brutal facts, there is a general belief that the organization could do 
better, and a process and the tools are in place to support those items.  He believes that 
those principles can work in a variety of different organizational settings, including the 
Chicago Public Schools.   
 Huberman’s goal is to employ a top to bottom performance management system 
that encompasses central office and schools.  His “top down bottom up” framework 
places executives at the top of the chain, then officers, then principals, and finally 
teachers.  Huberman, using principles from Jim Collins’s book Good to Great, stated that 
the right people need to be on the bus, the wrong people need to be off, and the right 
people need to be in the right seat in order for the organization to move in the right 
direction.  Though the performance management process, individuals in the organization 
are to focus on student achievement primarily, by utilizing real-time information to 
remain focused on outcomes, and efficiently use resources.   
 Huberman argues that although there is a plethora of data available, school 
leaders need organized data that is immediately usable.  Huberman has implemented a 
                                                            
10Ron Huberman, “The Future of CPS,” Powerpoint, August 20, 2009. 
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color system to help organize data into problem performance, average performance, 
and excellent performance.  To indicate the level of student performance, red indicates 
poor, yellow for average, and green for excellent.  Performance goals are broken down by 
student achievement, high school readiness, school climate, and staff quality and 
development.  Under each subcategory, there are several items that indicate how the 
school is performing, such as the percentage of students retained in grades 3, 6, and 8 for 
student achievement, the percentage of graduates enrolled in high school for high school 
readiness, the number of suspensions and expulsions per 100 students for school climate, 
and the percentages related to teacher attendance for staff quality and development.  The 
goals for each school are to perform in the “green” for all subcategories.   
 In order to improve performance, school teams must meet regularly to review 
data.  Upon reviewing data, teams are to address issues presented by the data, address 
previous action items, look at trends, remedy obstacles, and make decisions about future 
goals.  Performance management meetings feature the executive staff on one side of a 
large table, the department who is reviewing relevant data to the left of the executive 
staff, the support departments to the right of the executive staff, and relevant data is 
displayed in front of everyone.  On the area level (area district offices), the Chief Area 
Officers (CAO) are on one side, principals are to the left, support departments to the 
right, and data in front.  On the school level, the principal is on one side, the grade level 
team is to the left, support departments (reading and math coaches, technology team) is to 
the right, the data is in the front.  During the meetings, the executives present problematic 
data, and the review department answer questions related to the data.  The review 
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department must be prepared to explain why poor performance is taking place.  
Support departments can be called upon as well if a support service did not take place, or 
was ineffective.  The goal is to make decisions about improving student achievement 
based on data.  If a practice is deemed ineffective, it should end immediately.   
 To uncover the root of causes for poor performance, Huberman implemented a 
practice called “deep dive.”  Deep dives, much like peeling layers of an onion, he 
explained, is designed to look deeply into an issue to find the root of poor performance.  
To accomplish this, missing information is to be identified by answering five “why” 
questions.  Asking five “why” questions generally makes the respondent extremely 
uncomfortable, because it requires that the respondent thinks well beyond the surface 
regarding problem areas.  It can seem as if the respondent is being singled out.  However, 
in order to face the “brutal facts,” the deep dive is designed to ensure that the respondent 
is aware of all of the factors that are behind poor performance.   
 CEO Ron Huberman believes that school based performance management 
sessions will aid schools in using data to improve student outcomes.  In order for schools 
to conduct school based performance management, resources needed to be provided for 
schools.  Huberman noted that schools lag behind other industries in the use of 
technology, so to correct this, a school-by-school technology audit would be conducted 
and laptop carts as well as wireless technology would be allocated for all schools.  Also, 
central office provided funding for extended day meeting time and area offices received 
data coaches and analysts to support schools.   
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Suicide of Board President Michael Scott 
 In November of 2009, the body of Michael Scott was found with a single gunshot 
wound to the head along the North Branch of the Chicago River.  The Cook County 
medical examiner ruled it a suicide and the Chicago Police Department reported that 
Scott died of a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head.  Questions surfaced regarding 
how such a public man with no signs of depression would kill himself.  Scott is survived 
by his wife and their two children.   
Mayor Daley Announces That He Will Retire 
 On Tuesday, September 7th, Mayor Daley announced that he would not run for a 
seventh term.  Many speculated why the popular mayor decided to call it quits.  Daley 
stated:  
Its time, everybody is replaceable in life, no one is here forever.  I knew it 
was my time.  I was not afraid of any election…I don’t work on an 
election, I work on what to accomplish as an incumbent and I’ve done that 
for years.  You know like anything else, it’s time, it’s personal, there 
wasn’t one reason at all and it’s hard for people to understand that and this 
was the best kept secret in Chicago.11 
 
Daley’s announcement sent a shock throughout the city of Chicago.  CPS employees 
began to speculate about the future of CPS.  A little over a month after his announcement, 
local newspapers reported that CEO Ron Huberman planned to step down as CPS CEO 
before the 2010-2011 school year is over.  Huberman has since denied that he had such 
plans.  One thing is for certain: the future of CPS is uncertain.   
                                                            
11Stephanie Banchero and Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah, “Daley Stunner,” Chicago Tribune, 2007. 
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Researcher Opinion on the Effectiveness of CPS CEO Model 
An argument regarding the CEO model and its ability to produce positive student 
outcomes would not be fair without discussing student barriers to success.  An 
overwhelming majority of Chicago Public School students are born to families of a low 
socioeconomic status.  These families lack some or all of the financial, social, 
environmental and educational supports that children in families of a high socioeconomic 
status have.  Crnic and Lamberty discussed the impact of socioeconomic status on a 
child’s readiness for school:  
The segregating nature of social class, ethnicity, and race may well reduce 
the variety of enriching experiences thought to be prerequisite for creating 
readiness to learn among children.  Social class, ethnicity, and race entail a 
set of 'contextual givens' that dictate neighborhood, housing, and access to 
resources that affect enrichment or deprivation as well as the acquisition 
of specific value systems.12 
 
Parents may not have the ability to read or do simple math computations, which disallows 
them to help their children with their lessons.  Some parents are considered “homeless,” 
which means that they may live in a shelter, or they may live with other family members.  
The living quarters for some of those children are not conducive for the completion of 
homework assignments.  The living arrangements of homeless families often change, and 
with each change, the student is transferred to another school where he or she has to 
make new friends, meet new teachers, and make up for lost instructional time.  Parents 
may also lack information about childhood immunizations and proper nutrition.  Some 
students come to school after eating a bag of potato chips for breakfast.   
                                                            
12Keith Crnic and Gontran Lamberty, “Reconsidering School Readiness: Conceptual and Applied 
Perspectives,” Early Education and Development 5, no. 2 (1994): 99-105. 
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 CPS students of a low socioeconomic status may not have acquired the value 
systems that students of a higher socioeconomic status have.  Kalenberg argues that 
students need middle class environments more than higher per capita spending.  If this is 
true, then the improvement of schools is a social justice issue.  In order for all students to 
experience middle class environments, the families would need to adopt middle class 
values.  This proposition is a very complex one.  Elements of the CEO model are 
necessary when managing urban schools if there is not an emphasis on achieving social 
justice.  Social justice is not just a school issue, it is a societal issue.  Without the 
additional supports necessary to properly address social justice issues, the CPS CEO has 
to effectively manage a large bureaucracy which serves a highly disadvantaged 
population with limited resources.   
 To improve teaching and learning outcomes, leadership should aspire to transition 
from the bureaucratic and psychological sources of authority to the professional and 
moral sources of authority.  While the bureaucratic source of authority is effective in 
establishing hierarchy, rules and regulations, communicating mandates and outlining role 
expectations, it is ineffective in inspiring the kind of commitment that is necessary of 
teachers to counteract the barriers that exist for students of low socioeconomic status.  
With limited resources, the district cannot pay teachers for all the time that is spent 
working with students before and after hours.  After 15 years of bureaucratic decision-
making and the fear of school closure as a motivational tool, the data shows that CPS 
students are rarely successful after high school.  Teachers and administrators, with the 
threat of losing their jobs, are still struggling to close the achievement gap.   
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The CEO model has brought about a sense of accountability that has not been 
experienced in the past in the CPS district.  However, until social justice is achieved, CPS 
teachers will need to perform above and beyond the call of duty in order to help bridge 
the achievement gap.  To inspire individuals to perform at that level, motivational 
techniques must advance past the “comply or face consequences” level.  Sergiovanni 
argues that if we were to add professional and moral authority as primary sources of 
authority to the others, then what people follow, and why they are to follow it would 
change.13  Based on the current CEO model, what teachers follow are bureaucratic 
mandates from central office and the area office.  The answer to why they follow them is 
“because the CEO said so” (fear of losing job, school closure).  If people are to be 
inspired to a level of deep commitment that is necessary for the production of positive 
student outcomes, then the “what” and the “why” needs to change.  According to 
Sergiovanni, adding the professional and moral sources of authority means that people 
follow shared values and beliefs that define us as a community, and it is done because it 
is morally right to do so.  In this instance, who is followed, changes from the CEO 
(management) to the individual members of the collective community.  
                                                            
13Sergiovanni, 32. 
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